The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads by Bradley, Michael et al.
BRADLEY_ETAL.FMT6 02/28/00 2:41 PM
THE PURPOSES AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF THE CORPORATION IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AT A
CROSSROADS
MICHAEL BRADLEY,* CINDY A. SCHIPANI,** ANANT K. SUNDARAM,*** AND
JAMES P. WALSH****
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction......................................................................................................10
II. Changes in the Conduct of the Business Enterprise ...................................14
A. A Portrait of Change................................................................................14
1. Changes in the Nature of Work ........................................................15
2. Changes in the Capital Market .........................................................17
3. Changes in Product-Market Competition .......................................19
4. Changes in Organizational Forms ....................................................22
5. Changes in the Regulatory Environment ........................................24
B. The Implications of Change for Corporate Governance.....................29
III. Contemporary Corporate Governance Scholarship....................................33
A. Theories of Corporate Governance .......................................................33
1. Contractarianism ................................................................................35
a. Contractarianism Defined ...........................................................35
b. Implications of the Contractarian View.....................................36
c. A Critique of Contractarianism ..................................................38
2. Communitarianism.............................................................................41
a. Communitarianism Defined........................................................41
b. Implications of the Communitarian View .................................44
c. A Critique of Communitarianism...............................................45
                                                          
Copyright  2000 by Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram, and James P. Walsh
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/62LCPBradley.
* F.M. Kirby Professor of Investment Banking, Fuqua School of Business and Professor of Law,
Duke University.
** Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan Business School.
*** Associate Professor of Finance, Thunderbird, the American Graduate School of International
Management.
**** Gerald & Esther Carey Professor of Business Administration, University of Michigan Business
School.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research support of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and
their respective institutions, the comments by Thomas Dunfee, Michael O’Hara, Douglas Park, and
Gail Pesyna on an earlier version of this manuscript, and the valuable research assistance of Jet Vin-
cent Arnaez, Brian Broughman, and Rachel Tausend.
BRADLEY_ETAL.FMT6 02/28/00  2:41 PM
10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 3
B. Toward a Practical Resolution: American Law Institute Section
2.01 and Beyond .......................................................................................47
C. Corporate Governance in a Comparative Setting................................50
1. The German Corporate Governance System .................................52
2. The Japanese Corporate Governance System ................................56
3. Assessment of the German and Japanese Governance
Systems.................................................................................................61
a. A Critique of German and Japanese Governance ...................64
b. Changes in the Governance Systems..........................................67
IV. The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation ................................77
V. Voids at the Intersection of Sovereign Boundaries.....................................79
VI. Conclusion ........................................................................................................85
I
INTRODUCTION
Change is ubiquitous in contemporary society, and nowhere more so than in
the operations of the large-scale, public corporation.  Dramatic changes are un-
derway, not only in the structure of corporate activity in areas such as the na-
ture of work and the nature of organizational form, but also in the product and
financial markets and the regulatory environment within which corporations
operate.
The depth and rapidity of these changes compel a reassessment of the abil-
ity of various governance structures to cope and adapt.  The consequences of
these changes for governance have taken on an even greater sense of urgency
in light of the transformations that have taken place in Eastern and Central
Europe with the demise of the Soviet Union and with the economic convulsions
of 1997 and 1998 in Southeast Asia.  These events have brought into focus the
nature of governance practices in those economies.  The epic battle between
capitalism and communism has largely been resolved in favor of capitalism—at
least for the foreseeable future.  Similarly, the reform questions in Southeast
Asia are increasingly centered on the transition from one form of capitalism to
another.  Academics, practitioners, and policymakers, however, have an am-
biguous vision of the type of capitalism that would best serve the economic and
political order emerging in these parts of the world.  The particular form of
capitalism that ultimately will develop is substantially predicated on the institu-
tions that will arise from this social upheaval and the organizational structures
that will evolve for the provision of goods and services.  Understanding this
process will require not only an understanding of the nature of the changes that
are underway, but also a reassessment of the paradigms of corporate govern-
ance and their ability to inform, respond to, and even shape such change.
Traditionally, the phrase “corporate governance” invokes a narrow consid-
eration of the relationships between the firm’s capital providers and top man-
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agers, as mediated by its board of directors.1  For example, Andrei Shleifer and
Robert W. Vishny define corporate governance as the process that “deals with
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of get-
ting a return on their investment.”2  But corporate governance is more than
simply the relationship between the firm and its capital providers.  Corporate
governance also implicates how the various constituencies that define the busi-
ness enterprise serve, and are served by, the corporation.  Implicit and explicit
relationships between the corporation and its employees, creditors, suppliers,
customers, host communities—and relationships among these constituencies
themselves—fall within the ambit of a relevant definition of corporate govern-
ance.  As such, the phrase calls into scrutiny not only the definition of the cor-
porate form, but also its purposes and its accountability to each of the relevant
constituencies.  A basic goal of this article is to examine the changing nature of
the business enterprise and its implications for the theory and practice of cor-
porate governance across the range of corporate constituencies.
The academic literature in law, economics, finance, strategy, and manage-
ment presumes that governance problems are largely a result of the “agency”
problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control in the large-
scale, public corporation.  Perhaps the best example of this perspective is the
famous article by Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling,3 which, building
upon the earlier works of Ronald Coase,4 Oliver E. Williamson,5 and Armen A.
Alchian and Harold Demsetz,6 posits that the incentives of corporate managers
to maximize shareholder value are proportional to the fraction of the firm’s
shares they hold in their personal portfolios.  This narrow and limited view of
the governance problem, one that focuses on just the relation between the firm
and its capital providers, has become so dominant in the literature that it is al-
most automatically accepted.7
Empirical work testing this hypothesis typically involves a cross-sectional
analysis in which the fraction of shares held by insiders is used as an independ-
ent variable to explain a number of performance measures—stock returns, re-
turn on investment, and accounting earnings—and firm characteristics—
                                                          
1. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991 & Supp.); Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Governance:
Some Theory and Implications, 105 ECON. J. 678 (1995).
2. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 737
(1997).
3. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 305-11, 343-51 (1976).
4. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (defining the firm).
5. See generally OLLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR:
MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964) (discussing managerial discretion and
its relationship to a theory of the firm).
6. See generally Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (discussing the team productive process as moti-
vating organization into a firm).
7. Shleifer and Vishny readily admit that their “perspective on corporate governance is a
straightforward agency perspective, sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and control.”
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 2, at 738.
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diversification, size, and risk.  Much of this work in the fields of law, economics,
and finance is masterfully summarized by Shleifer and Vishny,8 and need not be
repeated here.  Related work is found in the organization theory and strategy
literatures as well.9  Other academic research attempts to link the nature and
structure of managerial compensation to firm performance.  The underlying
premise is that stock-based compensation packages provide managers with
greater incentives to maximize shareholder value.10
Jensen extends the agency-cost theory to argue that managerial malfea-
sance is positively related to the amount of free cash flows that managers have
at their disposal.11  Empirical tests of this theory typically use measures of free
cash flow as an independent variable in cross-sectional analyses of firm per-
formance.12  Likewise, there is an expanding literature that attempts to link the
composition of the board of directors to firm performance.  The underlying
thesis is that outside directors are better, more objective monitors of manage-
rial behavior, and, therefore, firms with greater outside representation on the
board are run more in the interest of the firm’s stockholders and less in the in-
terest of self-serving managers.13
                                                          
8. See id.; Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public
Corporations, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1989); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corpo-
rate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985); Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph
A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth, Profitability, and Ownership Structure, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 347 (1988); John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership
and Corporate Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595 (1990); Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and
Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988); René M. Stulz, Managerial
Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25
(1988).
9. See, e.g., Rajeswararao Chaganti & Fariborz Damanpour, Institutional Ownership, Capital
Structure, and Firm Performance, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 479 (1991); Gary S. Hansen & Charles
W.L. Hill, Are Institutional Investors Myopic? A Time-Series Study of Four Technology-Driven Indus-
tries, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1 (1991); Charles W.L. Hill & Scott A. Snell, Effects of Ownership
Structure and Control on Corporate Productivity, 32 ACAD. MGMT. J. 25 (1989).
10. Important studies on the relation between the pay and performance of corporate managers
include the following: KEVIN J. MURPHY, 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 70 (1999); Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225
(1990); Kevin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analy-
sis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 11 (1985); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the
Acquisition Process, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 7; David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock
Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449 (1997).  Related studies in the
management literature discuss the relationship between managerial control and executive compensa-
tion.  See, e.g., Randolph P. Beatty & Edward J. Zajac, Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk
Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offer-
ings, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 313 (1994); Donald C. Hambrick & Sydney Finkelstein, The Effects of Owner-
ship Structure on Conditions at the Top: The Case of CEO Pay Raises, 16 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175
(1995); Richard A. Lambert et al., Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive Compensation, 29 J.
ACCT. RES. 129 (1991); Henry Tosi, Jr. & Luis R. Gomez-Mejia, CEO Compensation Monitoring and
Firm Performance, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1002 (1994).
11. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76
AM. ECON. REV., May 1986, at 323; Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse on the Public Corporation, 67 HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 60, 66.
12. See, e.g., Larry H.P. Lang et al., A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder
Returns, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 315 (1991).
13. See generally the following articles relating to this thesis: James F. Cotter et al., Do Independ-
ent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (1997);
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There is also an extensive literature involving the relation between corpo-
rate governance structures—including insider ownership, managerial compen-
sation, and board composition—and such corporate events as mergers, hostile
takeovers, divestitures, and bankruptcies, as well as changes in the firm’s capi-
tal structure, dividend policy, and investment strategy.14  Numerous studies ex-
amine the relations between governance structures and changes in the legal en-
vironment including changes in the tax code, state and federal statutes, and
judicial decisions.15
Recently, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer,
and Robert W. Vishny have taken the cross-sectional analysis of governance
structures to a new level.16  Extending the analysis beyond the firm, they relate
country-specific variables, essentially the degree to which stockholders’ rights
are defined and protected by law, to the relative size of the external equity
market in that country.17  Not surprisingly, they find a positive relation between
shareholder protections and the size of the country’s external capital market.18
However, while cross-sectional studies provide important insights into the rela-
tive efficiency of different governance structures at a point in time, they shed
little or no light on how governance structures evolve through time.  Little at-
                                                          
Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,
48 J. FIN. 831, 864-65 (1993); Idalene F. Kesner, Directors’ Characteristics and Committee Membership:
An Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 66 (1988) (arguing that
low outside director representation on key committees negatively affects stockholder representation);
April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998); Laura
Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evi-
dence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898 (1996); Mark S. Mizruchi & Linda Brewster Stearns, A Longitudinal
Study of Borrowing by Large American Corporations, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 118, 123-24 (1994); Michael
C. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 433-35 (1988); Shaker A.
Zahra & John A. Pearce II, Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and
Integrative Model, 15 J. MGMT. 291 (1989); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, Board Independence and
Long-Term Firm Performance (University of Colorado and Columbia Law School Working Paper,
1996).  Interestingly, a recent meta-analysis of 54 studies of the relationship between board corpora-
tion and financial performance found little evidence for such a tie.  See Dan R. Dalton et al., Meta-
Analytic Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance, 19
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269 (1998) (arguing that there is very little evidence that board composition and
firm performance are related).
14. See the following literature analyzing this relationship: Catherine M. Daily, The Relationship
Between Board Composition and Leadership Structure and Bankruptcy Reorganization Outcomes, 21 J.
MGMT. 1041 (1995); Wilber Lewellen et al., Merger Decisions and Executive Stock Ownership in Ac-
quiring Firms, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 209 (1985); Anil Shivdasani, Board Composition, Ownership
Structure, and Hostile Takeovers, 16 J. ACCT. & ECON. 167 (1993).  See generally the following articles
dealing with corporate governance structures and corporate events: Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863 (1991); James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207 (1988); Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance
in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155 (1990).  For cases dealing with corporate
governance structures and corporate events, see generally Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition
Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), and Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
15. See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A
PLANNING APPROACH (1992); Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of
Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1989).
16. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
17. See id. at 1132.
18. See id. at 1149-50.
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tention has been paid to how the governance structures of public corporations
adapt to structural changes in the social, political, economic, and legal envi-
ronments in which they operate.19  This article attempts to begin to fill this void.
Specifically, this article has four purposes: (1) to chronicle the recent
changes in the conduct of the business enterprise; (2) to review and critique
four broad responses to these changes, as found in both the theories and the
practice of corporate governance; (3) to establish the necessary conditions for a
system of corporate governance capable of accommodating these changes; and
(4) to articulate an agenda for research, policy, and practice in light of our view
of the purposes and the accountability of the corporation.  To this last point, af-
ter careful analysis, we conclude that the Anglo-American governance system,
born of the contractarian paradigm, is the most flexible and effective system
available.  Notwithstanding its idiosyncratic historical origins and its limita-
tions, it is clearly emerging as the world’s standard.  Therefore, it is very impor-
tant to understand its limitations.  These limitations are of two types.  First, it is
necessary to understand and address the problems that hinder the system’s effi-
ciency.  A worldwide contractarian infrastructure that establishes exacting dis-
closure rules, a coherent body of contract law, and an independent judiciary is
as essential as it is unlikely.  Therefore, understanding how to hold firms ac-
countable absent such an infrastructure is one of the most pressing contempo-
rary governance challenges.  A worldwide market for corporate control holds
promise for some discipline in this emerging system.  The second set of limita-
tions are limitations on the Anglo-American system itself.  Problems of eco-
nomic efficiency and social welfare rooted in the limitations of incomplete con-
tracting, negative externalities, and abuses of power can be explained, but not
explained away.  Solutions to these problems are particularly elusive.
II
CHANGES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
A. A Portrait of Change
Dramatic transformations are underway in at least five crucial areas that
characterize the internal organization and external environment of the public
corporation: (1) the nature of work; (2) the capital market; (3) product-market
competition; (4) organizational forms; and (5) regulatory environment.
                                                          
19. Of course the notable exception is the recent work in the legal literature pertaining to the
evolution of financial institutions and the role of path dependencies.  Mark Roe’s account of the evolu-
tion of corporate governance in the United States is clearly a time-series perspective.  See generally
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).  Moreover, those who believe that social rigidities in certain countries
preclude any opportunity for meaningful changes in corporate governance also rely on a time-
dependency argument.  For an analysis of the Japanese corporate system, see, for example, Ronald J.
Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance
and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993).
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1. Changes in the Nature of Work.  The development of information,
communication, and automation technologies has fundamentally changed the
nature of work inherited from the eighteenth century beginnings of the
Industrial Revolution.20  Peter F. Drucker and Jeremy Rifkin identify the
period starting soon after World War II as the turning point.21  Five key
differences in the nature of work appear to define these changes:
(1) Whereas land, labor, and capital were once the key factors of produc-
tion in a system where profits resided in manufacturing volume, today
knowledge is the key factor of production in value creation;22
(2) Whereas workers used to serve machines and capital, today machines
and capital serve workers (that is, technology that used to amplify our mus-
cles today amplifies our intellect);23
(3) Whereas specialization, standardization, and mechanization provided
the logic for industrial work, today problem-identifying, problem-solving,
and strategic-brokering provide the logic for knowledge-based work;24
(4) Whereas workers were historically selected for their skills of exertion,
dexterity, and endurance, today skills of perception, attentiveness, and deci-
sionmaking are valued;25 and
(5) Whereas formal education was largely seen as irrelevant to the activity
of wealth accumulation, today human capital investments in formal educa-
tion are seen as a key to accumulating wealth.26
As specialized human capital becomes more central and critical to the pro-
duction process, individuals with such capital become more powerful in the or-
                                                          
20. Much has been written about these changes.  For an excellent summary of this argument, see
CATHERINE CASEY, WORK, SELF AND SOCIETY 26-49 (1995).  PETER F. DRUCKER, POST-
CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1993), and ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991), popularized
consideration of these changes.  See also WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE
MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997) (discussing globalization); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE END
OF WORK: THE DECLINE OF THE GLOBAL LABOR FORCE AND THE DAWN OF THE POST-MARKET
ERA (1995) (examining how work has changed in the past fifty years); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE
AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER (1988) (discussing technological
changes).
21. DRUCKER, supra note 20 at 3, 19-47; RIFKIN, supra note 20, at 60.
22. See DRUCKER, supra note 20, at 44-45 (noting that land, labor, and capital are now seen as
constraints).
23. See id. at 64-65.  Drucker points out that a computer, ultrasound machine, or radio telescope is
unproductive without a knowledgeable employee putting it to use.  See id. at 65.  He concludes that
“capital now serves the employee, where under Capitalism the employee served capital.”  Id. at 67.
24. See CASEY, supra note 20, at 26 (reviewing how specialization, standardization, and mechani-
zation were the fundamental processes of industrial work); REICH, supra note 20, at 171-84 (discussing
how identifying, solving, and brokering problems define the nature of work in the new, emerging
economy).
25. See CASEY, supra note 20, at 37.
26. See DRUCKER, supra note 20, at 40-42.  Drucker points out that of all the very successful 19th
century American capitalists, only one went to college—J.P. Morgan—and he dropped out after one
year.  See id. at 41.  “Higher education was considered a luxury, an ornament, and a pleasant way to
spend one’s early adulthood.”  Id. at 41.  Reich, however, argues that notwithstanding the importance
of education to wealth accumulation today, only 15 to 20% of American children are prepared for
what he calls symbolic-analytic work.  See REICH, supra note 20, at 227.
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ganization.27  Importantly, these individuals are also much more difficult to
monitor and control.  William G. Ouchi notes that when the outcomes of a per-
son’s work are difficult to measure and when the means to this end are difficult
to prescribe, then typical approaches to control are problematic.28  Outcome
controls, such as writing contracts that reward the successful performance of
some tasks, and behavioral controls, which include closely supervising individu-
als to ensure that their work is done properly, do not work well in these circum-
stances.  Rather, Ouchi argues that clan control, or what might be called cul-
tural control, is necessary in these situations.29  Therefore, absent prescribed
means and measurable ends, the firm must work to ensure that the goals and
values of the individual are consonant with the goals and values of the firm.
Firm-interests and self-interest must be aligned.30
However, cultural control is problematic in the best of times,31 and scholars
have pointed out that this kind of hegomonic control insidiously robs individu-
als of their humanity.32  John Van Maannen and Gideon Kunda’s work, for ex-
ample, traces the evolution in the various approaches to the control of indi-
viduals in organizations and concludes by worrying about the “social
molestation” that marks such contemporary approaches to control.33
The problem is that these are not necessarily the best of times.34  The corpo-
                                                          
27. See JEFFREY PFEFFER, POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS 99-115 (1981) (discussing how depend-
ence, providing resources, coping with uncertainty, and becoming irreplaceable all work to create
power in organizations).
28. See William G. Ouchi, A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control
Mechanisms, 25 MGMT. SCI. 833 (1979).
29. See id.
30. Trade books instruct managers on how to build such cultures.  See, e.g., TERRENCE E. DEAL &
ALLAN A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES AND RITUALS OF CORPORATE LIFE
(1982); WILLIAM G. OUCHI, THEORY Z (1981).  See also Stephen R. Barley et al., Cultures of Culture:
Academics, Practitioners and the Pragmatics of Normative Control, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 24 (1988)
(tracing the evolution of this corporate culture movement); Charles O’Reilly, Corporations, Culture
and Commitment: Motivation and Social Control in Organizations, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1989,
at 9 (discussing, in a practice-oriented journal, how to manage culture to this same end).
31. Gideon Kunda’s rich case study reveals how difficult it is to control employees using this cul-
tural approach.  See generally GIDEON KUNDA, ENGINEERING CULTURE: CULTURE AND COM-
MITMENT IN A HIGH-TECH CORPORATION (1992).
32. See, e.g., Hugh Willmott, Strength Is Ignorance; Slavery Is Freedom: Managing Culture in Mod-
ern Organizations, 30 J. MGMT. STUD. 515 (1993).
33. John Van Maannen & Gideon Kunda “Real Feelings”: Emotional Expression and Organiza-
tional Culture, RES. ORG. BEHAV. 43, 92 (1989).
34. This characterization may surprise those who think of “good times” in purely economic terms.
Yes, a portion of the American population has benefited quite handsomely from the recent economic
expansion, but a sizable portion of the American population has not benefited much at all from this
new wealth creation.  Recent empirical work has documented the rising wage inequality in the United
States.  See C. Juhn et. al., Wage Inequality and Rise in Returns to Skill, 101 J. POL. ECON. 410-42
(1993) (examining the 1963 to 1989 time period); Lawrence F. Katz, Technological Change, Comput-
erization, and the Wage Structure (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Harvard University
and the National Bureau of Economic Research) (examining the 1940 to 1998 time period).  We do not
mean to quibble about the distribution of these economic gains, rather we want to raise the issue con-
cerning the nature of managerial life in these turbulent times.
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rate downsizings with their accompanying layoffs and dismissals35—born of a
need to address overcapacity problems rooted in part in the technological im-
provements associated with these changes in the nature of work36—have un-
nerved a generation of managers.37  Firm interests have been at odds with at
least some individuals’ self-interest in this period,38 prompting observers to ad-
vise employees to resist attempts to become dependent on any one firm and in-
stead to become “Free Agent Manager[s].”39  Others comment on the rise of
cynicism.40  All in all, the changes in the nature of work have rendered control
in organizations problematic.41
2. Changes in the Capital Market.  The capital market environment also has
changed dramatically in the past twenty to thirty years.  Merton H. Miller
colorfully captures this phenomenon:
The wonderment of Rip Van Winkle, awakening after his sleep of 20 years to a
changed world, would pale in comparison to that felt by one of his descendants in the
banking or financial services industry falling asleep (presumably at his desk) in 1970
and waking two decades later.  So rapid has been the pace of innovation in financial
instruments and institutions over the last 20 years that nothing could have prepared
him to understand such now commonplace notions as swaps and swaptions, index fu-
tures, program trading, butterfly spreads, puttable bonds, Eurobonds, collateralized-
mortgage bonds, zero-coupon bonds, portfolio insurance, or synthetic cash—to name
just a few of the more exotic ones.  No 20-year period has witnessed such a burst of
innovative activity.42
Three broad areas of change stand out when considering the innovations in
financial instruments and institutions: (a) the emergence of an international
capital market; (b) the rise of the institutional investor; and (c) the unprece-
dented proliferation of financial products.43
                                                          
35. See generally THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE NEW YORK TIMES SPECIAL REPORT: THE
DOWNSIZING OF AMERICA (1996).
36. See generally Jensen, supra note 13.
37. See James P. Walsh, Managers Under Siege: Corporate Control Contests and Management
Turnover, in HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS STRATEGY §§ 15.1-.15 (Harold E. Glass ed., 2d ed. 1991).
38. See generally Andrei Shliefer & Laurence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers,
in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-67 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988)
(discussing how firms can benefit from reneging on promises to their employees).  Others question
whether firms and employee interests have ever been completely aligned.  See, e.g., Marleen A.
O’Conner, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capital-
ism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345 (1997) (discussing strategies that labor might employ to meet their
needs in the contemporary economic environment).
39. PAUL HIRSCH, PACK YOUR OWN PARACHUTE: HOW TO SURVIVE MERGERS, TAKEOVERS,
AND OTHER CORPORATE DISASTERS 119 (1987).
40. See generally DONALD L. KANTER & PHILIP H. MIRVIS, THE CYNICAL AMERICANS: LIVING
AND WORKING IN AN AGE OF DISCONTENT AND DISILLUSION (1989); James W. Dean, Jr. et al., Note,
Organizational Cynicism, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 341 (1998).
41. Azizah Y. al-Hibri’s vision of corporate democracy as a necessary complement to the changes
that define the information age is a fine example of how scholars are trying to come to terms with
these problematic control issues.  See Azizah Y. al-Hibri, The American Corporation in the Twenty-
First Century: Future Forms of Structure and Governance, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1399, 1438 (1997).
42. Merton H. Miller, Financial Innovation: Achievements and Prospects, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Winter 1992, at 4.
43. See, e.g., id. (discussing these broad areas).
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The most profound change in the capital market over the past two decades
has been its transformation from a conglomeration of regionally and nationally
segmented markets into one integrated, international market.  For example, in
1970, the total amount of debt and equity traded between U.S. residents and
nonresidents was less than three percent of gross domestic product (“GDP”).44
In 1997, the figure was more than 213%.45  International trade of stocks and
bonds in Japan rose from less than two percent of GDP in 1975 to almost
ninety-six percent in 1997.46  In the United Kingdom, the international trading
of securities amounted to almost 700% of that country’s gross domestic product
in 1990.47  The implication of the emergence of a global capital market is that
neither investors nor firms are constrained by their national borders to invest in
or issue financial securities.  Data from the Bank for International Settlements
report end-of-year net stocks for international bond financing at $2.21 trillion
in 1995, up from $700 billion in 1986.48  Annual volume of international bond
issues averaged more than $350 billion during the period 1990 to 1995.49  Cross-
border trade in equities grew at a rate of about twenty-eight percent per year
from 1980 to 1990, and annual volumes now approach $1.5 trillion per year.50
The second major change in the capital market over the past twenty years
has been the rise of the institutional investor.  In 1977, there were only 427 reg-
istered, public mutual funds in the United States, representing a total of forty-
five billion dollars and only 8.5 million shareholders (separate accounts).  By
1996, there were 5,305 registered mutual funds representing $2.6 trillion and
almost 120 million separate accounts.51  Institutional investors hold slightly less
than fifty percent of the outstanding equity of all U.S. corporations,52 but even
more impressively, account for more than eighty percent all shares traded.53
Between 1980 and 1996, pension fund assets in the United States have grown
from $873 billion to $5.9 trillion.54  The percentage of U.S. equity held by pen-
sion funds expanded from nine percent in 1970 to almost twenty-four percent in
1997.55
                                                          
44. See 1992 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS ANN. REP. 193 [hereinafter 1992 BIS REPORT]; see
also Anant K. Sundaram, International Financial Markets, in HANDBOOK OF MODERN FINANCE §§
F3.01-.02 (Dennis E. Logue ed., 1994).
45. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DE-
VELOPMENTS, PROSPECTS, AND KEY POLICY ISSUES, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS,
187 (1998).
46. See id.
47. See 1992 BIS REPORT, supra note 44, at 194.
48. See 1996 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS ANN. REP. 122.
49. See id.
50. See Sundaram, supra note 44, at 63-64.
51. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK (37th ed. 1997).
52. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 524 tbl.808 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 ABSTRACT].
53. See Stephen L. Nesbitt, Long-Term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A Study of the
“calPERS Effect,” J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1994, at 75.
54. See 1997 ABSTRACT, supra note 52, at 531.
55. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE PUBLIC RELATIONS & MARKETING DIVISION, NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 62 (1997).
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The third major change that has occurred in the capital market is the prolif-
eration of financial products.  John D. Finnerty identifies sixty major innova-
tions in securities offered by corporations between just 1973 and 1991, and
many more have been added since then.56  He lists a number of factors that led
to the development of these new financial products:  risk reallocation; en-
hanced liquidity; the reduction in agency costs, transactions costs, and taxes;
and the circumvention of regulatory restrictions.57  Almost forty of these inno-
vations involve debt instruments, including adjustable rate notes, bonds linked
to commodity prices, collateralized mortgage obligations, commercial real es-
tate-backed bonds, credit card receivable-backed bonds, global bonds, pay-in-
kind debentures, puttable bonds, stripped mortgage-backed securities, and
variable coupon renewable notes.58  Innovations in the equity market include
callable common stock, supershares, and unbundled stock units.59  Important
innovations since 1992 include targeted stock and other forms of project-based
financing.60
Perhaps the most significant innovation in financial products, however, has
been in the area of derivative securities.  As the name implies, the payoffs to
these securities are determined by or derived from the payoffs to other, pri-
mary assets.  The estimated total value of the derivatives market as of June
1998 was seventy trillion dollars.61  In general, these innovations in financial in-
struments represent a change from the generic and standardized to the specific
and customized, while, simultaneously, the institutional context of financial
markets is becoming more homogenous worldwide.
3. Changes in Product-Market Competition.  Corporate product-market
globalization (that is, the process by which corporate product-market activity
becomes worldwide in scope) is no longer news.  However, what is less well
known is the extent and recent acceleration of the phenomenon.  Recent data
from the United Nations reveal that, as of 1996, there were nearly 44,000
multinational enterprises (“MNEs”) worldwide with nearly 280,000 affiliates,
and assets of about $8.4 trillion.62  The industrialized world accounted for about
36,000, or about eighty-two percent, of these MNEs, a number that grew by
more than 29,000 (that is, more than 400%) since the end of the 1960s.63
                                                          
56. See John D. Finnerty, An Overview of Corporate Securities Innovation, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Winter 1992, at 23, 24, 29-32.
57. See id. at 24.
58. See id. at 29-32.
59. See id. at 38.
60. See generally Dennis E. Logue et al., Rearranging Residual Claims: A Case for Targeted Stock,
FIN. MGMT., Spring 1996, at 43.
61. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, INT’L BANKING FIN. MKT. DEV. 31 (Mar. 1999).
62. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY at 3-7, U.N.
Sales No. E.97.11.D.10 (1997) (the term “MNEs” is interchangeable with the term “transnational cor-
porations” (“TNC”)).
63. See id. at 6-7.  The data on MNE growth is derived from a 1994 report of the United Nations
which states that there were approximately 7,000 MNEs in the late 1960s.  See U.N. CONFERENCE ON
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Table 1 provides an evolutionary look at the globalization of the U.S. econ-
omy along two indicators:  foreign trade as a proportion of U.S. gross national
product (“GNP”) and inward and outward direct foreign investment (“DFI”)
as a proportion of U.S. GNP.64
TABLE 1
ROLE OF EXPORTS, IMPORTS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INTO THE
UNITED STATES (FDIUS), AND U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD (USDIA)
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: 1950-1994
Year Exports as
% GNP
Imports as
% GNP
Exports +
Imports as
% GNP
FDIUS as
% GNP
USDIA as
% GNP
FDIUS +
USDIA as
% GNP
1950 4.29 4.04 8.33 1.18 4.11 5.30
1960 4.93 4.44 9.37 1.34 6.21 7.56
1970 5.64 5.52 11.16 1.34 7.74 9.07
1980 10.31 10.85 21.16 3.06 7.95 11.02
1990 10.04 11.33 21.38 7.12 7.76 14.88
1994 10.67 12.12 22.79 7.49 9.08 16.50
Source: BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 287 tbls.337-38, 885 tbl.1096 (1955); HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, A U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT SUPPLEMENT
139 tbl.F1-5, 537 tbl.U1-14, 565 tbls.U193-206 (1960); BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 380-81 tbls.614 and 616, 798-
99 tbl.1342-44 (1975); BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 432 tbl.715, 802 tbl.1426, 803 tbl.1428 (1985); BUREAU
OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 451
tbl.699, 809 tbl.1329 (1995).
In 1950, exports and imports accounted for about eight percent of U.S.
GNP; by 1994, this figure had risen to twenty-three percent.65  Similarly, in
1950, inward and outward DFI accounted for 5.3% of U.S. GNP; by 1994, it was
                                                          
TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1994: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
EMPLOYMENT AND THE WORKPLACE at xxi, U.N. Sales No. E.94.II.A.14 (1994).
64. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 287 tbl.337-38, 885 tbl.1096 (1955); HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES:
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, A U.S. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT SUPPLEMENT 139 tbl.F1-5, 537 tbl.U1-14,
565 tbls.U193-206 (1960); BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 380-81 tbls.614 and 616, 798-99 tbl.1342-44 (1975); BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 432 tbl.715, 802 tbl.1426, 803
tbl.1428 (1985); BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 451 tbl.699, 809 tbl.1329 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 ABSTRACT].
65. See 1995 ABSTRACT, supra note 64, at 451 tbl.699.
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more than 16.5%.66  Given that MNEs account for a sizable proportion of for-
eign trade in the United States and nearly one hundred percent of DFI, these
two statistics taken together reveal a substantial increase in the role of MNEs
in U.S. product markets.
Considering detailed data for the United States in 1996, more than eighty-
eight percent of U.S. non-bank corporate assets were accounted for by firms
defined as (U.S. non-bank) MNEs by the U.S. Department of Commerce.67
These firms held twenty-eight percent of these assets, derived thirty-three per-
cent of their sales, and located twenty-nine percent of their employees abroad.68
Another indication of the MNE presence in the U.S. economy is in the area of
international trade.  In 1996, U.S. MNEs accounted for sixty-five percent of all
U.S. exports of goods and services, while U.S. operations of foreign MNEs ac-
counted for another twenty-two percent; U.S. MNEs accounted for forty per-
cent of all U.S. imports of goods and services, and U.S. operations of foreign
MNEs thirty-two percent.69  Thus, MNEs accounted for eighty-seven percent of
all exports and seventy-two percent of all imports in the U.S. economy.
The volume of both cross-border mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) and
strategic alliances—two of the important means by which firms implement their
product market globalization strategies—saw impressive increases during the
last two decades.  According to figures released by the United Nations, the pe-
riod 1990 to 1997 alone witnessed nearly $1.6 trillion in cross-border mergers
and acquisitions;70 approximately ten percent of all U.S. M&A activity from
1985 to 1994 took place across borders, and approximately twenty percent of all
non-U.S. M&A activity involved foreign firms merging with or acquiring U.S.
firms.71  The period 1980 to 1989 saw nearly 700 cross-border strategic alliances
in the information technology industry, 280 in biotechnology, 140 in new mate-
rials, and more than eighty in the automotive sector.72
The data above provide only partial evidence of the importance and recent
acceleration of corporate globalization.  There are other less measurable and
less tangible, but equally important, aspects of globalization that have under-
                                                          
66. See id. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 788 tbl.1288, 791 tbl.1293 (1996).
67. In 1996, U.S. non-bank MNEs had $10.88 trillion in assets (data includes the asset base of the
foreign affiliates of the U.S. parent company).  See Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr., U.S. Multinational Com-
panies: Operations in 1996, SURV. CURRENT BUS., Sept. 1998 , at 31, 66 tbl.17.2, 67 tbl.18.  Total assets
in 1996 of all non-bank U.S. corporations were $12.28 trillion.  See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STA-
TISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 544 tbl.862 (1998).
68. U.S. MNEs had $10.88 trillion in assets, with $3.075 trillion located abroad; $6.73 trillion in
sales, with $2.23 trillion abroad; 26.39 million employees, with 7.62 million located abroad.  See Mata-
loni, Jr., supra note 67, at 66-67.
69. See id. at 37 n.6, 49, 52.
70. See U.N. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998: TRENDS AND DETERMINANTS, UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT at 413 annex tbl.B7, U.N. Sales No.
E.98II.D.5 (1998).
71. See Cross-Border M & A, MERGERS & ACQUISITION, May-June 1995, at 61.
72. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MULTINATIONALS AND THE NATIONAL IN-
TEREST: PLAYING BY DIFFERENT RULES 71 (Sept. 1993).
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gone dramatic change in the past few decades.  The source of competition for
firms in many important sectors of the economy is de facto global.  Examples of
such industries include automobiles, commercial aircraft, semiconductors, ship-
ping, electronics, telecommunications, chemicals, xerography, pharmaceuticals,
and publishing.73  Firms must respond to product-market moves that their for-
eign competitors make, whether such moves are through the technologies,
products, and markets they develop, their manufacturing processes, their prod-
uct quality, or their pricing decisions.  The competitive impact of factors like
these is impossible to measure.  Equally difficult to measure are other intangi-
ble aspects of globalization such as the stimulating macroeconomic effects of
investments from abroad; the managerial and organizational innovations (for
example, just-in-time, lean production, decisionmaking styles) that are trans-
ferred across borders; the positive spillover effects of global competition that
keep firms on their toes in both product and process innovation, productivity,
and quality; and the pressure to upgrade and diversify job skills in this new
economy.74
While this portrait of contemporary MNE activity is impressive for its
reach, its effect on an understanding of governance is made all the more chal-
lenging because of its rapid development.  The phenomenon of corporate
globalization represents a disjunctive change in the conduct of the business en-
terprise.
4. Changes in Organizational Forms.  Until recently, it has been possible to
describe the various organizational forms that have emerged since the
industrial revolution in terms of variations on the common themes of
functional, multidivisional, matrix, or holding company structures.75  However,
during the past fifteen years, it has been a challenge to develop a vocabulary to
describe the new, emergent forms of organization.  The terms network
organization, modular corporation, virtual corporation, horizontal corporation,
and boundaryless organization all vie to capture the essence of these new
phenomena.76  Stated simply, Baker argues that “[i]n theory, a network
organization is integrated across formal boundaries; interpersonal ties of all
types are formed without respect to vertical, horizontal, or spatial
                                                          
73. See generally MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990);
MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 18 (1986).
74. See Geert Duysters & John Hagedoorn, Internationalization of Corporate Technology Through
Strategic Partnering: An Empirical Investigation, 25 RES. POL’Y 1 (1996) (discussing technological in-
novations); Janet Y. Murray et al., Strategic and Financial Performance Implications of Global
Sourcing Strategy: A Contingency Analysis, 26 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 181 (1995).  For an empirical look
at global sourcing and research and development effects, respectively, see Yao-Su Hu, The Interna-
tional Transferability of the Firm’s Advantages, CAL. MGMT. REV., Summer 1995, at 73 (discussing
transferability and competition in broad terms); HIRSCH, supra note 39 (examining career manage-
ment issues in the new economy).
75. See, e.g., JAY R. GALBRAITH, ORGANIZATION DESIGN (1977); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975).
76. For usage of these terms, see infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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differentiation.”77  While this definition succinctly captures the boundaryless
aspect of organizing within and across firms, a complete definition must also
note that network organizations “rely more on market mechanisms than on
administrative processes to manage resource flows.”78  Taken together, a
network organization is marked by a dual sense of cooperation that transcends
boundaries—both intra- and interfirm boundaries—and market-oriented
competition among groups defined by these boundaries.  The term “co-
opetition” has been used to describe this mode of organizing.79  A key point,
and often a point of confusion, is that such co-opetition in the network
organization defines both intrafirm and interfirm dynamics.
The intrafirm network structure can be seen both as an extension of Jay
Galbraith’s discussion of integration mechanisms80 and as an elaboration of
contingency theory.81  That is, in the spirit of creating an adaptive and flexible
organization for the changing times, network firms are marked by a degree of
vertical and horizontal integration that ignores boundaries to communication
induced by a logic of functional, product, or professional differentiation.82  De-
scriptive and prescriptive accounts of how to develop and organize these new
types of organizational forms can be found in the popular press,83 practitioner-
focused journals,84 and in trade books.85
Discussions of network organizations from an interfirm perspective begin
by acknowledging that these structures share aspects of both hierarchical and
market governance arrangements.86  As Farok J. Contractor and Peter Lorange
and Nitin Nohria and Carlos Garcia-Pont point out, these linkages can range
from various equity-based joint venture agreements, to research and develop-
ment or sourcing agreements, to patent licensing or distribution agreements,
                                                          
77. Wayne E. Baker, The Network Organization in Theory and Practice, in NETWORKS AND
ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM, AND ACTION 397, 422 (Nitin Nohria & Robert G. Eccles eds.,
1992).
78. RAYMOND E. MILES & CHARLES C. SNOW, FIT, FAILURE, AND THE HALL OF FAME: HOW
COMPANIES SUCCEED OR FAIL 117 (1994).
79. See ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 5 (1996).
80. See GALBRAITH, supra note 75, at 243-62.
81. See PAUL R. LAWRENCE & JAY W. LORSCH, ORGANIZATION AND ENVIRONMENT:
MANAGING DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION (1967).
82. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., John A. Byrne et al., The Virtual Corporation, BUS. WK., Feb. 8, 1993, at 98; Shawn
Tully, The Modular Corporation, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 1993, at 106.
84. See, e.g., Peter F. Drucker, The Coming of the New Organization, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb.
1988, at 45 (discussing an “information-based organization”); Raymond E. Miles & Charles C. Snow,
Network Organizations: New Concepts for New Forms, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 1986, at 62
(referring to this new organizational form as the “dynamic network firm”).
85. See, e.g., RON ASHKENAS ET AL., THE BOUNDARYLESS ORGANIZATION: BREAKING THE
CHAINS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE (1995); WILLIAM H. DAVIDOW & MICHAEL S. MALONE,
THE VIRTUAL CORPORATION: STRUCTURING AND REVITALIZING THE CORPORATION FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY (1992).
86. But see Walter W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12
RES. ORG. BEHAV. 295 (Barry M. Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1990).
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among others.87  A number of scholars have chronicled the emergence of such
linkages.88  Observing recent data on alliance formation in light of this past
work, Ranjay Gulati observed that these data only confirmed what previous
studies have reported—that there has been a “dramatic increase in interfirm
strategic alliances.”89  To the extent that many alliances take the form of equity
partnerships with greater than ten percent, but less than majority, ownership
stakes in foreign enterprises, the data in Table 1 also provide evidence of the
pace of cross-border alliance growth.90
5. Changes in the Regulatory Environment.  Between the two World Wars,
there was a flurry of regulatory activity in the United States relating to
corporations.  However, the primary focus of this regulatory activity was on
capital providers to the firm.  Perhaps the most notable development was the
passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, mandating greater
transparency in, and disclosure of, corporate activity—and resulting in the
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission—with a view toward
ensuring efficiency and fairness in the dealings of the corporation with its
capital providers.91  Around this time, a set of regulations describing—and
proscribing—the role of banking institutions in corporate activity was also
enacted.92  In the immediately following period, this regulatory focus on capital
providers continued.93 To the extent there was any concern with non-capital
provider constituencies, the consumer was the primary focus, as evidenced by
                                                          
87. See, e.g., COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS (Farok J. Contractor &
Peter Lorange eds., 1988); Nitin Nohria & Carlos Garcia-Pont, Global Strategic Linkages and Industry
Structure, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 105, 111 (1991).
88. See generally KATHRYN RUDIE HARRIGAN, MANAGING FOR JOINT VENTURE SUCCESS
(1986); KAREN J. HLADIK, INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF U.S.-
FOREIGN BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS (1985); DAVID C. MOWERY, INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE
VENTURES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING (David C. Mowery ed., 1988); Dorothy B. Christelow, Interna-
tional Joint Ventures: How Important Are They?, 23. COLUM. J. WORLD BUS., Summer 1987, at 7;
M.W. Morris & M. Hergert, Trends in International Cooperative Agreements, 22 COLUM. J. WORLD
BUS.,  Summer 1987, at 15; Anant Sundaram & N. Venkatraman, Organizational Forms, in RESEARCH
IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (N. Venkatraman & J. Henderson
eds., 1999); COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES, supra note 87.
89. Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust?  The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contrac-
tual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 85, 85-112 (1995).
90. See 1997 ABSTRACT, supra note 52.
91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77,
78 (1997)); LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 7 SECURITIES REGULATION 3448-66 (3d ed. 1991)
(discussing foundational cases related to the duty to disclose).  For cases that illustrate this point, see
generally Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (New York 1969); In re ORFA, 654 F. Supp. 1449
(D.N.J. 1987).  But see Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975); Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186
(7th Cir. 1978).
92. See, e.g., McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C.); Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 347a, 347b,
412 (1997)).
93. See, e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, Title I, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1997)); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat.
133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1843 (1997)).
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the passage of the Sherman94 and Clayton Acts95 dealing with antitrust issues
and fairness in competition.  It is equally important to note that during this
period of the emergence and solidification of the era of corporate capitalism in
the United States, there were few major federal laws addressing the concerns of
other stakeholders, such as employees, communities, and the natural
environment.96
In the 1960s, the focus on capital providers began to shift significantly.
Regulatory efforts during this era became increasingly concerned about the
corporate entity’s impact on its various non-shareholder constituencies.97  For
example, labor found protection in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,98 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act,99 the Occupational Safety Act,100 the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act,101 the Employment Opportunities for
Disabled Americans Act,102 and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act.103
This protection continued into the 1990s with adoption of both the Family and
Medical Leave Act104 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.105
Similarly, consumers of corporate products and services received a number
of additional protections in this time period.  Major consumer-oriented legisla-
tion adopted in the 1960s includes the federal Truth-in-Lending legislation106
and the 1962 Uniform Commercial Code, including its product-warranty provi-
sions adopted by forty-nine states.107  Courts also began abolishing contributory
negligence as a defense in product liability cases.108  Similar consumer protec-
                                                          
94. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1997)).
95. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1997)).
96. One of the few such laws passed in this era was the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch.
311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 41-57 (1997)).
97. See infra notes 98-105.
98. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447
and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
99. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1997)).
100. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 29, 42, 49 U.S.C. (1997)).
101. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
102. Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act, Pub. L. 99-643, 100 Stat. 3574 (1986)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1305 note, 1382-1383, 1396 (1997)).
103. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-347, 102 Stat. 646 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1997)).
104. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 2, 5, 29 U.S.C. (1997)).
105. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 706 and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
106. Truth-in-Lending Act, Pub. L. 90-321, Title I, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1997)).
107. U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to 2-318 (1962) (setting forth product-warranty provisions that have been
adopted by 49 states).
108. For examples of courts abolishing contributory negligence as a defense in product liability
cases, see generally Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 861, 864-65 (Ariz. 1995); Norrie v. Heil
Co., 203 Conn. 594, 599-602 (1987); Robinson v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 664 A.2d 616, 618 (Pa. Super.
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tions arose in the 1970s with the adoption of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,109
the Consumer Product Safety Act,110 the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,111 the
Fair Credit Billing Act,112 the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,113 and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act,114 and the states’ acceptance of Restatement
(Second) of Torts, Section 402B, providing consumers with recovery mecha-
nisms for misrepresentation.115  Truth-in-lending reform legislation was adopted
in the 1980s and 1990s.116
Similarly, society became increasingly concerned about corporations’ im-
pact on the natural environment.  The 1960s brought about the adoption of the
Clean Water Restoration Act117 and amendments to the Clean Air Act.118 Envi-
ronmental legislation in the 1970s included the National Environmental Policy
Act,119 amendments to the Clean Air Act,120 the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act,121 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,122 the Clean Water
                                                          
Ct. 1995); General  Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 966 S.W.2d 545, 553-57 (Tex. App. 1997) (abolishing con-
tributory negligence as a defense in strict product liability cases unless plaintiff has assumed the risk).
109. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. 91-508, Title IV, § 601, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1997)).
110. Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. §§ 5314-5315, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1997)).
111. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. 93-495, Title V, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1997)).
112. Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. 93-495, Title III, 88 Stat 1511 (1974) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1997)).
113. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. 93-637, 88
Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1997)).
114. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 note, 1692 (1997)).
115. See, e.g., Baroldy v. Ortho Pharm. Corp. 760 P.2d 574, 577 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Westlye v.
Look Sports, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 801-02 (1993); Ziegler v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 539 A.2d
701, 704 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988).
116. See Truth in Lending Simplification & Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, Title VI, 94 Stat. 168
(1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1997)); Truth-in-Lending Act Amend-
ments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(1997)).
117. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 431-437, 466 (1997)).
118. Clean Air Act, Pub. L. 86-365, 73 Stat. 646 (1959) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1857(d),
(g) (1997)).
119. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969); Pub. L. 94-52,
89 Stat. 258 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (1997)).
120. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 215 note, 1857, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1421, 1430, 50 U.S.C. app. § 456 (1997)), Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. (1997)).
121. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
122. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24; 15 U.S.C. §§ 633, 636; 31 U.S.C. § 1305; and scattered sections
of 33 U.S.C. (1997)).
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Act,123 the Safe Drinking Water Act,124 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.125
Further environmental legislation adopted in the 1980s and 1990s included the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
also known as the Superfund legislation,126 the Pollution Prevention Act,127 and
the Oil Pollution Act.128
At the same time that corporations were being increasingly regulated, both
directly and indirectly, the 1970s witnessed an affirmation of the corporation’s
separate-entity status in society.  That is, the courts began to view the corpora-
tion as though it were a natural person and began to afford it certain constitu-
tional protections.  In United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 129 for example,
the U.S. Supreme Court extended Fifth Amendment protection to the corpora-
tion.  In Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., 130 the U.S. Supreme Court applied the
Fourth Amendment to the corporation, and in First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 131 First Amendment protection was granted to corporate speech.
Perhaps not surprisingly, because the law was increasingly imposing a
greater mandate on managers to deal with the concerns of non-shareholder
constituencies, firms were also granted greater latitude in directors’ control.  In
addition to the constitutional rights granted to corporations, there was a trend
toward relaxing the liability of corporate directors.  In 1986, the Delaware leg-
islature adopted title 8, section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code Annotated,
permitting corporations to amend their charters to limit or eliminate directors’
monetary liability for non-intentional breach of the duty of care to the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.132  More than forty states have followed Delaware’s
lead and adopted similar exculpatory legislation.133
                                                          
123. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 33 U.S.C. (1997)).
124. Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 349, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 300 (1997)).
125. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1997)).
126. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1997)).
127. Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, Title VI [Subtitle G], 104 Stat. 1388-321
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101, 13102-13109 (1997)).
128. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 33 U.S.C. (1997)).
129. See 430 U.S. 564 (1976).
130. See 436 U.S. 307, 311-15 (1978).
131. See 435 U.S. 765, 775-86, reh’g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1998); see also Bradley & Schipani, supra note
15, at 42-44.
133. See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-2.02(b)(3) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (Michie 1998);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-202(B)(1) (Supp. 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202(B)(3) (Michie 1996);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-108-402 (1998); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 33-636(b)(4) (1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0831 (Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4)
(Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-48.5 (1997); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-202(2)(d) (Supp. 1998); 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2.10(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Michie 1995);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.832 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (1995); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) (Banks-Baldwin 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24(C)(4) (West Supp.
1999); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 2-405.2 (Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, §
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Similarly, a majority of states now statutorily permit directors to consider
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in making managerial deci-
sions.134  These statutes provide directors with discretion to consider the inter-
ests of other constituencies, such as labor, customers, suppliers, and the com-
munity.  For example, the New York statute provides the following:
In taking action, including, without limitation, action which may involve or relate to a
change or potential change in the control of the corporation, a director shall be enti-
tled to consider, without limitation, (1) both the long-term and the short-term inter-
ests of the corporation and its stakeholders and (2) the effects that the corporation’s
actions may have in the short-term or in the long-term upon any of the following:
(i)  the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity and profit-
ability of the corporation;
                                                          
13(b)(1½) (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1209(1)(c) (Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(4)
(Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-2.02(b)(4) (1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216(2)(d) (1997);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2018(2)(d) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.037(1) (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 292-2 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2(E)
(Michie 1998); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-
02(b)(3) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(5) (Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7)
(1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(d) (1988); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1713 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-
1.1-48(a)(6) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-2-
58.8 (Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1302-7.06(B) (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-7-3.1 (Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §
2.02(b)(4) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A)(2) (Michie 1993) (capping the liability at the
greater of $100,000 or the amount of cash compensation received from the corporation during the last
12 months); WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.320 (1994); WIS. STAT. § 180.0828 (1992); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-16-202(b)(iv) (Michie 1997); see also Bradley & Schipani supra note 15, at 72 n.374.
134. The following statutes permit directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder constitu-
encies in any appropriate context: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (1997) (mandating  consideration of
non-shareholder constituencies); FLA. STAT. ch. 607.0830(3) (Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
202(b)(5) (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 30-1702 (1996); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/8.85 (West 1993); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (1995); IOWA CODE § 491.101B (1991);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65
(West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (1998);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(3) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie 1997); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1993);
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (Supp. 1996); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 515 (1995); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827
(1992); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (Michie 1997).  The following statutes permit directors to
consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in the context of transactions for corporate
control: ALA. CODE § 10-2B-11.03(c) (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 10-2702, 10-1202(c) (1996) (sale of
assets); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1202(C) (Michie 1996) (sale of assets); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-106-
105(7) (reverse splitting of shares), 7-111-103(3), 7-114-102(3) (1998) (authorization of dissolution af-
ter issuance of shares); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.11-030(2)(b), 271B.12-020(3) (Banks-Baldwin
1989) (sale of assets); LA. REV.  STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West 1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347
(West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-815(3), 35-1-823(3) (1997) (sale of assets); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 293-A:11.03(c), 293-A:12.02(c) (Supp. 1996) (sale of assets); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-11-03(c),
55-12-02(c) (1990) (sale of assets); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-11-103(c),
33-12-102(c) (Law. Co-op. 1990) (sale of assets); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (Michie 1991); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.03 (West Supp. 1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1103(3) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, §§ 11.03(c), 12.02(c) (1997) (sale of as-
sets); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-718(C) (Michie 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-724(C) (Michie Supp.
1998) (sale of assets); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23B.11.030(3), 23B.12.020(3) (1994) (sale of assets).  The
following states and territories do not have specific legislation regarding consideration of the interests
of non-shareholder constituencies: Alaska, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Kansas, Mary-
land, Michigan, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and West Virginia.
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(ii)  the corporation’s current employees;
(iii)  the corporation’s retired employees and other beneficiaries receiving or en-
titled to receive retirement, welfare or similar benefits from or pursuant to any
plan sponsored, or agreement entered into, by the corporation;
(iv)  the corporation’s customers and creditors; and
(v)  the ability of the corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods, serv-
ices, employment opportunities and employment benefits and otherwise to con-
tribute to the communities in which it does business.
Nothing in this paragraph shall create any duties owed by any director to any person
or entity to consider or afford any particular weight to any of the foregoing or abro-
gate any duty of the directors, either statutory or recognized by common law or court
decisions.135
On the one hand, granting management further discretion in decision-
making authority is consistent with the societal trends requiring the corporation
to be more accountable to non-shareholder constituencies.  That is, to be sensi-
tive to the impact of the firm on such stakeholders as labor, customers, and the
local community, it may be necessary formally to allow managers the discretion
in their decisionmaking authority to consider these interests.  On the other
hand, such discretion holds the potential for managerial abuse.  Rather than
balance the interests of all constituencies affected by the corporate form, man-
agers may be tempted by this discretion to pursue their self-interest at the ex-
pense of others’ interests.  Responsibility to all stakeholder groups may effec-
tively mean accountability to none.
In summary, while early regulatory activity concerned itself with the protec-
tion of the rights of capital providers to the firm—notably equityholders, pre-
sumably because the relationship between the firm and bondholders has always
been, and continues to be, governed by contract law—the legislative thrust at
both the federal and state levels during the more recent past has been to
strengthen the hands of non-shareholder constituencies.136
B. The Implications of Change for Corporate Governance
If corporate governance theory requires consideration of how the various
constituencies that define the business enterprise serve and are served by the
corporation, then the changes considered above raise significant questions
about our understanding of corporate governance.  After identifying these gov-
ernance challenges, this article will appraise governance scholarship and its
ability to address these issues.
Knowledge-based, post-industrial work raises confusing control issues.
William G. Ouchi’s and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt’s consideration of clan-based
                                                          
135. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
136. But see Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV., Nov. 1992, at 14, 91-92 (1992) (arguing that constituency statutes “simply ratify
preexisting corporate law”; they do not “redefine corporate law to produce social change”).
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control pointed this out years ago.137  If a manager can neither measure a sub-
ordinate’s work with reliable validity nor specify the steps to accomplish the
desired outcomes, then process-and output-oriented control systems imported
from the days of the Industrial Revolution will be suboptimal, if not a counter-
productive failure.138
The proliferation of new financial products, the globalization of capital
markets, and the rise of the institutional investor raise at least three implica-
tions for corporate governance.  The increase in the number of sources of capi-
tal makes it very difficult to assess investment risk accurately.  This problem is
compounded by the global nature of the capital market.  Cross-border disclo-
sure rules and regulations are underdeveloped.  Because disclosure rules are
not standardized worldwide, an investor must make complex risk assessments
with limited information. In addition, the concentration of wealth in the hands
of pension and mutual fund managers139 challenges the control assumptions that
lie behind the traditional principal-agent theory that has oriented much of the
understanding of corporate governance over the years.140  As Daniel J.H.
Greenwood recently pointed out, it is very difficult to know who a firm’s own-
ers are today, much less their interests.141  Institutional owners who directly in-
teract with corporate managers are in reality agents of a diffuse group of fund
shareholders who may know or care little about the operations of any particu-
lar company.  Owners now must be seen as investors; accordingly, agency rela-
tionships are more complex.  If investment managers are agents for the firm’s
investors, then those investors must rely on an agent and the agent of an agent
(that is, the investment manager and the corporate manager) to deploy their
capital in a productive manner.  This potentially troubling development will be
referred to as a cascading agency problem.
Globalization of product-market competition serves as an exacting form of
firm discipline.  As Michael Jensen, Frank Easterbrook, and others have
pointed out, if a firm cannot sell a product at a profit in the marketplace, that is
unless it is fit, it will not survive.142  This form of market discipline is perhaps
                                                          
137. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Control: Organizational and Economic Approaches, 31 MGMT.
SCI. 134 (1985); William G. Ouchi, Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 129 (1980);
Ouchi, supra note 28.
138. See id.
139. See MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING
THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 25-33 (1996); John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, The Culture
of Capital: An Anthropological Investigation of Institutional Investment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 823, 823
(1992) (pension funds); Lester B. Snyder & Marianne Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal In-
come Tax: Taking the Tax Law “Private” Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM.
J. TAX POL’Y 1, 19-22 (1996).
140. See A.A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932); E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Internal Revenue Code
Section 170 and the Great Corporate Giveaway, 22 PAC. L.J. 221, 230-31 (1991); Thomas S. Ulen, The
Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 312-18 (1993).
141. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trus-
tees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1086-93 (1996).
142. See generally Jensen, supra note 13.  For a general discussion of law and market efficiency, see
Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
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the most important assurance that capital will be supplied at the lowest cost for
firms in market economies.  Concurrent with product-market globalization, the
market for physical capital, the market for technology, and to a certain extent,
the market for corporate control all have become globalized as well.  In the
process, both the internal management of the various parts of the firm’s value
chain and the external management of the firm’s shareholder/stakeholder in-
terests involve the imperative of cross-border coordination and control.  How-
ever, while MNEs have nudged economic activity toward borderlessness, their
operations span sovereign borders in a world in which the territorial authority
of the nation-state is paramount.  Cross-border liability and bankruptcy rules,
antitrust laws, contract enforcement, and dispute resolution standards and pro-
tocols are all problematic in a setting in which the principle of territoriality is
the governing norm.143  Thus, as the contemporary conduct of the corporation is
considered, it is important to recognize that there is a void at the intersection of
sovereign boundaries that is very difficult to manage and control.144
Network organizations are valuable for their flexibility and responsiveness
to complex and uncertain competitive environments.  For example, suppliers in
some situations can provide a higher-quality and lower-cost product even when
it is the product of a transaction-specific asset.145  Moreover, cooperative rela-
tionships can be established between fierce competitors.146  With the rise of in-
ter- and intrafirm agreements of all types, it is difficult to know where the
boundary of one firm ends and another begins.  These complex relationships
make it difficult for an outsider—be it an investor, regulator, or director—to
discern a firm’s operating characteristics.  Legally, the body of corporate law
that pertains to a discrete firm may become limited in its applicability, or even
inapplicable, when the firm is considered as an aggregation of all of these net-
work relationships.  If the latter organization is defined more broadly as an en-
terprise rather than a firm, it is questionable whether the understanding of
                                                          
Winter 1997, at 23, 28.  Interestingly, the phrase “survival of the fittest” was coined by Herbert
Spencer.  See HERBERT SPENCER, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 457 (1897).  Herbert Spencer was a
19th Century English social philosopher and the sub-editor of The Economist, who used the term to
describe both the process of a competitive market and the process of natural selection in the evolution
of biological species.  See Darwin Revisited, ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 1997, at 12.
143. See generally Kose John et al., Cross-Border Liability of Multinational Enterprises, Border
Taxes, and Capital Structure, FIN. MGMT., Winter 1991, at 54; James S. McNeill, Comment, Extraterri-
torial Antitrust Jurisdiction: Continuing the Confusion in Policy, Law, and Jurisdiction, 28 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 425 (1998); Steven L. Snell, Controlling Restrictive Business Practices in Global Markets: Re-
flections on the Concepts of Sovereignty, Fairness, and Comity, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 215 (1997).
144. See Anant K. Sundaram & J. Stewart Black, The Environment and Internal Organization of
Multinational Enterprises, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 729, 735-38  (1992).
145. See TOSHIHIRO NISHIGUCHI, STRATEGIC INDUSTRIAL SOURCING: THE JAPANESE AD-
VANTAGE 213-15 (1994).
146. See Greg Young et al., “Austrian” and Industrial Organization Perspectives on Firm-Level
Competitive Activity and Performance, 7 ORG. SCI. 243 (1996); BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, su-
pra note 79, at 27.
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firm-level corporate governance and control developed in an earlier era will
apply to the governance of enterprises.147
The move toward greater regulatory accountability and managerial discre-
tion mobilizes shareholders and forces directors to address the discretionary
paradox identified above.148  Even if self-dealing temptations can be resisted or
controlled, it is not clear how managers and directors should carry out their so-
cial responsibilities to their various stakeholders when their interests do not
coincide.149  The rise of statutes that address constituencies other than capital
providers may seriously erode the effectiveness of the market for corporate
control.  In other words, the corporate governance challenges identified here
may have to be addressed in a regulatory setting in which the disciplining role
of the takeover market might be increasingly under strain.  Table 2 summarizes
the five broad changes in the conduct of the corporation that have been identi-
fied—changes in the nature of work, capital markets, product-market competi-
tion, organizational forms, and regulatory environment—and their attendant
governance challenges.  The key question is whether the current theories and
practices of corporate governance can accommodate and effectively deal with
these challenges.  This question will be addressed next.
                                                          
147. See generally PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION
LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 231-53 (1993) (proposing enterprise law
for MNEs); REGULATING CORPORATE GROUPS IN EUROPE (David Sugarman & Gunther Teubner
eds., 1990); Cindy A. Schipani, Infiltration of Enterprise Theory Into Environmental Jurisprudence, 22
J. CORP. L. 599 (1997).
148. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1286-89 (1991).
149. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 110-17 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE];
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1190-92 (1981).
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TABLE 2
CHANGE AND ITS CHALLENGES TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The Nature of the Change and
its Attributes
Implications for Corporate
Governance
Work Knowledge based Problematic Managerial con-
trol
Capital Market Product proliferation Difficulties in assessing oper-
ating and business risk
Globalization Undeveloped cross-border
disclosure and regulation
Institutional investors Cascading agency problems
Product-Market
Competition
Globalization Regulatory and enforcement
voids at the intersection of
sovereign boundaries
Organizational Forms Network forms Enterprises with fuzzy
boundaries and opaque oper-
ating characteristics
Regulatory Environ-
ment
Regulatory accountability Accountability-discretion
paradox
Managerial discretion Need for assumption of multi-
fiduciary responsibilities
III
CONTEMPORARY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCHOLARSHIP
With these changes underway, it is not surprising that scholarly interest in
corporate governance has flourished in recent years.  This section will review
this work and examine whether it provides sufficient guidance as to how exist-
ing governance mechanisms will be able to cope with the changes documented
above.
A. Theories of Corporate Governance
The kinds of challenges identified above cut to the heart of our under-
standing of the firm and the regulation of economic activity.  These challenges
implicate the management of a firm (for example, the control of post-industrial
work and enacting a multifiduciary role), the control of a firm (for example,
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cascading agency problems, the accountability-discretion paradox, and opaque
operating and risk assessments), and the institutional infrastructure that en-
ables economic exchanges (for example, cross-border disclosure, regulation and
contracting norms, as well as the market for corporate control).  They also
prompt a reconsideration of the first principles in understanding the firm, its
role in society, and how it is to be controlled.
Stripped of their complexities, the debates in much of the scholarship on
corporate governance can be distilled to one fundamental issue: whether the
corporation should be viewed as a “nexus of contracts,” negotiated among self-
interested individuals or as a “legal entity,” with rights and responsibilities as a
natural person.  The debate concerns the best way to control the inherent con-
flict of interests among the corporation’s stakeholders, most notably the con-
flict of interest between corporate managers and stockholders that arises from
the separation of ownership and control in the large-scale, public corporation.
So-called contractarians view the corporation as a nexus of contracts with no
separate entity status of its own.150  Rather than advocate the imposition of le-
gal constraints on the behavior of corporate managers, they prefer to rely on
voluntary contracting and market forces to align the interests of managers and
stockholders.  In contrast, communitarians view the corporation as a separate
entity with rights and responsibilities as a natural person.151  Communitarians
argue that liability rules and judicial review are necessary to constrain the be-
havior of corporate managers.  Without legal constraints, it is feared that man-
agement will be accountable neither to stockholders nor to society in general.152
These two views of the nature of the firm generate drastically different im-
plications for public policy.  If, on the one hand, corporations are viewed as a
nexus of contracts, public policy should facilitate contracting among self-
interested individuals.  By this view, judicial or legislative constraints are im-
pediments to this contracting process and disadvantage all corporate stake-
holders.  On the other hand, if the corporation is viewed as a separate entity,
capable of doing both harm and good, then its activities, like those of a natural
person, must be held in check by legal rules and judicial review.153  Because this
debate is quite basic to understanding corporate governance and leads to very
different public policy proscriptions, the theoretical foundations of each posi-
tion will be reviewed, noting their implications for governance practice, and
then a critique of each view will be sketched.
                                                          
150. See infra notes 154-161 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 182-194 and accompanying text.
152. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1409 (1985); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663, 663-72 (1974).
153. See Bradley & Schipani, supra note 15, at 5.
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1. Contractarianism.
a. Contractarianism Defined.  Building on well-established principles of
neoclassical economics and finance, the contractarian view focuses on the
contractual relations that exist among the firm’s so-called stakeholders.  This
theory of the corporation, which is prevalent in the law and economics
literature, derives from the theory of the firm, a theory based on the early work
of  Ronald Coase, who argued that firms exist to minimize the costs of trading
in external markets.154  Coase was the first to point out that trading in markets
is costly, and that often these costs can be reduced by creating an organization
within which market transactions are replaced by a nexus of contracts that
governs trade among the contracting parties.  In this theory, Coase formally
recognized the role of the entrepreneur, who organizes the firm and directs the
transactions that occur within the organization.  Coase’s entrepreneur is the
central figure in the nexus of contracts that comprises the firm, is party to all
contracts, negotiates separately with each of the firm’s stakeholders, and has
the exclusive right to sell or disband the organization.155
In the 1970s, a number of  scholars began to extend Coase’s insights to the
public corporation.156  More recently, scholars have argued that the takeover
wave of the 1980s provided the crucible that ultimately forged this view into a
unified and well-articulated theory.157  The most obvious difference between a
public corporation and the organization envisioned by Coase is the absence of
an entrepreneur.  Granted, the managers of public corporations have certain
responsibilities that are the same as those of  Coase’s entrepreneur.  Unlike
Coase’s entrepreneur, though, corporate managers are not the providers of
capital, nor are they the firm’s residual claimants.  In the public corporation,
these functions are performed by outside investors.  However, in the nexus-of-
contracts paradigm, outside investors are simply one of the stakeholder groups
that comprise the contracting parties of the corporate organization.  This view
recognizes that there are both internal and external markets and that certain
transactions can be effected more efficiently in one market than in the other.
Thus, Coase’s fundamental insight that firms consist of a nexus of contracts de-
signed to reduce the costs of trade is not vitiated by the lack of an entrepreneur
in the public corporation.  It is simply that in the public corporation, the many
functions of Coase’s entrepreneur are performed by distinct stakeholder
groups.  Indeed, this specialization in functions gives a certain efficiency to cor-
porations over sole proprietorships.158
                                                          
154. See Coase, supra note 4, at 392.
155. See generally id.
156. See, e.g., Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 6, at 783-85; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3.
157. See, e.g., William J. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989); Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Con-
tractarianism Be Compassionate?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 315, 315-17 (1993); Michael C. Jensen & Rich-
ard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
158. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301, 308 (1983).
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Contractarians reject the proposition that the corporation should be viewed
as a distinct and identifiable entity.  Rather, they view the corporation as the
collection of explicit and implicit contracts that binds the various stakeholder
groups together.159  Stakeholder groups are free to bargain with one another
within the bounds set by existing contracts and agreements.  However, in most
instances, corporate managers facilitate the bargaining process by negotiating
with each of the stakeholder groups separately.  For example, labor contracts
are negotiated separately from product-market contracts, even though the
terms of the latter must necessarily affect the terms of the former.
The central role of contracts and market transactions in the contractarian
paradigm extends beyond the internal workings of the corporation.  Takeovers
are an external, market-based force; they insure the efficiency of the internal
contracts, helping to create an environment to insure the efficiency of the con-
tracting process.160  That U.S. corporations are creatures of the various fifty
states, together with the fact that these states actively compete for firms to in-
corporate in their jurisdictions, lends an additional competitive or efficiency
aspect to the contractarian model.161  External capital markets, with adequate
corporate disclosure and the ability for investors to freely enter and exit the
capital market; competitive product markets, with well-developed and well-
enforced antitrust rules that ensure competition; managerial labor markets; and
the ability and willingness of the government to recognize, assign, and enforce
property rights are important additional elements of the corporation’s envi-
ronment that aid in the efficiency of contracting.  Inefficiency in contracting
will be penalized by the market, and these penalties provide the impetus for
self-correcting behavior.  Thus, contractarianism is an internally consistent,
self-correcting paradigm for a corporate economy.
b. Implications of the Contractarian View.  The implications of the
contractarian view of the corporation are far-reaching.  It pierces the corporate
facade and forces individuals and, more importantly, public officials to talk
about people and not a vague, amorphous fiction called the corporation.  Thus,
by this view, corporations do not pay taxes; instead, stockholders are double
taxed.  Corporations themselves do not pollute; rather, employees of
corporations pollute.  Corporations are not liquidated; rather, bondholders are
not willing to finance the continuation of the firm’s activities.
The contractarian view thus has significant implications for public policy.
Appropriate public policy differs dramatically if one considers the corporation
a legal entity rather than viewing it as an abstraction of a collection of contracts
freely negotiated by corporate stakeholders.  If the corporation is a self-
                                                          
159. Interestingly, the emergence of network organizations can be seen as an illustration, if not an
affirmation, of a contractarian organizing logic.  See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
160. See Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter
1988, at 21, 22-23.
161. See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Compe-
tition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 259 (1980).
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interested, legal entity, then it has the potential to inflict harm on society just as
a natural person does, and its actions, therefore, must be regulated.  Alterna-
tively, if the corporation is nothing more than a collection of contracts, then
any government intervention into the affairs of public corporations must be
evaluated in terms of its effect on the ability of individuals to contract freely.
From this perspective, the role of government typically is relegated simply to
protecting property rights and enforcing contractual agreements.
The freedom of self-interested, rational individuals to enter into voluntary
contracts is the primary concern of contractarians, and individual liberty is a
cornerstone of the contractarian philosophy.  The working of Adam Smith’s in-
visible hand, which transforms individual self-interest into an optimal alloca-
tion of society’s resources, provides the moral and economic justifications for
the contractarian view.162  By this view, a corporate economy, unfettered by
government regulation, in which self-interested individuals can write and en-
force mutually beneficial contracts, maximizes not only individual freedom but
economic efficiency as well.163
An important implication of the contractarian view is that the objective of
corporate managers is to maximize the value of the firm’s residual claims,
which typically are the firm’s common stock.  Characterizing the production
process of firms in a capitalistic economy as “team production,” Alchian and
Demsetz argue that to minimize shirking and therefore maximize output, con-
trol of the team should be vested in the residual claimant.164  Consequently, in
the contractarian framework, the fiduciary duties of corporate managers run
exclusively to the firm’s stockholders.  It must be stressed that the principle of
maximizing shareholder wealth derives not from any philosophical predilection
to favor this stakeholder group over others.  Rather, the preeminence of the
stockholders in the contractarian paradigm follows from their position as resid-
ual claimants.  Only residual claimants have the incentive to maximize the total
value of the corporation.  All of the other stakeholder groups are, to some ex-
tent, fixed-claim holders and, therefore, do not have any incentive to increase
the value of the firm beyond the point that the payment of their fixed claim on
                                                          
162. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Oxford University Press 1923) (1776).
163. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32.
164. See Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 6, at 782.
Specialization in monitoring plus reliance on a residual claimant status will reduce shirking.
The specialist who receives the residual awards will be the monitor of the members of the
team (i.e., will manage the use of cooperative inputs).  The monitor earns his residual through
the reduction in shirking that he brings about, not only by the prices that he agrees to pay the
owners of the inputs, but also by observing and directing the actions or uses of these inputs.
Hence, team members who seek to increase their productivity will assign to the monitor not
only the residual claimant right but also the right to alter individual membership and per-
formance on the team.
Id.
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the firm is assured.  Control of the public corporation resides with its residual
claimants because they value this control right above all other stakeholders.165
Because shareholder-wealth-maximization is the focal point in the contrac-
tarian view of the public corporation, many of its detractors refer to it as a pro-
stockholder view.  Quite ironically, this often leads to a description of an alter-
native view that is labeled a pro-stakeholder view, one that presumably takes
into account the interests of all stakeholders.166  The irony is that the contrac-
tarian view is manifestly pro-stakeholder.  Under perfect market conditions, all
wealth-maximizing stakeholders at the time the firm is formed would agree that
managers should run the firm so as to maximize the value of the firm’s residual
claim or common stock.  The proposition that maximizing the residual claim of
a public corporation in turn maximizes the claims of all stakeholders is a more
general application of the so-called “market value rule” of corporate finance.
Eugene F. Fama and Merton H. Miller demonstrate that under conditions of
perfect markets, the market value rule maximizes the value of all the firm’s
outstanding securities, provided of course, that the firm’s security holders “are
free to compensate one another for the effects of operating decisions that in-
crease the wealth of one group but not the other.”167  It is a short step to gener-
alize this proposition to all stakeholders.  Thus, assuming that side payments
among stakeholders are possible, pursuing the market value rule ensures that
the values of all stakeholders’ claims are maximized.
Of course, application of the market value rule requires—as does the entire
contractarian paradigm—the ability of stakeholders to conduct Coasean bar-
gains to eliminate all third-party effects.168  This assumption is potentially the
Achilles’ Heel of the contractarian model.
c. A Critique of Contractarianism.  Because contractarianism relies on
the sanctity of contracts, the most damaging critiques of the position emphasize
situations where contracting is costly or impossible.  Contractarians presume
that contracts can be written to contemplate all possible contingencies.
Unfortunately, this is an ideal that never can be reached.  There always will be
inevitable contractual incompleteness due to ambiguities in language,
                                                          
165. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspec-
tive, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1993).
166. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 22-27
(1984).
167. EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE 179 (1972).
168. The notion of a Coasean bargain stems from the so-called Coase Theorem, which was first
stated, though not under that name, in R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON., Oct.
1960, at 1.  See generally Robert D. Cooter, Coase Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DIC-
TIONARY OF ECONOMICS 457 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (presenting an overview of the theorem).
The theorem states that in a world with zero transaction costs, initial rights allocations are unimpor-
tant; they will be transferred to their highest-value use through private, Coasean, bargains.  Thus, in
the present context, if an action taken by a corporation harms one group of stakeholders more than it
helps another, the former group will bribe the latter group to abandon the action in question.  Maxi-
mizing the residual claim maximizes the size of the corporate pie.  The way this pie will be allocated
among the firm’s various stakeholders will depend on the Coasean bargains they work out with one
another.
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inadvertence, unforeseen circumstances, and disputes concerning observability,
parties’ precontracting intentions, measurability, and verifiability of contract
terms and outcomes.169
If contracts are inefficient and incomplete, the pure contractarian position
is untenable.  Critics argue that information asymmetries, transaction costs, and
outright fraud are insurmountable obstacles to efficient contracting solutions.170
For example, contractarians assume that the agency problem between stock-
holders and corporate managers can be solved through contracting.171  How-
ever, a plethora of theoretical and empirical papers demonstrates the inability
of contracts to eliminate the agency costs of the corporate form.172  Critics also
point out that serious imperfections and impediments in the market for corpo-
rate control belie the notion that outside forces exert pressure on corporate
managers to maximize shareholder wealth.173  Indeed, evidence testifying to the
efficiency of top-management discipline born of this market is equivocal at
best.174
Another limitation of the contractarian view is that it does not recognize
the many individuals who are affected by, but are not directly party to, the cor-
porate contract.175  Put simply, a contract between two parties may harm a third.
For example, a contract between a firm and a creditor may create externalities
for other creditors directly by altering priority rules, or indirectly by altering
managerial incentives.176  Thus, so-called externalities or third-party effects viti-
ate the claim that the freedom of individuals to enter into voluntary, mutually
beneficial contracts will result in the optimal allocation of society’s resources.
Technically, third parties have the freedom to join the corporate contract.
However, transaction costs, incomplete or asymmetric information, duress, as-
sessment of contingencies, collusion, and incomplete verifiability of actions and
outcomes render this impractical.  It is impossible for individuals to compre-
hend, let alone write, contracts that anticipate the innumerable ways in which
they could be affected by the actions taken by the affiliates of some unknown
corporation.  For example, how could the victims of the Bhopal disaster have
anticipated the actions taken by the employees of Union Carbide and ex ante
                                                          
169. See Alan Schwartz, Legal Contract Theories and Incomplete Contracts, in CONTRACT
ECONOMICS 76, 76-80 (Lars Werin & Hans Wijkander eds., 1992).
170. See id.
171. See AMIR BARNEA ET AL., AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING (1985) (and
references therein).
172. See id.
173. See e.g., Jensen, supra note 13, at 850-62; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 7-11.
174. See James P. Walsh & John W. Ellwood, Mergers, Acquisitions, and the Pruning of Managerial
Deadwood, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 201, 214-16 (1991); James P. Walsh & Rita D. Kosnik, Corporate
Raiders and Their Disciplinary Role in the Market for Corporate Control, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 671, 691
(1993).
175. See John et al., supra note 143, at 56.
176. See Jean Tirole, Comments on Legal Contract Theories and Incomplete Contracts, in
CONTRACT ECONOMICS, supra note 169, at 109.
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contracted with the company to obtain insurance or taken sufficient precau-
tions to prevent such an accident from occurring?177
The contractarian view of the corporation is perhaps most vulnerable to at-
tack when dealing with cross-border transactions.  The contractarian view re-
quires the existence of property rights and a judicial process that is willing and
able to enforce contract terms.  These conditions do not exist in many of the
emerging economies throughout the world.  Consider, for instance, the difficul-
ties in the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the People’s Republic
of China.178  Even in economic exchanges among the so-called developed
economies, there are innumerable problems that arise because of conflicting or
inconsistent legal systems such as civil law versus common law versus religious
law, regulations, customs, traditions, languages, and mores.179  Areas of direct
concern to corporations and corporate governance in which there are voids at
the intersections of sovereign boundaries include antitrust enforcement, liabil-
ity rules, bankruptcy and creditor protection laws, disclosure rules, and em-
ployment laws.  Indeed, the absence of a superstructure to enforce contracts
across borders is a problem for the contractarian view because, in the final
analysis, all international law, and hence all international contracting, is a mat-
ter of voluntary acceptance of jurisdiction, mediation, and judgments on the
part of the contracting parties.
Finally, there are those who argue that even if the contractarian view results
in maximum economic efficiency, it does not achieve maximum social wel-
fare.180  Allowing individuals to engage in free trade will not rectify the ine-
qualities stemming from the inequitable distribution of wealth or bargaining
power of certain individuals and coalitions.  This view—consistent with the
views of communitarians—holds that the corporation is a social organization
                                                          
177. See John et al., supra note 143, at 65-66.  The abstract economic language about negative ex-
ternalities belies the deep emotion that gives form to the critique captured by this economic construct.
The Bhopal accident is one example of such problems.  For an example of how heartfelt the criticism
of the firm can be, see Jeff Gates’s discussion of the anger, grief, and mourning that he believes will
accompany society’s acceptance of these externalities:
The anger will emerge from the shared consciousness of what we’ve allowed our
“unconscious capitalism” to do—to ourselves, to our fellow man, to our children and to na-
ture.  The genetic defects, the needless cancers, the stunted growth of chemically abused chil-
dren, the denuded landscapes, the endangered aquifers, the depleted oceans, the lost spe-
cies. . . .  The list is an endless recitation of senseless tragedy bred of blind human self-
absorption whose cause lies deep within the very paradigm on which we base our standard of
living.
JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION: TOWARD A SHARED CAPITALISM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 296 (1998).
178. See Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China: Prob-
lems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1082-84 (1996); Julia Cheng, Note,
China’s Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPs Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Member-
ship, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 1969 (1998).
179. See generally Sundaram & Black, supra note 144, at 735-38 (discussing the problems of state
sovereignty for MNEs).
180. For a broad critique of libertarian economic theory and practice, see ROBERT KUTTNER,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS (1997).
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and, as such, has social responsibilities that transcend achieving economic effi-
ciency.
2. Communitarianism.
a. Communitarianism Defined.  The contractarian ideology has clearly
dominated the discourse in the worlds of law, economics, and management
during the past fifteen or twenty years.  Indeed, after observing this
phenomenon, Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Chancery Court observed that
“[o]ne of the marks of a truly dominant intellectual paradigm is the difficulty
people have in even imagining any alternative view.”181  That said, an
alternative view does exist.  Recognized by the press,182 often associated with
the work of Amitai Etzioni,183 and increasingly represented in both the law and
economics literature184 and the management literature,185 the communitarian
paradigm has emerged as the alternative to contractarian thinking.  Its origins
lie in the worlds of both theory and practice.
Communitarianism finds its origins in a long-standing controversy about
human nature.  For centuries, sociologists and philosophers have debated the
primacy of individuals or collectivities in the understanding of social life.186
Some believe that self-interested individual decisionmaking lies at the center of
social, political, and economic life.187  Others believe that personal preferences
and decisions are shaped by, and largely explained by, the social structure and
context within which people live.188  Contractarianism is rooted in assumptions
                                                          
181. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1395, 1401 (1993); see also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corpora-
tion, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 261-64, 72 (1992).
182. See Freedom and Community: The Politics of Restoration, ECONOMIST, Dec. 24, 1994, at 33.
183. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: THE REINVENTION OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1993); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS (1988).
184. See, e.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Thomas Lee
Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273
(1991); David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Cri-
sis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993).  But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Commu-
nity and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 856, 857-58 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E.
Mitchell ed., 1995)).
185. See Max B. E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate
Social Performance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 92 (1995); FREEMAN, supra note 166.
186. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
187. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990); infra note 188 and ac-
companying text.
188. The differing perspectives are illustrated by the well-known tensions between the ideas of
Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau, as well as by the distinction between organic and mecha-
nistic solidarity, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, under-socialized and over-socialized conceptions of
individual behavior, and even the distinction between Whigs and Tories.  See generally EMILE
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (MacMillan 1984) (1893) (discussing the conse-
quences of the division of labor on societal cohesion and solidarity); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
(Guernsey Press 1973) (1651); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Charles Frankel
ed., Hafner Publishing 1955) (1762); F. TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY (GEMEINSCHAFT UND
GESELLSCHAFT) (Charles P. Loomis trans. & ed., Michigan State University Press 1957); Mark Gra-
novetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481
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of utilitarian and methodological individualism, while communitarianism finds
its roots in humanism and methodological holism.189  The current primacy of
contractarian thinking should not be misread as evidence that no other theo-
retical world view exists.
Turning to business practice, those who view the firm not as an economic
aggregation of individuals but rather as an entity, connected in some organic
fashion with our social, historical, and political world, ask how economic activ-
ity serves society.  Indeed, by providing limited liability and various constitu-
tional protections to the corporation, society accords the corporation entity
status in the eyes of the law.  In this light, Thomas Lee Hazen raises a key ques-
tion: “What is the quid pro quo that society exacts for granting this special
privilege to corporations?”190  In a famous paper, E. Merrick Dodd answered
this question years ago: “[A] sense of social responsibility toward employees,
consumers, and the general public may thus come to be regarded as the appro-
priate attitude to be adopted by those who are engaged in business.”191  How-
ever, communitarians look for evidence in support of Dodd’s assertion and
come away disappointed.  Discussions of externalities and contract failure may
explain—but not explain away—the fact that corporations often harm or ex-
ploit many in society who have a stake in their activities.192  A point of depar-
ture for communitarian thinking then is a desire to redress and prevent the
harms that firms may inflict upon society.193
The conceptual battle lines are stark.  Where contractarianism finds its le-
gitimacy in the values of liberty and competition, communitarians emphasize
justice and cooperation.  Where contractarians look to Adam Smith’s invisible
hand for a social welfare logic to justify the distribution of gains from corporate
activity, communitarians yearn for an authentic community where the fulfill-
ment of the true needs of society’s members justifies corporate activity.194  Fo-
cusing on the managerial means to achieve corporate ends, contractarians in-
voke norms of freedom, while communitarians emphasize responsibility.
                                                          
(1985) (discussing conceptions of individual behavior); Dennis H. Wrong, The Oversocialized Concep-
tion of Man in Modern Sociology, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 183 (1961) (discussing conceptions of individual
behavior); ETZIONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION, supra note 183, at 6-8 (discussing under-socialized and
over-socialized and Whigs and Tories).
189. See Antonin Wagner, Communitarianism: A New Paradigm of Socioeconomic Analysis, 24 J.
SOCIO-ECON. 593, 598 (1995).
190. Hazen, supra note 184, at 296.
191. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145,
1160 (1932).
192. See supra notes 169-180 and accompanying text.
193. Morrissey’s work places the tension between contractarian and communitarian thinking in an
historical perspective.  See Daniel J. Morrissey, Toward a New/Old Theory of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1005 (1989).  While not denying the logic of Allen’s observation,
supra note 181 and accompanying text, Morrissey traces the reemergence of contractarian thinking
using Friedman’s New York Times essay, supra note 163, referring to it as a “[c]ounterattack from the
[t]raditionalists.”  Id. at 1023-25.
194. See Amitai Etzioni, The Responsive Community: A Communitarian Perspective, 61 AM. SOC.
REV. 1, 3 (1996) (discussing authentic communities).
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Finally, both camps conjure up an image of a sinister world if their para-
digm is not embraced.  The contractarians warn of slavery and oppression if
communitarians have their way, while communitarians fear exploitation and
alienation if contractarianism is unchecked.  Table 3 captures the fundamental
distinctions between these two corporate worldviews.
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TABLE 3
CONTRACTARIANISM VERSUS COMMUNITARIANISM
Contractarianism Communitarianism
Human Nature Utilitarian individualism Humanistic holism
The Firm An economic organization
defined as an aggregation of
individuals
A social, political, historical,
and economic entity
Legitimation Competition, liberty Cooperation, justice
Social Welfare Invisible hand Need fulfillment
Decision Norms Freedom Responsibility
Feared Alternative Slavery, oppression Exploitation, alienation
Manager’s Role/Duty Maximize shareholder wealth
within the bounds of the law
A multifiduciary duty to all
stakeholders
Internal Control Pricing of contractual
exchanges
Trust among those in
embedded relationships
Role of Law Promotion of ex ante
contractual freedom
Promotion of ex post
distributive fairness
b. Implications of the Communitarian View.  Three areas in which
contractarian thinking is manifest in organizational life have been identified:
(1) the manager’s role in maximizing shareholder wealth within the bounds of
the law; (2) maintenance of internal control by the pricing of contractual
exchanges; and (3) the role of law as promoter of ex ante contractual freedom.
Communitarians, on the other hand, believe that corporate managers have a
social responsibility not only to the shareholders, but to all of the firm’s
stakeholders.  Consistent with Dodd’s early sentiments,195 Clarkson’s recent
exhortations are emblematic of thinking in this area: “Managers are now
accountable for fulfilling the firm’s responsibility to its primary stakeholder
groups.”196  While contractarians rely on bargaining between the firm and its
stakeholders to meet the needs of these stakeholders, communitarians worry
about the equity implications of such arrangements in light of information and
power asymmetries, as well as the problem of negative externalities that arise
when some stakeholders do not have the opportunity to bargain with the firm
at all.  Communitarians want firms to be responsive to all stakeholders.  Of
                                                          
195. See Dodd, supra note 191.
196. Clarkson, supra note 185, at 112.
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course, this sentiment raises the question of how a firm’s value should be
allocated among the various stakeholders.  Communitarians would respond
with the notion of a “true” need.  A “true” need is evidenced by the persistence
of a behavior absent social control.197
Communitarians envision a far different world of internal control than the
one marked by contract setting and enforcement.198  Added to the list of the
problems with contracting specified earlier is the recognition that, at their best,
contracts yield compliant behavior and not commitment.199  Moreover, as Ouchi
has shown, the behavioral and outcome specifications needed to establish con-
tracts are illusory in a world where tasks cannot be programmed nor their out-
comes validly measured (that is, post-industrial work).200  Clan or trust-based
control, the kinds of control that are consistent with the communitarian con-
cept of human nature and the firm, is necessary in these circumstances.201
Turning to their views of law, contractarians view law as a means of ensur-
ing ex ante freedom and efficiency of contracting,202 while communitarians see
law as a vehicle to ensure distributive justice and equity from the payoffs to
contracts.  In practice, the communitarian view argues for various types of cor-
porate constituency statutes: the ability to choose different rules for different
situations.203  As discussed above, a variety of these types of statutes have been
adopted during the past few decades.204
c. A Critique of Communitarianism.  To be sure, there are laudatory
aspects of a communitarian system.  Who would object to corporations being
more socially responsible?  Clearly, society would be better off if
discrimination, pollution, workplace hazards, and dangerous products could be
eliminated without serious effects on incentives or resource allocation.
Moreover, if individuals believe they have lifetime employment, they may be
                                                          
197. See Etzioni, supra note 194, at 6.
198. See, e.g., Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 287 (Jane J.
Mansbridge ed., 1990).
199. For sociological discussion of compliance, see Herbert C. Kelman, Processes of Opinion
Change, 25 PUB. OPINION Q. 57 (1961).
200. See Ouchi, supra note 28; Ouchi, supra note 137.
201. Powell provides a succinct definition of how communitarians view trust, and thus control, in
organizational life.  He suggests that it is “a by-product of the embeddedness of individuals in a web of
social relations such that values and expectations are commonly shared.”  W.W. Powell, Trust-Based
Forms of Governance, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 51, 62
(Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).  A recent special research forum on intra- and in-
ter-organizational cooperation, see Ken G. Smith et al., Intra- and Interorganizational Cooperation:
Toward a Research Agenda, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 7 (1995), the recent collection of essays on trust in
organizations, see TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra, and a special topic forum on TRUST IN AND
BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS, see Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-
Discipline View of Trust, in 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 393 (1998) (Introduction to Special Topic Forum),
signal a resurgent interest among management scholars to better understand such forms of control and
their links to communitarian ideas.
202. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 149, at 15-16.
203. See Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1565, 1581 (1993).
204. See, e.g., supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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more willing to invest in firm-specific human capital.  This would make
corporations more efficient.  Arguably, employees in labor-managed firms
work harder because they share directly in the firm’s prospects.  However, the
tensions enumerated in Table 3 expose the shortcomings of the communitarian
view of governance.  Each aspect of the communitarian paradigm can be
countered by an opposing contractarian argument.  As noted above, issues
regarding the fundamental nature of individuals and the corporation have been
debated in various forms for centuries.205
The argument for responsible, true-need fulfillment on the part of the mul-
tifudiciary firm can be countered in any number of ways.  Who decides whether
a need is true or false?  What is the social, economic, and political legitimacy of
the entity that makes that decision?  Some needs are insatiable (for example,
wealth), while others are satiable (for example, thirst and hunger)—is one type
of need more or less true than the other?  Is there a reasonable limit to the
firm’s responsibilities?  Who defines these limits?  What are the penalties and
the self-correction mechanisms for violators?
In a world where companies routinely cross national boundaries and where
the companies’ boundaries themselves are blurred by network relationships, it
is impossible to fulfill the needs of every possible stakeholder that might be
touched by the global reach of the firm.  Who will place capital at risk in a
company that unilaterally seeks to fulfill such stakeholders’ true needs?  An in-
vestment in such a firm might be better cast as a charitable contribution.  Fi-
nally, resource dependence theory suggests that a great deal of power will ac-
crue to the firms who satisfy so many human needs.206  At best, the leaders of
such companies may exercise their power in a benevolent and paternalistic way.
At worst, Lord Acton’s words, “power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely,” may foreshadow an even gloomier future.207
Other discrete aspects of the communitarian paradigm can be critiqued.
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel argue that it is impossible for a fi-
duciary to serve beneficiaries whose interests conflict.208  As such, mangers can-
not be asked to act as fiduciaries for stakeholders in conflict.209  Moreover, the
                                                          
205. “The naiveté of the Left has long been reflected in their attempts to construct a system to
change human nature to achieve social justice instead of nurturing an economic environment that
evokes social justice while accommodating human nature.”  GATES, supra note 177, at 291 (footnote
omitted).
206. See JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF OR-
GANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 50-54 (1978).
207. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 1 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1996).  In addi-
tion, it is a little-known fact that Adolf Hitler was one of the first politicians to embrace communitar-
ian thinking.  The passage of the German corporation law in 1937 enabled him to focus the German
economy on serving of the broader needs of the German people, as he defined them, rather than on
earning economic rents.  This act presaged his fascist regime.  For a more comprehensive discussion of
these issues, see Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the “Modern” Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 26-31 (1966).
208. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 149, at 112-13.
209. Giving form to this debate, McDaniel later criticized this argument.  See Morey W. McDaniel,
Stockholders and Stakeholders, 121 STETSON L. REV. 122 (1991).
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nature of trust itself is in question.  Communitarians may view trust as a by-
product of embedded social life, but others see trust emerging from repeated
exchanges, exchanges that can be grounded in contractual relationships.210  As a
result, trust can be seen as a derivative of—and not a substitute for—contracts.
The final critique of communitarianism is that it is neither self-referential
nor does it offer a positive logic to organize economic production.211  The limits
to contractarian thought are apparent in the limits to contracting, that is, in-
complete information, hold-ups, bounded rationality, externalities, and so
forth.  A self-referential critique of communitarianism is not so readily appar-
ent.  As noted above, the criticisms are much more subtle.  For instance, a sys-
tem rooted in a multifiduciary commitment to justice ironically can become a
tool of tyrannical injustice in the wrong hands.212  In other words, the limits of
communitarianism may not be recognized until it is too late.
B. Toward a Practical Resolution: American Law Institute Section 2.01 and
Beyond
Against this backdrop, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) began its Cor-
porate Governance Project in 1979.213  The part of the project most closely re-
lated to the issues addressed in this article is Section 2.01.  Section 2.01 defines
the objective and conduct of the corporation as follows:
(a)  Subject to the provisions of Subsection (b) and § 6.02 (Action of Directors That
Has the Foreseeable Effect of Blocking Unsolicited Tender Offers), a corporation [§
1.12] should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view to en-
hancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.
                                                          
210. See Powell, supra note 201, at 63.
211. “Self-referential” is the ability of a system of ideas to embed its own critique.
212. See supra notes 205-210 and accompanying text.
213. The ALI is a non-profit institute that seeks to simplify and clarify the law in the United States.
It includes representatives of legal practitioners, the judiciary, and academics.  The ALI considered a
corporate law project back in the 1920s and 1930s but was reluctant to pursue it until 1979 when it be-
gan its Corporate Governance Project.  See Richard B. Smith, An Underview of the Principles of Cor-
porate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 1297, 1298 (1993).  Many previous projects undertaken by the ALI
have resulted in restatements of law.  Although such restatements do not have the force of law, they
are often cited by the courts and commentators as accurate summaries and portrayals of the law.  Since
its adoption in 1992, the ALI’s PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE has been cited 141 times in
published state and federal cases.  See 1998 ANN. REP. 24.  The ALI began its Corporate Governance
Project as a restatement, but the name of the project was eventually changed to its final title, Principles
of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations.  There was some conflict over the prior use
of “Restatement” in the original title.  It was replaced with “Analysis,” which was appropriate given
the heavy element of analysis.  See AMERICAL LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS xx (1994).  The project, however, was written in
the same manner as any other restatement.
The intent of the project was not to draft a model state corporation law or new federal corporation
law.  Instead, the focus was “on issues of governance responsibilities and to state existing or recom-
mended ground rules . . . to be implemented by the courts, . . . legislatures, and . . . by corporations
themselves.”  Id. at xx-xxi.  The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Model Penal Code (MPC), Study
of Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts, and Federal Securities Code were among
the examples mentioned that addressed legal problems requiring legislative treatment.  “A basic pur-
pose of the Project has always been to clarify the duties and obligations of corporate directors and offi-
cers and to provide guidelines for discharging those responsibilities in an efficient manner, with mini-
mum risks of personal liability.”  Id. at xxi.
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(b)  Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the cor-
poration, in the conduct of its business:
(1)  Is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to act within the bounda-
ries set by law;
(2)  May take into account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded
as appropriate to the responsible conduct of business; and
(3)  May devote a reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humani-
tarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.214
Although Section 2.01 was thought to be consistent with the case law, it has
sparked controversy.215  Subsection (a) provides for shareholder primacy,
which, as a general rule, is consistent with the case law and the contractarian
model.216  Subsection (b), however, allows reasonable ethical and charitable
considerations to supersede shareholder primacy, a sentiment more in line with
a communitarian viewpoint.217
Addressing the construction of section 2.01(b), Professor Eisenberg, the
Chief Reporter and reporter for this part, noted that in addition to the goal of
enhancing corporate and shareholder gains, “[a] second premise of corporation
law is that in pursuing the profit objective, the corporation should conduct itself
with regard to the fact that it is a social as well as an economic institution.”218
The social elements are implicated in three realms.  First, subsection (b)(1)
makes it clear that corporations must operate within the constraints of law,
which, on its face, is a reasonable proposition.219  Subsection (b)(2), allowing
                                                          
214. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 213, at 55.
215. See Donald E. Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI’s Principles,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 519-20 (1984).
216. The definitive case supporting shareholder primacy is Dodge Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); see also Elliott J. Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Cor-
porate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 34 (1984).
217. The use of “may” in subsection (b) indicates that compliance with social concerns is not man-
datory, but consideration of them should not be precluded by the economic aims of corporation.  Sec-
tion 2.01(b) does not seek to penalize those corporations that do not follow concerns that they consider
unreasonable for their purposes, but enables corporations “to go beyond the law’s minimum require-
ments if the cost is reasonable.”  Schwartz, supra note 215, at 515.  It should also be noted that sections
2.01(b)(2) and (3) do not permit a corporation to commit more than a reasonable amount of resources
to ethical and charitable considerations.  See Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI
Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 1008 (1993).  It has been further argued, however, that Section
2.01 can be used to show how adopting a tin parachute as a takeover defense would comport with fun-
damental objectives of enhancing shareholder gain.  See Patrick J. Ryan, Corporate Directors and the
“Social Costs” of Takeovers—Reflections on the Tin Parachute, 64 TUL. L. REV. 3, 35-36 (1989).
218. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 BUS.
LAW. 1271, 1276 (1993); see also Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Shareholder Alternatives to
Hostile Takeovers: Restructurings, Auctions and MacMillan II, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 4, 68-69 (1989)
(noting that several cases as well as state codes and the ALI Corporate Governance Project approve
the authority of corporate boards to spend funds on charitable contributions); Schwartz, supra note
215, at 514 (“The permissive exceptions to wealth-enhancing activity articulate contemporary business
practice.”).
219. But see CHARLES HANSEN, A GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE PROJECT 186 (1995) (noting that in conjunction with other sections of the Principles,
there are inconsistencies with prior views of the obligation of corporate directors and officers to abide
by the law); cf. Cynthia Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C.
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corporate conduct to be guided by reasonable ethical concerns, is based on the
observation that corporate policy, like individual behavior, should reflect ethi-
cal considerations, and to state otherwise would be “unwise social policy.”220
Subsection (b)(3), permitting corporations to devote reasonable resources to
charitable concerns, also reflects a social policy orientation, perhaps rooted in
the fact that corporations control much of the nation’s resources.221
Section 2.01 is not without its critics.  On the contractarian front, many
commentators prefer a stronger shareholder primacy model.  For example,
Nicholas Wolfson argues for a reliance on market forces, noting that there is no
empirical support for the ideas and premises revealed in the ALI Project.222
Oliver E. Williamson argues that shareholder gain should be the sole criterion
for firm effectiveness because the inclusion of other constituencies’ objectives
compromises efficiency and invites tradeoffs.223  James W. Walker, Jr. notes
that the ALI Project would be unacceptable in the business community, ob-
jecting to the underlying belief that governance solutions should be based on
increased government regulation.224  James D. Cox similarly argues that the
ALI should anchor the directors’ obligation more directly to the shareholders
rather than diffuse it over other constituents.225
Potential problems also have been noted with the provision granting corpo-
rate directors and officers free reign to make decisions based on ethical and
charitable considerations.  Critics claim there is insufficient shareholder over-
sight for these decisions226 and that shareholders lack the mechanism to express
their own preferences.227  The Reporter’s Note for Section 2.01 similarly indi-
cates that this lack of control can lead to abuse and may prevent shareholders
from contractually limiting corporate behavior in this area.228  Perhaps even
more troublesome are concerns that Section 2.01 may, in fact, encourage man-
agement to fulfill their own personal value choices.229
                                                          
L. REV. 1265, 1280-85 (1998) (discussing how parts of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance
favor the view that the law acts as a limit).
220. Eisenberg, supra note 218, at 1276.
221. See id.
222. See Nicholas Wolfson, A Critique of the American Law Institute Draft Proposals, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 629, 631 (1984).
223. See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1219 (1984).
224. See James W. Walker, Jr.,Comments on the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 9 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 580, 580 (1984).
225. See James D. Cox, The ALI, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside Di-
rector’s Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (1993).
226. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corpo-
rate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579, 604-05 (1997).
227. See Ribstein, supra note 217, at 1009; see also Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the
American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1212, 1212-13 (1993) (criticizing the ALI Project for
“exalt[ing] the role of lawyers and litigation in corporate governance” and for overstating the “extent
to which process-oriented reforms are likely to succeed in improving the governance of the American
public corporation”).
228. See William Carney, The ALI’s Corporate Governance Project: The Death of Property Rights?,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 920-21 (1993).
229. See M.J. Pritchett III, Comment, Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Critique of
the ALI Statement on Corporate Governance Section 2.01(b), 71 CAL. L. Rev. 994, 1001, 1007 (1983).
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Interestingly, the ALI project also can be criticized for not going far enough
in permitting managers to consider non-shareholder interests.230  The permis-
sion granted to management to take into account ethical concerns is restricted
to only those interests that are “reasonably regarded as appropriate to the re-
sponsible conduct of business.”231  There is no mandate for managers to take
these considerations into account.
Moreover, even placing these criticisms aside, the project does not specifi-
cally address issues of concern to multinational enterprises.  Contemporary
governance rules need to address issues of cross-border governance structures
and recognize differences in the operations of domestic versus multinational
firms.  For example, even if it is conceded that the project strikes an appropri-
ate balance between the needs of shareholders and societal concerns by permit-
ting management to supersede shareholder gain in the interest of responsible
business, how might this standard be evaluated when a U.S. multinational en-
terprise is faced with a decision involving ethical standards of another country
that may differ from those in the United States?  Similarly, by providing that a
corporation is obliged, to the same extent as a natural person, to comply with
legal regulations, the question that immediately arises in the MNE context is,
which law?  Furthermore, issues of enterprise liability have not been addressed.
What is the responsibility of a U.S. parent corporation for a subsidiary operat-
ing abroad?  What rules govern the conduct of the management of the subsidi-
ary?232
It is no surprise that the ALI project would come under attack by those es-
pousing either a pure contractarian or communitarian view.  But more impor-
tantly, it is necessary to look beyond the ALI project to consider the needs of
corporate governance in a global environment.  To this end, the next section
examines the major alternative governance structures observed around the
world.
C. Corporate Governance in a Comparative Setting
The contractarianism versus communitarianism debate has been going on
within the governance literature for nearly 100 years—even longer in its philo-
sophical manifestations.  It is unlikely to be settled any time soon.  The prob-
lem today is that the changes identified above require a reexamination of con-
temporary corporate governance practices.  The ALI project offers some
practical guidance, but its contributions are limited.  An alternative approach is
                                                          
230. See generally Laurence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALI Principles of Cor-
porate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 871 (1993) (arguing that section 2.01 provides no resolu-
tion of the question of the appropriate constituents of the corporation); Lewis D. Solomon & Kathleen
J. Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate, 12 J.
CORP. L. 331, 332 (1987) (arguing that society can demand a corporate quid pro quo for the privilege
of corporate status).
231. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 213, § 2.01(b)(2), at 55.
232. For an elaboration of many of these issues, see Sundaram & Black, supra note 144.
BRADLEY_ETAL.FMT6 02/28/00  2:41 PM
Page 9: Summer 1999] CORPORATE PURPOSES 51
to consider governance practices abroad.233  Consequently, this article next will
consider an analysis of two leading economies where the governance systems
seem to be quite different from that in the United States.  The main features of
the governance systems in Germany and Japan will be examined with a view
toward learning if there are practices that might be imported into the Anglo-
American system.  In particular, the following governance attributes of Ger-
many and Japan will be examined: (1) the roles of the board of directors; (2)
the role of the managerial labor market; (3) the roles of managerial control and
compensation systems; (4) the structure of equity ownership; (5) the nature of
monitoring and control exercised by providers of capital; (6) the role of the
non-shareholding stakeholders, notably suppliers and employees; (7) the role of
the government and regulatory authorities in matters such as antitrust, disclo-
sure, insider trading, tax policies, and corporate law; and, finally, (8) the role of
the market for corporate control and takeover defenses.
The focus on the corporate governance systems of Germany and Japan, to
the seeming exclusion of other leading economies, is deliberate.  Together, the
United States, Japan, and Germany comprise the three largest industrial
economies in the world, and their gross national products collectively account
for slightly more than one-half of the gross world product.234 The universe of
the largest corporations of the world is substantially populated by firms be-
longing to one of these three economies.  For example, as of the end of 1994,
350 out of the largest 500 non-financial companies in the world were from the
United States, Germany, or Japan.235  Firms from these economies are most of-
ten among the leading global competitors of each other in a wide range of sec-
tors such as automobiles, chemicals, semiconductors, machinery, electrical and
electronics, and banking and financial services.  To the extent that the nature of
corporate governance is closely linked to the nature of industrial organization
and market structure, their styles of governance matter in the global competi-
tive arena.  Moreover, the governance systems of Germany, Japan, and the
United States have had substantial spillover effects beyond their respective
borders.  Many countries in Europe, such as Austria, Belgium, Hungary, and, to
a lesser extent, France and Switzerland, and much of northern Europe evolved
their governance systems along Germanic, rather than Anglo-American, lines.
The newly liberalizing economies of Eastern Europe appear to be patterning
their governance systems along Germanic lines as well.  The spillover effects of
the Japanese governance system are increasingly evident in Asia where Japa-
nese firms have been the largest direct foreign investors during the past decade.
Variants of the Anglo-American system of governance are evident in countries
such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
                                                          
233. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United
States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).
234. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 835
tbl.1334, 983 tbl.1335 (1996).
235. See id. at 844 tbl.354.
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1. The German Corporate Governance System.  Germany has nearly half a
million corporations and more than 3,200 joint-stock companies, known as
Aktiengessellschaften (“AGs”), but fewer than 700 are listed in equity markets,
with most of the listed firms being incorporated as AGs.236  This compares to
the more than 9,000 firms listed in the three major stock exchanges in the
United States (New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and
NASDAQ).237  Listed firms account for only about twenty percent of the
revenues of the corporate sector in Germany,238 and stock market capitalization
as a percentage of GDP at the end of 1997 is low, at less than forty percent,
compared to fifty-seven percent in Japan and 136% in the United States.239
These non-listed firms tend to be mostly the small- and medium-sized
enterprises, typically incorporated as GmbHs (Gessellschaften mit beschränkter
Haftung).  Note, however, that nearly eighty percent of the larger firms, the
AGs, are also non-listed.240
The goals of German corporations are clearly defined in German corpora-
tion law.  Originally implemented in 1937, and subsequently modified in 1965,
German corporate law defines the role of the board and the objective of corpo-
rations as the following (actual German words in parentheses): The managing
board is, on its own responsibility, to manage the corporation for the good of
the enterprise and its retinue (Gefolgschaft), the common weal of the folk
(Volk) and realm demand (Reich).241
Nothing specific was mentioned in German corporate law about sharehold-
ers until the 1965 revision.  The law also provides that if a company endangers
public welfare and does not take corrective action, it can be dissolved by an act
of state.242  Despite the relatively recent recognition that shareholders represent
an important constituency, corporate law in Germany makes it abundantly
clear that shareholders are only one of the many stakeholders on whose behalf
the managers must operate the firm.243
Large firms with more than 500 employees are required to have a two-tier
board structure: a supervisory board (Aufsichstrat) that performs the strategic
oversight role and a management board (Vorstand) that performs an opera-
tional and day-to-day management oversight role.244  Membership overlaps be-
                                                          
236. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC SURVEYS: GERMANY 87 (1995) [hereinafter OECD
GERMANY].
237. See LGT GUIDE TO WORLD EQUITY MARKETS 1997 500 (1997).
238. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236.
239. For stock market data, see INTERNATIONAL FIN. CORP., EMERGING STOCK MARKETS
FACTBOOK 17 (1998) [hereinafter IFC].  For GDP data, see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS 315, 397, 745 (July 1998) [hereinafter IMF].
240. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, and accompanying text.
241. Vagts, supra note 207, at 40 (quoting German corporate law).
242. See id. at 40-41.
243. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 84.  A report in Financial Times notes that there is
no phrase in the German language for the words “shareholder value.”  See Stefan Wagstyl, Crumbs
from the Table, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at 27.
244. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 86.
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tween the two boards are prohibited, and membership overlaps between boards
of multiple corporations are restricted and rare.245  The supervisory board per-
forms the watchdog role and is responsible for appointment and oversight of
the management board.  In firms with more than 2,000 employees, half of the
supervisory board must consist of employees of the firm; the other half consists
of shareholder representatives.246  The chairperson of the supervisory board is,
however, typically from the shareholder side and has the tie-breaking vote.247
The management board consists almost entirely of the senior management of
the company.248  Thus, board members tend to possess technical skills related to
the product and considerable firm- and industry-specific knowledge.  The es-
sence of this two-tiered board structure is the explicit representation of stake-
holder interests other than of shareholders: no major strategic decisions can be
made without the cooperation of employees and their representatives.
Management compensation in German companies is usually in the form of
fixed salaries and bonuses.  The provision of stocks or stock options as part of
the top-management’s remuneration package is rare.  In 1997, CEOs of listed
German companies earned about half of what their American counterparts
earned.249  Unlike in the United States, the compensation of German board
members must be approved by shareholders.  German corporation law stipu-
lates that such compensation must be reasonable and in conformity with the fi-
nancial situation of the firm.250  Careers are often built up from the ground level
and are focused on building asset-specific skills, through the extensive appren-
ticeship system that is used to train workers and managers in Germany.251
The ownership structure of equity differs quite substantially from that ob-
served in Anglo-American firms.  Approximately fourteen percent of the
shares are owned by banks, and about forty percent by other German corpora-
tions; both constituencies hold virtually nothing in the United States.252  Inter-
corporate shareholdings are common and difficult to disentangle from publicly
                                                          
245. See Stephen Prowse, Corporate Governance in an International Perspective: A Survey of Cor-
porate Control Mechanisms Among Large Firms in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Germany, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS ECONOMIC PAPERS NO. 41, 43 (July 1994).
246. See id.
247. See id.  The ratio of non-employee to employee representation in companies with fewer than
2,000 employees is two-to-one.  For more details on German boards, see MITSUHIRO FUKAO, FI-
NANCIAL INTEGRATION, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS 100-01 (1995); Alfred F. Conrad, Corporate Constituencies in Western Europe, 21
STETSON L. REV. 73, 74-80 (1991); Mark J. Roe, German “Populism” and the Large Public Corpora-
tion, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 187 (1994); Prowse, supra note 245, at 43; Roe, supra note 233; Vagts,
supra note 207.
248. The management board consists of managing directors, who are usually functional heads from
within the company.  See PHILIP GLOUCHEVITCH, JUGGERNAUT:  THE GERMAN WAY OF BUSINESS:
WHY IT IS TRANSFORMING EUROPE—AND THE WORLD 136 (1992); see also ROBERT LIGHTFOOT &
W. CARL KESTER, NOTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN,
AND GERMANY 10 (1991).
249. See MURPHY, supra note 10, at tbl.4.
250. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 16-17.
251. See id. at 59.
252. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 88.
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available data sources.  Seventeen percent of the equity is owned by house-
holds253–compared to approximately fifty percent in the United States254—and
this proportion has declined steadily since the 1960s.255  Ownership is concen-
trated: roughly twenty-five percent of the listed German firms have a single
majority shareholder, and such majority holdings account for about sixty-five
percent of the value of all listed stock.256
Importantly, a substantial portion of equity is in the form of bearer, rather
than registered, stock.257  As a result, such equity is left on deposit with the
hausbank of the corporation, which handles matters such as dividend payments
and record keeping.258  German law allows banks to vote such equity on deposit
by proxy, unless depositors explicitly instruct banks to do otherwise.259  Inertia
appears to work in favor of banks having these proxy votes.  As a result, banks
directly or indirectly control a large portion of the equity in German compa-
nies.  In a study of large, non-majority-owned firms in Germany reported by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”),
Baums and Fraune found that nearly eighty-five percent of the voting shares in
1992 were controlled by banks and their associated investment funds.260  Com-
pounding the influence and the controlling role of banks is the provision in
many company charters that non-bank shareholders may not exercise more
than five to ten percent of the total votes regardless of the proportion of shares
they own.261  Further, even when the shares are listed on an exchange, it is not
uncommon practice for German corporations to list only non-voting shares.262
Turning to financing patterns, German companies, taken as a whole, are
somewhat more leveraged than their American counterparts.  Gross debt-to-
total book assets was sixty percent in 1992, compared to fifty-one percent for
                                                          
253. See id. at 90 tbl.25.
254. See 1997 ABSTRACT, supra note 52, at 524 tbl.808.  (The exact percentage for the United
States  in 1990 was 49.7%; the proportion had declined slightly to 47.4% by 1996.)
255. See id.; DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, COMPARISONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES IN SELECTED EC COUNTRIES WITH OWN FUNDS, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK MONTHLY
REP. (Oct. 1994); OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 90.
256. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 89.
257. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 27.  In 1988, approximately 40% of the market value of Ger-
man shares was thus deposited with German banks, according to LIGHTFOOT & KESTER, supra note
248, at 11.
258. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 95 (noting that the system is that smaller share own-
ers typically deposit their shares with banks, which prior to general meetings are required to ask de-
positors of shares about their desires concerning the exercise of associated voting rights but, in cases
when shareholders have explicitly authorized the bank to vote on their behalf but have not given spe-
cific instructions, are allowed to vote in accordance with their own proposals).
259. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 27.
260. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 95; T. Baums & C. Fraune, Institionelle anleger und
publikumsgessellschaft: Eine empirische untersuchung (Institut for Handels-unds Wirtschaftsrecht an
der Universit Osnabrck Working Paper, 1992).
261. Banks, however, are exempt from this requirement.  See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 108-09.
262. See GLOUCHEVITCH, supra note 247, at 93.  Glouchevitch notes that the Frankfurt exchange
lets companies list only non-voting shares, thus allowing controlling interests to be kept in private
hands.  However, he also notes that this practice is prevalent with only the smaller German companies.
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U.S. firms.263  But leverage is inversely related to size: Debt-to-asset ratios are
much higher for the small- and medium-sized enterprises.  Gross debt as a per-
centage of total assets in sample German companies averaged forty-five per-
cent, but the breakdown was seventy-five percent for smaller companies, sixty-
nine percent for medium-sized companies, and forty percent for large compa-
nies.264  The one notable difference between the leverage of Anglo-American
and German firms is, however, the reliance of German firms on bank or inter-
mediated debt, and the relatively minor role played by market debt instru-
ments.265  Bank financing of long-term debt has averaged around fifty percent,
and this percentage has remained fairly stable during the past two decades.266
The other notable difference is the reliance on internal financing.  During the
period 1984-92, German companies met more than seventy percent of their
gross funding needs through internal financing.267  The relatively minor role of
equity financing is explained partly by taxes and regulation.  Until 1992, there
was a one-percent tax on the value of all new equity issues, and secondary
trading in equities was subject to a transaction tax.268
Dividend payout rules are designed to protect creditor interests.  German
law stipulates that dividends may not be paid out from paid-in capital, even if
such paid-in capital includes a premium over the face value of equity.269  This
provision makes it difficult for German firms to undertake share repurchases.
Moreover, companies must retain a portion of their profits as reserves, serving
as added security for creditors.270  Compared to U.S. firms, the quality of disclo-
sure in German firms is poor.  An OECD survey of disclosure quality states
that, as of 1989, none of the German firms in their sample had complied fully
with OECD disclosure guidelines.271  Moreover, the legal and regulatory
framework for disclosure is considered relatively lax, compared to that in the
United States.  Accounting rules emphasize conservatism.  For example, unre-
alized losses that are likely to be realized must be provided for, but unrealized
                                                          
263. See DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, WEST GERMAN ENTERPRISES’ PROFITABILITY AND FI-
NANCING, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK MONTHLY REP. (Nov. 1992); see also OECD GERMANY, supra
note 236, at 92.
264. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 93; see also Deutsche Bundesbank, supra note 263.
265. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 26.  The relatively minor role of market debt is explained by the
severe restrictions placed by the German government on the issuance of such debt.  Issuance of com-
mercial paper and domestic bonds was discouraged until 1992 by complicated authorization procedures
and transfer taxes.  The issuance of foreign currency bonds was prohibited until 1990, and the issuance
of Eurobonds required prior notification and was subjected to maturity restrictions.  See id.at 26 tbl. 4.
For more details, see M. TAKEDA &  P. TURNER, THE LIBERALIZATION OF JAPAN’S FINANCIAL
MARKETS: SOME MAJOR THEMES (1992).
266. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 94.
267. See id.
268. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 26; see also Stephen Prowse, Corporate Finance in an Interna-
tional Perspective: Legal and Regulatory Influences on Financial System Development, ECON. REV.,
July-Aug., 1996, at 2.
269. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 120.
270. See id.
271. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 29.  The zero-compliance rate in Germany compares to 67% for
U.S. firms and 75% for U.K. firms.  See id. at 10.
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gains may not be recognized.272  Similarly, tangible fixed assets are carried at
cost, less depreciation, so that true asset values are understated, and market-
able securities are carried at historical cost.273  Net income figures reported by
German firms are suspect because of the extensive use of reserve accounting to
build up hidden reserves; income-smoothing considerations tend to predomi-
nate.274  Until recently, Germany had no insider-trading laws; if insider trading
was discovered, the penalty was simply to turn over the profits.275
No doubt owing to the concentration of ownership, the constraints imposed
on stockholder voting and the control of the banks, the market for corporate
control is poorly developed in Germany.  Stephen Prowse reports that during
the period 1985-89, only 2.3% of the market value of listed stocks were in-
volved in mergers and acquisitions, compared to more than forty percent in the
United States.276  Even when corporate combinations take place, they tend to
be friendly, arranged deals.  Hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts are virtu-
ally non-existent.277  There is, as yet, no commonly accepted formal takeover
law, but there are informal guidelines.  Antitakeover provisions, poison pills,
and golden parachutes have not yet been employed in Germany.
Corporate restructurings tend to be private affairs with the hausbank play-
ing the lead role, and most workouts in financial distress tend to be informal
rather than court-based. 278  The absence of court-based workouts is not sur-
prising.  Although there are both reorganization and liquidation provisions in
German bankruptcy law, the law is skewed toward protecting creditor interests,
and the absolute priority rule is strictly followed.279  Thus, there is a bias toward
liquidations in bankruptcies that end up in courts or enter the formal workout
process,280 a situation that stakeholders prefer to avoid unless absolutely neces-
sary.
2. The Japanese Corporate Governance System.  There are approximately
1,800 listed companies in Japan,281 and their collective market capitalization as a
percentage of GDP was approximately fifty-seven percent as of 1997.282  The
hallmark of the Japanese industrial organization system is groups of networks
                                                          
272. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 106.
273. See id.
274. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 120-21.
275. See id. at 117-18.
276. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 47.
277. Between 1945 and July 1999, there have been only three cases of completed hostile takeovers
of non-financial corporations in Germany.  Data for 1945 to 1994 (three hostile takeovers) are from
Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Ownership, Control and the Performance of German Corporations 1
(London Business School Working Paper, Dec. 1997) (on file with authors).  Data from 1994 to July
1999 (zero hostile takeovers) is based on the authors’ analysis of the Securities Data Corporation
Mergers and Acquisitions database (calculations on file with authors).
278. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 123.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See LGT GUIDE TO WORLD MONEY MARKETS, supra note 237, at 266.
282. See IFC, supra note 239; IMF, supra note 239.
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of firms with stable, reciprocal, minority equity interests in each other, known
as keiretsus.283  Although the firms in a keiretsu are typically independent,
separate, joint stock companies, they tend to have relational and implicit
contracts with each other on matters such as ownership, governance, and
commercial contacts.  Keiretsus can be vertical or horizontal.  When the
network of firms consists of a loose collection of firms from the supplier to the
distributor chain, they are called vertical keiretsus; when the network consists
of a loose collection of businesses in similar product markets, they are called
horizontal keiretsus.  The horizontal keiretsus typically include a large main
bank that does business with all of the member firms.  The main bank also
holds minority equity positions in each of the member firms.284  Although the
actual number of keiretsu firms is small relative to the total number of joint
stock companies in Japan, they collectively represent about twenty-five percent
of the total sales in the Japanese corporate sector and about fifty percent of the
value of all listed stock in Japan.285
The structure of boards in Japan is similar to that in the Anglo-American
system, with single-tier boards.286  However, a substantial majority of board
members consist of company insiders, notably the current or former senior and
middle management of the company.287  Thus, unlike the United States, outside
directorships are rare.  The one exception to outside directorships is the main
banks.  Their representatives usually sit on the boards of the keiretsu firms with
whom they do business.288  Mitsuhiro Fukao reports that in 1989, banks collec-
tively sent about 2,065 directors and auditors to 2,131 Japanese companies,
which had a total of nearly 40,000 directors and auditors.289  Unlike the case of
Germany where employees and sometimes suppliers tend to have explicit
board representation, the interests of stakeholders other than management or
the banks are not directly represented on Japanese boards.290
                                                          
283. Fukao translates it as “a series of things organized to perform a function.”  FUKAO, supra note
247, at 2.  For more details on the Japanese keiretsu, see generally W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE
TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 54-55 (1991); Erik Berglof & En-
rico Perotti, The Governance Structure of the Japanese Financial Keiretsu, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 259 (1994);
David Flath, Shareholdings in the Keiretsu, Japan’s Financial Groups, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 249
(1993); Hesna Genay, Japan’s Corporate Groups, ECON. PERSP. Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 20 (comparing
Japanese keiretsus and independent firms); James R. Lincoln et al., Evolving Patterns of Keiretsu Or-
ganization and Action in Japan, in 20 RESEARCH AND ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 303 (Barry M.
Staw & L.L. Cummings eds., 1998); James R. Lincoln et al., Keiretsu Networks & Corporate Perform-
ance in Japan, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 67 (1996) (examining the relationship between keiretsu membership
and profitability among 197 firms over a period of 24 years); Gilson & Roe, supra note 19, at 894-95.
284. See Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan, 11 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 399, 402 (1989).
285. See LIGHTFOOT & KESTER, supra note 248, at 6.
286. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 42.
287. Fukao notes that nearly 78% of Japanese directors are promoted from among employees.  See
FUKAO, supra note 247, at 14.
288. See id. at 25.
289. See id.
290. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS NO.
62, Dec. 1995, at 23.
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Concrete evidence on the role and effectiveness of Japanese boards in dis-
ciplining management is unavailable, but, in addition to the boards, three other
constituencies seem to perform important monitoring roles.  Banks play an
oversight role, being closely involved in matters of top-management selection
and replacement, advice, commercial contacts, and intervention in times of fi-
nancial distress.291  Evidence suggests that involuntary top-management turn-
over is higher following poor financial and stock price performance in Japanese
companies with extensive bank involvement.292  The other common governance
feature among vertical keiretsu companies with a supplier network is the kyo-
ryokukai, or suppliers’ clubs, that meet regularly to exchange ideas and infor-
mation on people and firms with whom they do business.293  These clubs act as a
check on management.294  The third source of top-management monitoring is
the Presidents’ Club, which consists of the presidents of the member firms of a
keiretsu who meet at regular intervals, and sometimes informally, to discuss ac-
tivities within their group.295  Shareholders can theoretically remove directors
by a simple majority vote, but this rarely happens.296
Share ownership in Japan is concentrated and stable.  Although Japanese
banks are not allowed to hold more than five percent of a single firm’s stock, a
small group of four or five banks typically controls about twenty to twenty-five
percent of a firm’s equity.297  The largest bank shareholder also is usually the
largest debtholder in the company.298  Individual share ownership in Japan, like
in Germany, has steadily declined from about fifty percent in the 1950s to
                                                          
291. See generally KESTER, supra note 283, at 69-74 (discussing the concept of selective interven-
tion); W. Carl Kester, The Hidden Cost of Japanese Success, 3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 90 (1991)
(discussing the role of bank oversight in corporate governance).
292. See Jun-Koo Kang & Anvil Shivdasani, Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top
Executive Turnover in Japan, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 41-49 (1995); Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A.
Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers,
36 J. FIN. ECON. 225, 243, 246-47 (1994).
293. See LIGHTFOOT & KESTER, supra note 248, at 8.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 68-69.
296. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 15.
297. See id. at 22 tbl.2-4; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance
and Commercial Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48
STAN. L. REV. 73, 82-83 (1995).
298. In his sample of Japanese firms, Prowse reports that in 45% of the firms, the largest share-
holding bank is also the largest debtholder, accounting for about 25% of the firm’s debt, on average.
See Stephen Prowse, The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan, 47 J. FIN. 1121, 1123, 1126
(1992).  The five largest debtholders in a firm had, on average, approximately 50% of the firm’s debt
and about 20% of its equity.  See id. at 1128.  Another 25% of the equity in Japanese companies is ac-
counted for by inter-corporate stockholding, and these cross-holdings are rarely, if ever, sold.  The
agreement not to sell inter-corporate holdings is unwritten and implicit.  Indeed, the 25% of equity as
inter-corporate holdings is a number that remained remarkably stable during the past two or three
decades.  It is remarkable because the proportion of inter-corporate holdings barely budged during the
period 1985-89, when the Japanese stock market rose by about 150% and when we may have expected
an increase in such holdings, and during the period 1989-94, when the stock market declined by about
60% and a decrease in such holdings may have been expected,.  Insurance companies in Japan hold
another 20% of the equity; they may not own more than 10% of the equity in a single company.  See
David E. Weinstein, FDI and Keiretsu: Rethinking US and Japanese Policy, in EFFECTS OF US TRADE
PROTECTION AND PROMOTION POLICIES 91 tbl.4.1 (Robert C. Feenstra ed., 1997)
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about twenty percent at present.299  Thus, in a typical Japanese firm, approxi-
mately two-thirds of the equity is owned by banks, insurance companies, and
other corporations.300  This proportion has remained fairly stable over the past
fifteen years, and these closely held shares rarely, if ever, make it into the fi-
nancial marketplace.
As in Germany, the market for corporate control in Japan is relatively inac-
tive.  Mergers and acquisitions were slightly more than three percent of total
market capitalization during the period 1985-89,301 and all were friendly transac-
tions.  Although there are, on average, about 450 mergers or acquisitions in-
volving Japanese companies annually, about half of these consist of Japanese
companies acquiring non-Japanese companies, and most of the remaining con-
sist of small deals among Japanese companies.302
Antitakeover defenses, poison pills, and golden parachutes are rarely pres-
ent in corporate charters or bylaws.  The words used to describe takeovers in
Japanese—miurisuru (to sell one’s body), baishu (bribery), and nottori
(hijack)—suggest a cultural aversion to takeovers.  Part of the reason for this
cultural aversion appears to stem from the fact that organized crime groups
such as the yakuza are often involved in stock-cornering, greenmailing, and the
occasional takeover attempt.303  The late 1980s saw successful greenmailings of
a number of Japanese companies, including some well-known companies such
as Toyota, Fujiya, and Mitsui Mining.304  Although the Japanese Commercial
Code prohibits firms from repurchasing their own shares,305 the frequency of
greenmailings suggests that many Japanese firms seem to have overcome this
provision in the law quite successfully.306
Corporate restructurings in Japan tend to be private and informal.  Courts
or lawyers are rarely used, with the main bank usually taking the lead role in
these transactions.307  Restructurings also appear to be accompanied by consid-
erable top-management replacement.308  Bankruptcy law in Japan has both liq-
uidation and rehabilitation provisions, and, as in Germany, the law is skewed
                                                          
299. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 88.
300. In 1990, insurance companies held 19.6% of common stock in Japanese companies.  See id. at
88 tbl.23. According to this source, banks owned 18.9%, and non-financial enterprises owned 24.9%,
thus totaling 63.4% among these three constituencies.  If pension funds and other financial institutions
are added, the total would be approximately 73%.
301. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 47.
302. See KESTER, supra note 283, at 83-84, exhibit 4-1  (noting that “deal flow in Japan involves
combinations of much smaller size [compared to the U.S.]”).
303. See id. at 245.
304. See id. at 245, 247-48 (listing 41 greenmailings during the period 1976-88).  Regarding the in-
volvement of the underworld in corporate Japan, see Corporate Japan Hit By Gangsters, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1997, at 23; Fifth of Japanese Companies Admit to Bad Behavior, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at
6.
305. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 114.  There are severe restrictions, as in Germany, on firms’
payout policies vis-à-vis their paid-in capital.  See id.
306. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
307. See LIGHTFOOT & KESTER, supra note 248, at 8-9.
308. See Kang & Shivdasani, supra note 292.
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toward protecting creditors’ interests.309  However, there is no evidence of a
bias toward liquidation in restructurings that result in formal workouts.
Although their leverage has been decreasing over time, Japanese companies
tend to be, on average, more leveraged than their U.S. or German counter-
parts.  Gross debt-to-total book assets was about eighty percent in 1992, and
fifty-seven percent of the debt was bank or financial institution-
intermediated.310  During the period 1984 to 1992, Japanese firms funded more
than fifty percent of their gross funding needs through debt.311  Retained earn-
ings play a smaller role than in Germany and the United States.  About forty
percent of the gross funding needs during the period 1984 to 1992 were ac-
counted for by internally generated funds.312  There were considerable restric-
tions during the 1970s and 1980s on a firm’s ability to raise market debt such as
commercial paper, domestic bonds, and Eurobonds.313  Moreover, until 1988,
there was a heavy transactions tax on equity transfers.314  As these restrictions
have been eased, however, Japanese firms have been undertaking more issu-
ances of market debt, especially in the Euromarkets, driven, in part, by a desire
to reduce their dependence on the main banks and their bank debt.315  In the
early 1980s, only 250 Japanese firms had issued bonds outside Japan; by the late
1980s, the number had grown to more than 1,200.316  Rules on dividend payouts
and share repurchase are similar to those in Germany, although Japanese firms
are able to overcome the rules on share repurchases with some ease.
Internal management styles and control systems in Japanese firms rely on
building long-term, consensus-based relationships and are characterized by a
great deal of informal interactions, personal relations, and information-sharing
among relatively culturally homogeneous individuals.  There is an apparent re-
liance on trust, reputation-building, and face-saving considerations as the basis
for contracting.317  The corporation is seen by its employees as much as a social
entity as an economic entity.  Companies rely on basic agreements and face-to-
face contacts to resolve issues.  Legal contracts or stipulations with stakehold-
ers are rare.  Japanese firms in the larger, organized sector of the economy em-
phasize lifetime employment and building human capital by maximizing asset-
specific and relation-specific skills.318  Lateral inter-functional transfers of man-
                                                          
309. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 123 (noting that banks are usually involved in the informal
workout process and that the “protection of collateral is strong”).
310. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 92.
311. See id. at 91.
312. See id.
313. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 26 tbl.4.
314. See id.
315. See id. at 58 (citing Hoshi et al., The Role of Banks in Reducing Costs of Financial Distress in
Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67 (1990) (noting that many Japanese firms were reducing their dependence
on banks and resorting to external finance during the 1980s).
316. See The New State of Corporate Japan, Survey: International Finance, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27,
1991, at 32, 36.
317. See generally KESTER, supra note 283.
318. See generally Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1 (1990) (discussing the structure of Japanese firms).
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agers and horizontal information flows among functions and departments, both
within the firm and across firms within the network, are common.  Upward
mobility within Japanese organizations is carried out through a process of
moving up through a cross-functional spiral rather than a series of promotions
within a particular functional area.319  Management compensation, including
that of top management, relies on salaries and bonuses.320  Stocks or stock op-
tions are rarely used as a basis for remuneration.  Total compensation of top
managers, including bonuses, is about six to eight times the compensation of
the most highly paid blue-collar worker and about seventeen times that of the
average worker.321  A managerial labor market along the U.S. style, especially
for mid-career workers, is thin.322
Disclosure quality, although considered superior to that of German compa-
nies, is poor relative to that of U.S. firms.  Although there are rules against in-
sider trading and monopolistic practices, the application of these laws is, at
best, uneven and inconsistent.  As with German firms, accounting rules empha-
size conservatism.323
3. Assessment of the German and Japanese Governance Systems.  Although
there are some apparent differences, there is a surprising degree of similarity
between the German and Japanese governance systems.  Similarities include
the relatively little reliance on external capital markets; the minor role of indi-
vidual share ownership; the significant role of institutional and inter-corporate
ownership, which is often concentrated; relatively stable and permanent capital
providers; boards comprising functional specialists and insiders with knowledge
of the firm and the industry; the relatively important role of banks as financiers,
advisers, managers, and monitors of top management; the increased role of lev-
erage with emphasis on bank financing; informal as opposed to formal work-
outs in financial distress; the emphasis on salary and bonuses rather than stocks
and stock options as the basis for top- management compensation; the rela-
tively poor disclosure from the standpoint of outside investors; and conserva-
tism in accounting policies.  Moreover, both the German and Japanese govern-
ance systems emphasize the protection of employee and creditor interests at
least as much as the interests of shareholders.324  The market for corporate con-
trol as a credible disciplining device is largely absent in both Japan and Ger-
many, as is the need for takeover defenses.  The governance system itself may
be considered a de facto poison pill.
The focus of the governance problem in the United States and, more gener-
ally, the Anglo-American system, appears to implicitly address the agency
                                                          
319. See id. at 11.
320. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 107 fig.27.
321. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 17.
322. See id. at 57.
323. See id. at 119-20.
324. One difference is that employees play less of a direct role in Japan as compared to the German
system, but suppliers play a more important role in Japan.
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problems that arise in the context of information asymmetries and self-
interested behavior among managers, equityholders, and debtholders.  In Ger-
many and Japan, the governance systems appear to be focused on addressing
problems of transaction efficiency and the appropriate scope of the firm.325  In
the U.S. governance system, the solution to problems of transaction efficiency
and firm scope is approached through the lens of the choice between markets--
arms-length dealings--and hierarchies--vertical or horizontal integration--while
in the German and Japanese governance systems, the solution to agency prob-
lems between management, debt, and equity appears to be addressed by at-
tempts to bundle or commingle the three constituencies into one.326  The U.S.
approach to governance is comparatively contractarian in its scope and intent,
while the German and Japanese approaches to governance are relatively com-
munitarian in their scope and intent.  As noted above, the firm in Germany and
Japan is considered as much of a social entity as it is an economic entity.  In the
words of OECD, the U.S. system is an outsider system of governance, while the
German and Japanese systems are insider systems of governance.327
The attributes of German and Japanese governance identified above—
emphasis on lifetime employment; a significant governance role for employees
and suppliers; concentrated and stable equity ownership with relatively perma-
nent providers of capital; bank involvement; insiders with experience on the
board; and emphasis on informal and face-to-face, rather than formal, contrac-
tual, court-based relationships—have not been created in an institutional and
historical vacuum.  The very fact that these attributes have evolved and sur-
vived over time in two relatively successful corporate economies prima facie
suggests that they must, indeed, have their efficiency aspects.
The emphasis on lifetime employment and the employee role in governance
must surely give employees a greater incentive to develop and supply firm-
specific human capital.328  It also encourages greater employee loyalty to corpo-
rations and perhaps helps to create a more engaged labor force that is willing to
contribute to a team effort rather than competitive relationships within firms.329
Employees also may have a greater incentive to provide value-saving advice
                                                          
325. Kester, Gilson, and Roe refer to the latter set of issues as the workings of a contractual--as op-
posed to corporate--governance system. W. Carl Kester, Industrial Groups as Systems of Contractual
Governance, 8 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 24 (1992); Gilson & Roe, supra note 19, at 874.
326. See KESTER, supra note 283, at 32-34 (noting that “an important effect of cross-shareholding
arrangements . . . is to commingle the types of claims against a company held by its various stakehold-
ers,” and the economic benefits from such commingling are “a reduction in the frictions that might
normally arise among various stakeholder groups if each owned a separate and distinct claim”).
327. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 28.
328. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 6 (arguing that “it is easier for the management of Japanese
and German companies than it is for the management of U.S. and U.K. companies to maintain long-
term implicit contracts with employees”); see also OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 108 (noting
that the “greater stability and consensus in labor relations may increase the incentives for investment
in human capital both on the part of firms and workers themselves”); Kester, supra note 325, at 35
(arguing that “the distribution of equity ownership among significant corporate stakeholders facilitates
implicit contracting and the realization of transactional efficiencies”).
329. See Roe, supra note 233, at 1984 (noting that “loyalty to real people may motivate better than
legally mandated loyalty to an abstraction”).
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and may be more willing to make concessions in times of economic or financial
distress.330  Analogous arguments, such as the greater ability to deal with qual-
ity-control issues and to develop firm-specific arrangements, could be logically
made with respect to suppliers.
Stable, concentrated, relatively permanent, cross-owned equity capital pro-
viders also play a positive role.  Mark J. Roe argues that large shareholders’
“ongoing involvement means that they do not need time to move up from the
bottom of a learning curve and can intervene quickly when crises hit.”331  He
goes on to argue that block ownership of shares facilitates a great deal of mu-
tual monitoring and deters opportunism with multiple blocks checking each
other, impelling managerial action, and facilitating power sharing, not domina-
tion.332  Mitsuhiro Fukao argues that such an equity ownership structure could
lower the cost of equity capital.333  In addition, the preponderance of insiders on
the board encourages a great deal of information sharing and brings firm- and
industry-specific knowledge to the governance process.334  Other implications of
stable, permanent equity ownership are obvious.  Managers do not need to con-
stantly look over their shoulders worrying about corporate raiders.  They can
manage for the long run and can more effectively withstand the pressures to
manage on a quarter-to-quarter basis.
Quite apart from the lending and the direct intervention roles they play,
banks also may facilitate the governance process.  They are likely to have a
great deal of access to inside information and hence can perform a monitoring
role very effectively;335 the bundling of debt and equity claims with the same
capital providers eliminates, or at least mitigates, the potential agency prob-
lems that can arise between debtholders and equityholders;336 and restrictions
on cash distributions (for example, on share repurchases and dividend pay-
ments) can lower the cost of debt because creditors’ positions are made safer.337
Finally, it is no surprise, given the governance role of the banks, that resolution
                                                          
330. Germany has among the lowest levels of strike activity among the OECD group of countries,
and an extremely high proportion of new recruits, 71%, receive formal training from employers
through apprenticeship systems “represent[ing] a considerable investment by both firms and workers
(through lower pay), partly related to the expected long tenure.”  OECD GERMANY, supra note 236,
at 108.  The report also points out that in Germany, employment adjustment to output fluctuations
happens more through the number of hours worked, compared to the United States where the number
employed bears a much larger part of the adjustment.  See id. at 108-09.
331. Roe, supra note 233, at 1980.
332. See id.
333. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 6.
334. See KESTER, supra note 283, at 35 (“[D]irectors of an industry group company mirror the
company’s most important long term stakeholder relationships.  They generally bring to the position
considerable managerial expertise, thorough knowledge of the company’s businesses, and a deep ap-
preciation of the company’s contractual relationship with its major stakeholders.”).
335. See id. at 35-36; see also Roe, supra note 233, at 1984 (arguing that bank ownership can actu-
ally increase managerial accountability).
336. See Roe, supra note 233, at 1986 (pointing out that such commingling of claims can create a
disincentive to adopt high-variance strategies that can benefit stockholders at the expense of creditors
and other stakeholders).
337. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 6.
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of financial distress in both Germany and Japan is a much more informal proc-
ess compared to a country such as the United States.338
Clearly, the cooperation among firms under the Japanese system permits a
degree of integration that is not possible under U.S. antitrust laws.  The coordi-
nation along the value chain as well as consultation with competitors must en-
hance economic efficiency, although the lack of competition may stifle the in-
centives to exploit these efficiencies.
a. A Critique of German and Japanese Governance.  The stakeholder
orientation and the relatively communitarian features of German and Japanese
corporate governance are not, however, without their costs.  The bank-centered
nature of governance in both Germany and Japan poses a number of risks.
Unlike the case of equity investors who, in both theory and practice, are
concerned with the systematic risk of a particular asset vis-á-vis a well-
diversified portfolio, undiversified debtholders are concerned about their credit
risk, which is determined by an asset’s total risk.339  Focus on total risk creates a
number of adverse incentive problems on both the asset side and the liability
side of a firm’s balance sheet.  On the asset side, it can create the tendency to
reduce total risk through corporate diversification or by ex ante constraining
investment that maximizes share value.340  It also can induce a bias against start-
up kinds of businesses because a focus on total risk minimization can lead to
entrepreneurial risk-aversion in investment choices.  In a related vein, it is
inherent in the nature of bank credit to focus on asset types that are
collateralizable and tangible, thus biasing investment choices away from asset
types that are intangible and, hence, non-collateralizable.  The latter type of
asset typically tends to be more research-and-development- and human-capital
intensive.  As previously argued, comparative advantages in global product
markets depend critically on such assets.341  On the liability side of a firm’s
balance sheet, a focus on total risk reduction can lead to excessive hedging and
excessive investment in insurance.  It also can focus a firm’s accounting policies
toward income-smoothing, rather than value-creating, considerations.
The heightened roles of both employees (Germany) and suppliers (Japan)
in corporate governance can lead to inflexibility in sourcing strategies, labor
markets, and corporate restructurings (for example, asset sales, downsizing,
                                                          
338. See Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE
L.J. 1043 (1992).  For a comparative discussion of bankruptcy laws in Germany, the United Kingdom,
Japan and the United States, see Bankruptcy Law: The Sticky End, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 1990, at 77
(comparing the bankruptcy laws in the major industrialized economies and arguing the need for a
more uniform system); see FUKAO, supra note 247, at 122-24.
339. Systematic risks are the risks that remain in a well-diversified portfolio of stocks, whereby all
the unsystematic risks have been diversified away.  Rational stock investors are assumed to hold well-
diversified portfolios and, hence, bear only the systematic portion of the total risk--the total risk is the
sum of systematic and unsystematic risks--in stock returns.  See, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART
MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1996).
340. This is the underinvestment incentive recognized in the finance literature.  See, e.g., Stewart C.
Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).
341. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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spin-offs, and deconglomeration).  In contrast to U.S. firms, therefore, firms in
Germany and Japan are less likely to be able to move quickly to meet competi-
tive challenges from the global product-market arena.342  The employees’ role
in governance also may have an adverse impact on labor costs, further eroding
firms’ competitive positions in a global economy.  The suppliers’ role in gov-
ernance, as in the case of the vertical keiretsu in Japan, can lead to potential
problems of implicit or explicit vertical restraints to competition and, hence,
antitrust problems.  In addition, a firm’s globalization strategy might be seri-
ously hindered because an entire vertical chain of relationships is less portable
across borders than within a stand-alone firm.  Moreover, as fixed claimants to
a firm’s revenue stream, both employees and suppliers have an incentive to
skew corporate decisions toward total-risk-minimization strategies.  This exac-
erbates the similar incentives that follow from the bank’s role in governance.
The nature of equity ownership—intercorporate holdings as permanent and
stable providers of equity capital—also may pose problems.  Given the differ-
ences in laws, especially in the Anglo-American system of governance, the
ownership structures are likely to be illegal in some countries and therefore less
likely to be portable across borders.  They are also inconsistent with the inexo-
rable trends toward the globalization of financial markets, with the increasing
role played by private pension and mutual funds.  Because such structures may
be biased toward external-capital-market dependence and because current
owners may not want to dilute their ownership, stable crossholdings create arti-
ficial capital constraints.  The perceived stability in capital provision also may
lead managers to undertake excessive investments in capacity and may create
the tendency for product and brand proliferation as well as uneconomical di-
versification.343  Finally, these equity ownership structures militate against the
development of a market for corporate control, which arguably is an important
source of managerial discipline in the Anglo-American system.
The emphasis on lifetime, or at least long-term, employment may induce its
own biases—it obviates any role for the managerial labor market as a disci-
plining mechanism.  Further, it biases the firm toward corporate strategies that
emphasize survival and market-share maximization, rather than share-value
and profit maximization, because of the obvious benefits of job stability that
such strategies entail.  Lifetime/long-term employment strategies also hinder
inter-corporate mobility and inter-corporate socialization, thereby potentially
                                                          
342. See generally Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, 37 J.
FIN. ECON. 67 (1995) (examining deconglomeration evidence that speaks to the flexibility of the U.S.
system).  See generally Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the
1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547 (1994).
343. See KESTER, supra note 283, at 39 (observing this to be true in the Japanese setting); see also
Kester, supra note 291, at 219-35.  Recent work related to the Korean governance system with their
chaebols, which are industrial groupings similar to the keiretsu in Japan, finds that chaebol firms, too,
have a tendency to overinvest, that is, they invest more than non-chaebol firms, despite relatively poor
growth opportunities.  See Hyun-Han Shin & Young S. Park, Financing Constraints and Internal Capi-
tal Markets: Evidence from the Korean Chaebols (Working Paper, 1999) (on file with the authors).
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stunting the development of industries that rely on cross-fertilization of ideas
and human capital (for example, Silicon Valley-type industries).
Recent and growing empirical evidence suggests that many of these theo-
retical risks are, in fact, real.  Labor costs in manufacturing both in Germany
and Japan have seriously eroded the competitiveness of their firms in the global
marketplace.  For example, as of the end of 1996, the average German manu-
facturer paid about thirty-two dollars per hour of employee work, the Japanese
manufacturer paid about twenty-one dollars, while in the United States, the
comparable figure was about $17.70.344  Inflexible labor markets have contrib-
uted to the historically high unemployment rates in Europe during the past few
years, while the unemployment rate in the United States has been steadily de-
clining.345  During the period 1984 to 1996, the U.S. economy created 22.3 mil-
lion jobs--20.5 million in the private sector and 1.8 million in the government
sector--for an employment growth of nearly twenty-five percent--twenty-seven
percent growth in the private sector and more than twelve percent growth in
the government sector.346  In comparison, for the roughly similar period 1984 to
1995, the European Union witnessed an employment growth of just 0.6% in the
private sector and a decline of 4.2% in the government sector, thus increasing
overall unemployment, given the growth in the labor force during this period.347
A recent report of the OECD states that labor productivity across the board in
Germany is about eighty percent of that in the United States, while labor pro-
ductivity in Japan is about sixty-one percent of that in the United States.348
As previously noted, private mutual funds play an extremely small role in
the equity markets of both Germany and Japan, as do private pension funds.
Pension funds in the United States held more than four trillion dollars in assets
in 1995 (fifty-five percent of GNP), and the U.K. funds had $814 billion in as-
sets (seventy-three percent of GNP), compared to seventy billion dollars in
pension fund assets in Germany (3.2% of GNP) and forty-one billion dollars in
France (3.4% of GNP).349  More than eighty percent of the U.K. pension fund
                                                          
344. See OFFICE OF PRODUCTIVITY AND TECHNOLOGY, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HOURLY COSTS FOR PRODUCTION WORKERS
IN MANUFACTURING, 1975-1996, tbl.2 (June 1997).
345. See generally OECD, THE OECD JOBS STUDY: EVIDENCE AND EXPLANATIONS: PART 1:
LABOUR MARKET TRENDS AND UNDERLYING FORCES OF CHANGE (1994).  During the period 1980
to 1995, the unemployment rate in the Unites States declined from 7.1% to 5.6%, while it went up
from 2.8% to 6.5% in West Germany and from 2.0% to 3.2% in Japan.  See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 845 (1997).
346. The figures are calculated from the data in ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND
DEV., NATIONAL ACCOUNTS—DETAILED TABLES 71, tbl.15 (1998) (on file with authors).
347. The figures are calculated from the STATISTICS DIRECTORATE, 33 HISTORICAL STATISTICS—
1960-1995 tbls.1.12, 1.13 (1997)  (on file with authors).
348. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., 2 TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTIVITY
AND JOBS CREATION 32 tbl.2.1 (1996).  There is also evidence that total manufacturing productivity
growth during the 1990s in Germany and Japan has substantially lagged behind that in the United
States.  See BUREAU OF CENSUS, supra note 345, at 847.
349. Data for pension fund assets in the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany are found in
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS,
PROSPECTS, AND KEY POLICY ISSUES 184 (Sept. 1998).  For GNP data, see BUREAU OF CENSUS, su-
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investments were in equity, compared to thirteen percent in France and eleven
percent in Germany.350  The negligible roles that the market for corporate con-
trol and the managerial labor markets play in both Germany and Japan have
already been noted.
A more serious, longer-term competitive issue for Germany and Japan may
be the bias in the governance system against start-ups and research-and-
development- (“R&D”) and human-capital-intensive industries.  The average
age of a listed firm in the United Kingdom is about eight years.351  In the United
States, the figure is fourteen years for stocks listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change and thirteen years for NASDAQ-listed stocks.352  These numbers are in
stark contrast to the average fifty-five years for firms listed on the pan-German
stock exchanges.353  The share of less-than-ten-year-old companies listed in the
stock exchange is about forty percent in the United States, compared to 0.7%
in Japan.354  A recent OECD analysis concludes that, compared to the United
States, both Germany and Japan have a comparative disadvantage in high-
technology sectors.355  This empirical analysis is also borne out by casual obser-
vation.  Germany and Japan have nowhere near the number and variety of
firms that we see in the United States in high R&D- and human capital-
intensive sectors such as computer software, the internet, information technol-
ogy, media, and biotechnology.356  A U.S.-style venture capital industry is virtu-
ally non-existent in either country.357
b. Changes in the Governance Systems.  The three governance systems
are, of course, not static.  The past decade has witnessed evolutionary shifts in
all three systems, but arguably, the nature of changes in Germany and Japan,
relative to their underlying focus historically, has been more dramatic than that
in the United States.
There are a number of changes underway in the U.S. system of corporate
governance including the increasing influence of the sentiments reflected in the
ALI Project on Corporate Governance;358 the shifting roles of institutional
                                                          
pra note 345, at 838.  Data for France pertain to 1993, and are found in Editorial, Olivetti’s Lesson,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1996, at A16.
350. See generally IMF, supra note 239; Olivetti’s Lesson, supra note 349.
351. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 117.
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 70-71.
355. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 102.
356. See Business in Europe Survey: Small Beginnings, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1996, at 13-14.
357. See generally Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capi-
tal Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998) (comparing U.S. capital markets
to those of Germany and Japan).  California alone generated more venture capital funds in 1996 than
did Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.  See Start-Ups, ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 1997, at 113.
358. See Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 21 J. CORP. L. 417, 430-32 (1996).  See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 213.
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shareholders and independent directors on boards;359 the attempts to delink the
jobs of chairpersons and CEO;360 the recent changes in proxy-voting rules insti-
tuted by the SEC;361 the Delaware court rulings on the importance of incum-
bent-firm strategy in takeover contests;362 the regulatory moves away from di-
rector liability;363 and the increasingly contractarian imperatives of the global
financial markets.  However, as discussed earlier, these changes do not appear
to challenge in any fundamental way the United States’s outsider orientation or
                                                          
359. The increased role of institutional investors is apparent in the various corporate governance
principles that have been proposed and promulgated by large pension funds such as the California
Public Employees Retirement System (“CalPERS”) and in the annual rankings of “governance
grades” given to various companies. A recent study uses the governance grades given by CalPERS as a
control variable in assessing corporate performance and finds that there are significant improvements
in corporate performance, as measured by Economic Value Added, for those companies graded higher
by CalPERS. See Ira Millstein & Paul MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Improved Per-
formance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998).  Millstein and
MacAvoy document substantial evidence on the governance pressures faced by U.S. corporations from
large public pension funds.  With respect to the heightened roles of independent directors, the article
cites an impressive array of evidence from a number of surveys of board composition during the 1990s
which have found increased roles for outside and independent directors.  See INVESTOR RESPON-
SIBILITY RESEARCH CTR., INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER BOARD PRACTICES 1996,
3-6 (noting that nearly two-thirds of directors in 435 Standard & Poors 500 companies are independ-
ent; four out of five companies have boards where independent directors comprise a majority);
KORN/FERRY INT’L, TWENTIETH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 3 (1993) (showing that the
proportion of insiders on board was 25% in 1992, compared to 38% in 1972).  See generally Constance
E. Bagley & Richard H. Koppes, Leader of the Pack: A Proposal for Disclosure of Board Leadership
Structure, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 149 (1997); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, Board Composition and
Firm Performance: The Uneasy Case for Majority Independent Boards, 1053 CORP. GOVERNANCE
INST. 95 (1998); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-
Captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1996); Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the
Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV. 985 (1993); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 124 (1994); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Share-
holder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313 (1992); Park McGinty, Replacing Hos-
tile Takeovers, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1996); Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance: The Role
of Special Litigation Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79 (1993); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); James M. To-
bin, The Squeeze on Directors—Inside is Out, 49 BUS. LAW. 1707 (1994).
360. See HAROLD M. WILLIAMS & IRVING S. SHAPIRO, THE 1979 BENJAMIN F. FAIRLESS
MEMORIAL LECTURES, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CORPORATE
BOARD 18 (1979); see also JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 184-87 (1989); Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A
Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 58 (1992).
361. See generally Joseph Evan Calio & Rafael Xavier Zahralddin, The Securities and Exchange
Commission’s 1992 Proxy Amendments: Questions of Accountability, 14 PACE L. REV. 459 (1994).  See
also Norma M. Sharara & Anne E. Hoke-Witherspoon, The Evolution of the 1992 Shareholder Com-
munication Proxy Rules and their Impact on Corporate Governance, 49 BUS. LAW. 327 (1993).
362. See Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When is Using
a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 514-24 (1993).  See generally Richard C. Brown, The Role
of the Courts in Hostile Takeovers, 93 DICK. L. REV. 195 (1989); Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles
M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the
End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593 (1994); Alex Devience, Jr., A Hindsight Review of the
Business Judgment Rule in a Takeover Environment: The State of the Business Judgment Rule after the
Fall, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 113 (1992-93).
363. See supra notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
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its focus on shareholder value and financial returns.  Indeed, many of the
changes in the U.S. governance system may be in the direction of actually
strengthening its underlying contractarian focus.  Further, there do not appear
to be any systematic or widespread moves either in boardrooms or in the realm
of public policy to make U.S. firms more communitarian in their approach to
governance.  On the other hand, the changes in Germany and Japan appear to
be moving firms in a direction away from their traditional in-
sider/communitarian focus.
Consider the German case first.  Although the German governance system
continues to meet stiff resistance from unions and employees and although
some of the changes may be halting, many basic features of the system appear
to be under severe stress.  The sources of such stress include regulatory changes
both at home and from the European Union directives, the imperatives of cor-
porate decisionmaking in the context of eroding competitiveness in globalized
financial and product markets, and grassroots shareholder activism.364
During the past decade, many of the regulations prohibiting or constraining
the issuance of equity and market debt have been dismantled in Germany.365
Insider trading laws have been passed;366 consideration is being given to changes
in corporate law to allow firms to repurchase shares;367 firms are now allowed to
pay their sick workers only eighty percent of full pay;368 banks are being en-
couraged to divest their corporate shareholdings and to reduce their lending
exposures to individual companies;369 major revisions of bankruptcy laws are
under discussion;370 efforts are underway to develop a new set of standards for
financial disclosure;371 German investors are now required to reveal the details
of share ownership of more than five percent in a company;372 a new supervi-
sory authority for securities trading is in the process of being created;373 special
tax incentives are being offered for start-up firms in high-risk industries;374 for-
eign share ownership rules have been relaxed;375 and, as a result, foreigners now
                                                          
364. See, e.g., A Specter in Europe: Shareholders Demand Rights, INT’L HERALD TRIB. Apr. 28,
1998, at 11; Shareholder Rights Go Global, INT’L HERALD TRIB. Apr. 7, 1998, at 11; The Outsider,
ECONOMIST, June 3, 1995, at 66.
365. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 27.
366. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 120.
367. See Stefan Wagstyl et al., Crumbs from the Table, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at Comment &
Analysis 27.
368. Until recently, firms were required to pay 100%; this change resulted in major strikes and
work stoppages in Germany in the last quarter of 1996.  See Edmund Andrews, New Hard Line by Big
Companies Threatens German Work Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1996, at A1 (noting that “the Par-
liament approved a broad new bill that reduces the minimum required sick pay from 100% of pay for
six weeks to 80%”); see also Blue Monday, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 1996, at A18.
369. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 120.
370. See FUKAO, supra note 247, at 123.
371. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 120.
372. See Stakeholder Capitalism: Unhappy Families, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 23.
373. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 120.
374. See id. at 121.
375. See Business in Europe: Investor Power, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1996, at 11-12.
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own nearly twenty percent of the shares in Germany, up from negligible
amounts in the 1950s.376
Substantial changes are underway at the German corporate level as well.
An increasing number of firms are listing their shares abroad, especially in the
Anglo-American markets;377 some degree of corporate restructuring through
sale of unprofitable units, spin-offs to increase shareholder value, downsizing,
and deconglomeration appear to be underway;378 and a few major companies
have introduced stock-option schemes as part of top-management compensa-
tion.379
The changes in the German corporate sector are exemplified in perhaps an
exaggerated way—although the extent of exaggeration may be a matter of de-
gree rather than kind—by the case of its largest industrial company, Daimler-
Benz.380  During the 1980s, the company diversified aggressively, primarily
through acquisitions, from its core automotive business to such increasingly un-
related businesses as aerospace, microelectronics, white goods, and financial
services.  Many of these acquisitions turned out to be unprofitable, and from
1986 to 1993, the market value of the company declined from DM50.5 billion to
DM25.3 billion, its operating income declined from DM6.13 billion to a nega-
tive DM6.76 billion, and its operating cash flow as a percentage of sales de-
clined from 10.43% to 7.15%.381  Faced with an increasing cash-flow crisis and
the need to expand its sources of capital, in 1993, Daimler-Benz listed its stock
on the New York Stock Exchange under SEC-mandated U.S. GAAP rules of
disclosure.382  Fewer than two years later, there was a CEO change, and the new
CEO was viewed as “putting profits ahead of strategy and treat[ing] sharehold-
ers as owners rather than serfs.”383  During the next eighteen months, the com-
pany reduced its workforce by 70,000, reduced the proportion of shares held by
both its hausbank shareholders, Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank—and more
                                                          
376. See European Business: Le Defi Americain, Again, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1996, at 21-22.
377. See id. at 21.
378. See Wake Up or Die, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1996, at 8; see also European Business, supra note
376, at 22-23.
379. See Business in Europe, supra note 375, at 12.  See generally European Business, supra note
376.  The Economist also discusses how the well-known German firm Siemens is transforming itself
into a shareholder-value corporation by adopting Economic Value Added, a popular variant of the
standard-discounted-cash-flow model, into its operating and financial strategy.  See A Star to Sail By?,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 53.  In a related article, Siemens’ controller Thomas Seeberg stated, “We
want more capital-markets influence in our management systems.”  Greg Steinmetz, Siemens AG Re-
members its Shareholders, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1998, at A17.
380. Data are derived and calculated from data in Disclosure/Worldscope CD-ROM (on file with
authors).  See generally Business in Europe, supra note 375; European Business, supra note 376.
381. See generally Business in Europe, supra note 375; European Business, supra note 376.
382. The listing occurred after months of dispute with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion regarding adoption of U.S. disclosure standards.  Soon after the U.S. listing and reporting under
U.S. GAAP standards, the company reported its first loss since World War II, a loss of nearly one bil-
lion Deutchmarks.  However, it showed a profit under German accounting rules.  Asked how the com-
pany could show a profit, its then-CEO Edzard Reuter said, “Speaking frankly, we made use of a
German accounting rule that allowed us to release reserves.”  John Schmid, Daimler Benz Reports
First Ever Loss, Reflecting New Accounting, Lower Sales, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1993, at A10.
383. Dismantling Daimler-Benz, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 1995, at 67.
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generally, reduced the number of closely held shares from 34.5 million to 26.0
million—divested the Fokker aircraft division, instituted an internal manage-
ment-control system based on the metric of return on equity, and offered its
top management stock options and bonuses linked to share-price perform-
ance.384
Daimler-Benz’s friendly merger with the Chrysler Corporation in May 1998
reveals just how far the transformation of the company has progressed.  It is
difficult to imagine that such a combination, rooted in the pursuit of scope
economies, could have occurred before 1993.  Taken together, the 1990s have
been witness to the Anglo-Americanization of the third largest German com-
pany, by market capitalization, and a stalwart of German governance.  Given
the recent changes at Siemens,385  Hoechst,386 and Deutsche Bank,387 we suspect
we may look back on the changes within Daimler-Benz as a pivotal moment in
the transformation of the German corporate governance system.388
The significant increase in merger and acquisition activity for German firms
is another sign that the governance structure of these corporations is changing
toward a more Anglo-American system.  In the United States, M&A activity
was 232% greater (60,407/26,000) in the 1990s than in the 1980s.  In compari-
son, the number of successful acquisitions of German firms grew by 1,959%
(8,246/421) over the same period.  For continental Europe as a whole, M&A ac-
                                                          
384. See id.
385. See Valuing Companies: A Star to Sail by?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 53.
Karl-Hermann Baumann, Siemens chief financial officer, says that the trains-to-telecoms gi-
ant, which will switch to EVA [Economic Value Added] in October, is now convinced that
the focusing on shareholder value is the best way to ensure its long-term prosperity.  A
growing number of other companies in Europe, Asia and Latin America, have reached the
same conclusion—and are turning to consultants offering ‘performance metrics’ to measure
how much value is being created (or destroyed).
Id.
386. See Greg Steinmetz & Matt Marshall, The Lazy Man of Europe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
1997, at A1.
About the only thing German about Hoechst AG these days is its hard-to-pronounce name.
Following massive job reductions at home last year, the world’s biggest chemicals company
now employs more people on the other side of the Atlantic than in Germany. . . .
. . . .
With global competition more intense than ever, German companies are making themselves
more international and, in many cases, more American.
Id.
387. See Industry in Germany:  Has it Changed?, ECONOMIST,  Apr. 6, 1996, at 68.
Germany’s biggest bank, Deutsche Bank, and its biggest industrial firm, Daimler-Benz, are
proposing to offer the first share-option schemes. . . .
. . .
On March 27th Veba, a conglomerate involved in energy, trading and telecoms, became the
second German company, after Daimler, to report financial performance according to
American accounting standards, which are more revealing than German ones.  A day later
Deutsche Bank used international standards to report its annual accounts for the first time,
disclosing Deutsch Marks 20 billion ($14 billion) of previously hidden reserves.
Id.
388. For more details on the transformation of Daimler Benz and its governance implication, see
Dennis E. Logue & James K. Seward, Anatomy of a Governance Transformation: The Case of Daim-
ler-Benz, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (Summer 1999).
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tivity was 1,275% greater (33,687/2,643).389 Interestingly, while the number of
successful hostile acquisitions of U.S. targets has fallen dramatically in the most
recent decade--163 between 1981 and 1989 compared to fifty-six between 1990
and 1998--the number of hostile takeovers of firms in continental Europe has
actually increased from eight to seventeen.
Finally, the number of German firms that recently have listed their shares
on the New York Stock Exchange indicates a trend toward a more Anglo-
American governance structure.  None of the eight German firms with Ameri-
can Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) currently trading on the NYSE was listed
before 1996.390
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal reflected on the changes occur-
ring in German corporations:
German banks are losing their domestic influence to a burgeoning capital market that
forces companies to heed investor wishes. A spate of cross-border mergers is giving
firms more global reach. And once-close ties among government, industry and labor
are unraveling.
. . . .
There’s no doubt Germany will remain Europe’s economic kingpin, its companies
among the world’s mightiest.  But experts say the very foundation of Europe’s power-
house, which has been envied and emulated for decades, is giving way to a new struc-
ture that borrows from a different model.
. . . .
The signs of accelerating change are everywhere.  Companies have been on a buying
spree outside Germany that is helping create stateless corporations with looser ties to
home.  The value of crossborder deals involving German companies jumped fourfold
in 1998, to $92.8 billion, according to Goldman, Sachs & Co.
. . . .
Germany is also being shaken by a profound shift of power away from banks and to-
ward broad-based equity markets.  Over the past five years Deutsche Bank has un-
loaded stakes in nine major firms and reduced investments in dozens more.
Meanwhile, the number of companies trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange has
more than tripled since 1995 to 2,244.  Sixty-four of them are young, fast-growing
firms that have listed on the exchange’s two-year-old Neuer Markt, which gives access
to capital to fledgling companies that in the past would have had difficulty prying a
loan out of banks.391
Similar changes are occurring elsewhere in Europe.  The OECD reports
that the governance systems of France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Swe-
den are moving closer to the Anglo-American model, whereas they previously
                                                          
389. See Securities Data Corporation database (program and results on file with author).
390. The eight firms are Celanese (1999), Deutsche Telekom (1996), Epcos (1999), Fresenius
Medical Care (1996), Pfeifer Vacuum (1996), SAP Aktiengesellschaft (1998), SGL Carbon (1996),
VEBA (1997).  See New York Stock Exchange  (visited Jan. 24, 2000)
<www.nyse.com/international.htm>.
391. David Woodruff, Banks’ Loss of Influence, Cross Border Mergers Force More-Global Style,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1999, at A18.
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had more closely followed the German model.392  There are significant corpo-
rate governance debates underway in France.  Many of the changes in both the
regulations and the conduct of French corporations parallel those chronicled
above for the German case.393  France is currently debating the introduction of
private-pension-funding schemes along the lines of those in the United States.
In both France and Italy, there is an increasing number of high-profile cases in
which minority shareholders are demanding and obtaining adequate rights, es-
pecially in matters concerning takeover premia.394  Norms are also being devel-
oped to limit multiple-board memberships among a small group of financial
and corporate elites.395  Perhaps most telling, since 1998, there have been five
hostile acquisitions of French companies, each with a market value in excess of
one billion dollars.396
There are other examples of this trend toward the Anglo-American system
across Europe.  In Italy, a group of U.S. and U.K. fund managers were able, by
virtue of their recently acquired majority share ownership, to successfully re-
place Carlo de Benedetti, the CEO of Olivetti SpA, due to poor perform-
ance.397  Although, in this instance, de Benedetti ultimately was able to neu-
tralize the efforts of these institutional shareholders by installing a top manager
from one of his other subsidiaries as the new CEO, the moves by the foreign in-
stitutional shareholders suggest at least the beginnings of an Anglo-American-
style battle for boardroom control in the Italian governance setting.398  Compe-
tition laws and antitrust regulations are being strengthened and more forcefully
                                                          
392. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 19.
393. The French phrase for corporate governance is “le corporate governance.”  See Allanna Sulli-
van & Thomas Kama, Continental Shift: Elf Aquitane’s Chief Illustrates the Changes in Europe’s Ex-
ecutives, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 1996, at A1.
394. For a chronicle of such cases, see Business in Europe, supra note 375, at 11-12; see also John
Tagliabue,  A Specter in Europe: Shareholders Demand Rights, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 28, 1998, at
11; France’s Boardroom Revolution,  WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1995, at A20.  For a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the corporate governance reform efforts underway, including a “Marini Report” of the French
Senate to reform the rights of minority shareholders in France, see ORGANIZATION FOR ECON.
COOPERATION AND DEV., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMIC SURVEYS: FRANCE  128-29 (1997) [hereinafter OECD FRANCE] (noting that “[o]verall,
the transition appears to have gone on the direction of shareholder (outsider) model and . . . the
French system is now closer to the Anglo-American model”).
395. This recommendation is contained in the Viénot Report, the report produced by a corporate
governance committee formed in France and headed by Marc Viénot, the CEO of Société Générale.
See OECD FRANCE, supra note 394, at 130 (summarizing the Viénot  Report and comparing it to the
so-called Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom); European Business, supra note 376, at 23
(discussing a number of corporate governance changes taking place in Europe).
396. Data are derived and calculated by the authors from the online mergers and acquisitions data-
base of the Securities Data Corporation (calculations on file with authors).
397. See John Tagliabue, Profits and Pride are at Stake for Ailing Olivetti, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,
1996, at D3.
398. See Business in Europe, supra note 375, at 11-12 (“[W]ithin a few weeks, Mr. De Benedetti was
back in power. Well, not Mr. De Benedetti exactly, but one of his lieutenants, Roberto Colan-
inno . . . .”); see also Tagliabue, supra note 397, at D3 (chronicling the Olivetti event).
BRADLEY_ETAL.FMT6 02/28/00  2:41 PM
74 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 3
applied in the European Union.399  Moreover, there are significant moves to-
ward the adoption of a common set of accounting and disclosure rules under
the International Accounting Standards.400
In Japan, financial markets were liberalized to a significant degree during
the 1980s.401  The Japanese government also recently announced new plans for
further deregulation of the banking, securities, foreign exchange, and insurance
sectors to take effect by 2001, along the lines of the “Big Bang” in London.402
Other changes are similarly underway that challenge the status quo in Japanese
corporate governance: Some keiretsu firms are reportedly beginning to sell
their stockholdings;403 the notion of lifetime employment is under serious de-
bate;404 after a few years of slowdown, 1996 saw a resurgence in the market for
mergers and acquisitions, with more than 600 deals valued at more than one
trillion yen being completed;405  a significant number of large corporations have
moved toward arms-length relations with their main banks as Japanese banks
are losing their capacity to act as enforcers of financial discipline;406 Japanese
firms have become far more dependent on international capital markets for
their global funding needs for both debt and equity, and the proportion of bank
financing to total capitalization has steadily declined during the past decade;
and the number of firms listing their shares in the Anglo-American stock mar-
kets has risen substantially during the past decade, to the point where thirty-
four percent of the largest, by market capitalization, 100 Japanese firms listed
                                                          
399. See The Irritating Commissioner, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 1998, at 72 (describing the increase in
the aggressiveness and “free market zealotry” of antitrust enforcement in the European Union under
the new Competition Commissioner).
400. See INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE INSIGHT 15 (Oct. 1997).  The International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee (“IASC”) is an international group of financial institutions, corporations, and poli-
cymakers, such as stock exchange authorities and central bankers, that has undertaken the task of
formulating a common set of accounting standards worldwide.  The Insight reports that as of the end of
1996, 56 of 67 countries that they surveyed either used the International Accounting Standards
(“IAS”) as their national standards or based their national standards primarily on IAS.  The United
States, however, has decided to continue with its own standards.  See id.
401. See Prowse, supra note 245, at 26.
402. See Laying the Charge for the Big Bang, BANKER, July 1, 1997, at 108, 108-09; see also Chang-
ing Japan: Whispering Reform, ECONOMIST,  Jan. 11, 1997, at 19, 19; see also Survey Japanese Finance,
ECONOMIST, June 28, 1997, at 2, 2-3.
403. See Stakeholder Capitalism: Unhappy Families, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 25 (noting that
“some keiretsu may have begun to unravel; under financial pressure, some partners have recently
started to sell their cross-shareholdings”); see also Japan Inc. Frays at the Edges, ECONOMIST, June 3,
1995, at 67, 67 (noting that “[a] sluggish economy is putting unprecedented pressure on the system of
cross-shareholdings that binds Japanese companies and banks together”).
404. See Stakeholder Capitalism, supra note 403, at 25 (noting that “the lifetime employment of
core workers is increasingly under threat” and that “Japanese firms are redefining ‘lifetime employ-
ment,’ pointing out that it applied only to a proportion of workers and whittling down the proportion
as much as they can”).
405. See Velisarios Kattoulas, Japan Catches Merger Fever Again, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 2,
1997, at 9.
406. See OECD GERMANY, supra note 236, at 20.
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on the Tokyo stock exchange are also now listed on either the U.S. or the U.K.
stock markets.407
The Asian economic crises that began in the latter half of 1997—with the at-
tendant economic contraction, currency depreciation, plummeting stock mar-
kets, soaring unemployment, and banking crises—affecting Japan, Thailand,
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Korea have brought into sharper fo-
cus the nature of corporate governance practices in those economies.  Numer-
ous writers, policymakers, and commentators have alluded to the opacity and
crony capitalism in the governance systems in these economies, arguing that
these attributes have exacerbated the crises, if not actually engendered them.408
Of course, it is too early to forecast just how these events will transform these
economies, their politics, laws, institutions, and corporate governance practices.
However, it is clear that these economies, like the post-communist economies
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, are in transition into a new
and uncharted governance territory.  At a minimum, these events legitimately
have raised questions about the efficacy of communitarian styles of governance
and their ability, or lack thereof, to cope with a world in which international
capital flows, globalization, and human-capital-intensive technologies have be-
come the norm.  Arguably, they also have resulted in the increasing acceptance
of the notion that the adoption of some form of contractarian governance
mechanisms in the Anglo-American tradition—with their transparent, market-
driven, shareholder-oriented styles—may be the long-term solution.
                                                          
407. Data are derived and calculated from Disclosure/Worldscope CD-ROM (on file with authors).
408. Although there have been voluminous viewpoints on the Asian economic crisis, all of it is in
the realm of the public media at the time of this writing, and, unfortunately, little has yet to appear in
the academic realm.  A sampling of some of the articles—perhaps just their headlines—colorfully re-
veals the views on the crisis.  See generally Michel Camdessus, Drawing the Appropriate Lessons from
the Asia Crisis, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 7, 1998, at 8; Michel Camdessus, Korea and Thailand Begin
to Rise as Indonesia Lags, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 6, 1998, at 10; Ron Chernow, Sayonara to Japan
Inc., WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1997, at A22; Industrial Policy Caused South Korea’s Collapse, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 8, 1997, at A24; Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., A Last Waah! For Japan’s Crybabies, WALL ST. J., Dec.
3, 1997, at A23; Shanthi Kalathil, Asia Gets a Hard Lesson in Costs of Firms’ Murky Bookkeeping,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1997, at A19; Nicholas D. Kristoff, Crisis Pushing Asian Capitalism Closer to
U.S.-Style Free Market, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1998, at A1; George Melloan, This Year’s Economic Les-
son: Japan’s Model Failed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1997, at A11; Steven Mufson, Chaebol Reform: Like
Redoing the Whole Economy, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 24, 1997, at 15; Reality Hits Japan,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 1997, at 15; Paul M. Sherer, World Bank’s Tricky Task in Thailand: Mine Into
Mountains of Corporate Debt, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 1998, at A17; South Korea: The End of the Miracle,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 29, 1997, at 21; Meredith Woo-Cummings, How Asia’s Financial Foibles Make
American Way Look Like a Winner, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A1.
For somewhat more academic viewpoints on the Asia crisis, see Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs,
The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects, HARV. INST. INT’L DEV., Apr. 20,
1998; Paul Krugman, What Happened to Asia (visited Oct. 4, 1999)
<http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html>; Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Which
Capitalism?  Lessons from the East Asian Crisis, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1998, at 40; Janet Yellen,
The Impact of the Asia Crisis on the U.S. (Address before the Council of Economic Advisors, Apr. 24,
1998).  For an impressive, and constantly updated, compendium of hundreds of articles relating to the
Asia crisis, see the web page maintained by Prof. Nouriel Roubini at the Stern Business School at New
York University (visited Oct. 4, 1999) <http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.
html>.
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A particularly compelling example of such acceptance comes from Japan.
A 1998 statement of corporate governance principles for Japan, issued by a
Corporate Governance Committee of the Corporate Governance Forum of Ja-
pan,409 derives its principles based on the primacy of creation and management
of shareholder value as the basic managerial goal and role of board independ-
ence in achieving that goal.410  The report notes that Japanese boards of direc-
tors as currently constituted have not been “equipped with sufficient govern-
ance authority or capability, while the board of auditors has been little more
than a cosmetic shell,”411 that “the board of directors tends not to have real de-
cision making power,”412 and that currently “a sufficient supply of independent
external directors does not exist in Japan.”413  It points out that “in the medium
term, the uniquely Japanese system of cross-shareholding might begin to un-
ravel, which will necessitate a system of governance more reliant on independ-
ent and external directors, in turn leading to the creation of a market for such
individuals.”414  The report argues for the creation of a U.S.-style concept of fi-
duciary duty to shareholders and implies that the current Japanese concepts of
such duty may be somewhat vague, covered as they are by legal concepts such
as bona fide loyalty duty and the duty of honest manager’s care.415
In both Continental Europe and Asia, many other such examples abound.
But the evidence presented here reveals that the evolutionary shifts underway
in both these geographic areas appear to be posing significant challenges to
their traditionally insider-oriented, stakeholder-based, relatively communitar-
ian systems of corporate governance.  Moreover, the governance systems of the
three major industrial economies of the world—the United States, Germany,
and Japan—seem to be inexorably moving toward some practical form of con-
vergence.  The nature of this movement is inarguably in the Anglo-American
direction rather than the other way around.
This conclusion is quite different from the prevailing sentiment in the litera-
ture on comparative corporate governance.  W. Carl Kester, for example, cap-
tures the prevailing sentiment quite clearly:
Since the early 1980s a kind of competition among systems of corporate governance
has emerged.  Despite the twentieth century international hegemony of first the
United Kingdom, followed by the United States, it is by no means certain that the
Anglo-American system of governance as currently configured will win this competi-
tion.416
                                                          
409. See generally CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM
OF JAPAN CORPORATE, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES: A JAPANESE VIEW (FINAL REPORT) (May 26,
1998).  The Committee, constituted in 1994, consists of 17 leading Japanese corporate executives, insti-
tutional investors, media representatives, and lawyers.  Details on the Committee, its meetings, and its
deliberations, can be found in the Report.  See id. at 33, 35.
410. See id. at 45-54.
411. Id. at 37.
412. Id. at 41.
413. Id. at 42.
414. Id.
415. See id. at 43.
416. Kester, supra note 325.
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Additionally, Kester mentions that Mark J. Roe has tied these shifts to the
political roots in their respective settings but Roe notes that it may be a mis-
take to pronounce one system as more advantageous than another.417  Andrei
Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, in a similar vein, argue that “all these econo-
mies have the essential elements of a good governance system, [and] the avail-
able evidence does not tell us which one of their governance systems is the
best.”418
Our conclusion that the economies of the world, and the corporate forms
residing therein, are evolving toward a more contractarian structure follows
from our analysis above and is rooted in the following assessment of the pur-
poses and accountability of the public corporation in an ever-changing, global
economy.
IV
THE PURPOSES AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE CORPORATION
Having identified the major forces of change that are occurring in the envi-
ronment of the contemporary corporation, reviewed the two primary para-
digms of the corporate form, and examined the two primary alternative gov-
ernance structures observed throughout the world, this article now turns to the
question of the purposes and accountability of the corporation in contemporary
society.  It concludes that the purpose of the corporation should continue to be
to maximize the value of its residual claimants—stockholders—within the con-
straints imposed by law, social norms, customs, and mores.  Furthermore, there
is no need to jettison the basic tenets of the contractarian view of the corpora-
tion to achieve this purpose.
To be sure, in its starkest manifestation, the contractarian view leaves unre-
solved several critical issues—most notably the so-called third-party effects.  As
discussed above, the fundamental underpinning of the contractarian model is
the ability of individuals to enter into enforceable contracts.  Clearly, there are
numerous situations in which neither the affected parties nor future events can
be anticipated ex ante and contracted around.  However, one should not view
the contractarian model in isolation.  Rather, it should be viewed as the founda-
tion of a corporate governance structure, augmented by rules established
through democratic processes, much like it is in the United States today.  The
plethora of legislative reforms documented above that address the rights and
welfare of individuals outside of the corporate contracting process have miti-
gated many of these third-party effects, and it is expected that future legislation
will do likewise.  There is, therefore, within the contractarian paradigm, a sepa-
                                                          
417. See W. Carl Kester, American and Japanese Corporate Governance, Convenience to Best Prac-
tice?, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY & GLOBAL CAPITALISM 107-37 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds.,
1996).  See generally Mark J. Roe, The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Winter 1997, at 19.
418. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 2, at 739.
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rate and distinct role for corporate managers on the one hand and elected gov-
ernment officials on the other.
While this preference for the contractarian view over the more communi-
tarian governance structures of Europe and Asia might seem provincial, the
emerging evidence suggests that these alternative governance structures are
evolving toward the practices observed in the United States.  There are at least
three structural, and hence possibly long-lasting, reasons why organizations in
the industrialized nations are gravitating toward the contractarian model, all
related to the inexorable development of a unified, global economy.  The first is
the ability to attract capital, particularly foreign capital.  Rafael La Porta and
others have shown that the size of external capital markets in a particular coun-
try is directly related to rules and regulations that focus on shareholder protec-
tion.419  Because shareholder welfare is at the center of the contractarian model,
it is no surprise to find that firms seeking to attract foreign investors are re-
fashioning their organizational structures in the image suggested by this para-
digm.  As further evidence of this trend, witness the revision in accounting and
reporting practices adopted by German firms seeking to have their shares listed
on the New York Stock Exchange.420
The second reason firms are migrating toward the contractarian model is
the extent of global competition in product markets.  Firms can no longer af-
ford to be content to dominate their domestic markets.  Rather, they must
compete head-to-head with international firms.  Global competition, with its
exacting form of Darwinian discipline, requires firms to be more profit-driven.
Increasingly, a contractarian governance structure is a necessary condition for
success, if not survival.
Finally, the third cause for the trend toward more contractarian firms is the
rapid pace of change in the global marketplace.  The significant corporate re-
structuring activity that has taken place during the 1980s and 1990s in corporate
America never could have taken place within the context of a communitarian-
based economy.421  The rigidities of the traditional German and Japanese gov-
ernance structures hinder adaptation to the ever-quickening changes in the
global marketplace.
These three reasons are the basis of our disagreement with the views of
Roe,422 Shleifer and Vishny,423 and Kester424 regarding the German and Japa-
nese systems of governance being not only good, but self-sustaining and sepa-
rate from the Anglo-American system.  While their arguments might be justifi-
able if all economies were autarkic, the imperatives of the new, open, global
economy are different.  The sheer depth and breadth of the global competition
                                                          
419. See generally La Porta et al., supra note 16.
420. See supra notes 381, 389-93 and accompanying text.
421. See Comment & Jarrell, supra note 342; Davis et al., supra note 342.
422. See ROE, supra note 19; Roe, supra note 233.
423. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 2.
424. See Kester, supra note 417.
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for capital, people, technologies, and products dictate that some form of a
Darwinian shakeout could well occur.425  One reasonably might argue about the
extent and the speed of the changes taking place in the other systems.  It is con-
ceded that the inertia in these systems creates frictions that hinder change, but
the direction of the change is inarguable.  This view also draws upon and is bol-
stered by the arguments of Frank H. Easterbrook that the law itself is an output
of the process of the drive toward economic efficiency, rather than the other
way around.426  In other words, the efficiencies and the contractarian impera-
tives of global competition actually may help propel changes in the underlying
legal, political, and social infrastructures in the relatively more communitarian
economies.
This belief, and even faith, in the contractarian model is not without con-
cerns, however.  Of particular concern is the absence of international institu-
tions with the authority to enforce the contracts that are the threads which keep
the fabric of the contractarian model from unraveling.  Without a worldwide
contractarian infrastructure, the promise of the Anglo-American system of
governance cannot be realized.  It speaks to the question of accountability, at
home and abroad.  These concerns are addressed in the following section.
V
VOIDS AT THE INTERSECTION OF SOVEREIGN BOUNDARIES
Contractarianism identifies to the necessary conditions for a system of cor-
porate governance.  The changes identified in Table 2 reveal the problems as-
sociated with an underdeveloped or absent contractarian infrastructure.  Four
conditions must be met to overcome these problems.  First, disclosure rules are
needed to provide all contracting parties with information that is as complete as
possible.  Second, a system of contract laws is necessary to establish the terms
of trade.  Third, an impartial judiciary is required to enforce those laws.  Fi-
nally, the entire system must be flexible and adaptive to continued changes in
business conditions.  The problem today is that the institutions that might pro-
vide such a worldwide infrastructure do not exist in most instances, or, where
they do, they are at best forums for voluntary acceptance of jurisdiction, media-
tion, and enforcement.  Thus, problems of opaque operating characteristics and
sovereign voids grow worse.
                                                          
425. This kind of broad view runs counter to a view that allows for a variety of governance practices
to flourish in local niches.  Ronald J. Gilson best articulates the opposing perspective: “It is going to be
very hard to sit at a great distance and make broad statements about the way corporate governance
should be.  Analysis has to be increasingly textured and tailored to the practical circumstances of an
industry.” Ronald J. Gilson, The Future of Corporate Governance in the United States, 31 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1459, 1465 (1997).  This view is shared in the sociology literature as well.  See Neil Fligstein &
Robert Freeland, Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives on Corporate Organization, 21 ANN. REV.
SOC. 21, 21 (1995) (“Our review of the comparative literature suggests that there is no evidence of
convergence across societies toward a single form of governance . . . . “).
426. See Frank H. Easterbrook, International Corporate Differences: Markets or Law?, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Winter 1997, at 23 (1997).
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The obvious solution to this problem is to establish a worldwide contrac-
tarian infrastructure.  What is not so obvious is how to do that.  Focusing on the
development of international trade law, Luis Olavo Baptista acknowledges the
problem and notes two paths that might lead to this result.427  The first, and
least acceptable, is to coordinate laws across systems on a case-by-case basis.
Baptista refers to this approach as the “elaboration of permanent rules.”428
Standard clauses and contracts would be applied as needed on a case-by-case
basis.  In time, a standardized infrastructure might emerge from this practice.
The problem, of course, is that this process will take time.  There are also no
guarantees that any kind of efficient and effective legal framework will evolve
from this approach.
The second approach is to work toward a harmonious integration of differ-
ing systems.429  While different, the various countries’ laws would be inspired by
similar goals.  Such treaties as WTO, and its precursor, GATT,430 Mercosur,431
the EU,432 and NAFTA433 help to establish goal congruence.
This is not to say that there has been no movement to establish interna-
tional organizations to fill these voids at the borders.  As outlined in Table 4,
there has been a proliferation of cross-border laws, treaties, conventions, etc.,
or, more generally, “instruments,” dealing with direct foreign investments in
the post-World War II era.  According to the United Nations, the twenty-four-
year period from 1947 to 1971 witnessed the creation of eighteen such instru-
ments, of which fourteen were adopted; the following twenty-five-year period
from 1972 to 1996 witnessed a tripling to fifty-five such instruments, with forty-
five adopted.434
                                                          
427. See Luis Olavo Baptista, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Law Proj-
ect: Aspects of International Private Law, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (1989) (“International trade
leads to a closer interrelationship between countries, especially in the economic sense, and thus de-
mands the security of uniform laws.”).
428. Id. at 1212.
429. See id. at 1214.
430. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194.
431. MERCOSUR is a Latin American trading bloc originally comprised of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay.  See Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic,
the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
Mar. 26, 1991, art. 1, 30 I.L.M. 1041, 1044.
432. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1, (incorporating
changes made by Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.C.C. 224/1.
433. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1902 (1), 32 I.L.M. 605.
434. See UNITED NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE AND
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 135-39 tbl.v.2 (1996).
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TABLE 4
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS* DEALING WITH
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT:
1948 TO 1996
Period Number of Multi-
lateral/Int’l In-
struments
Number of Re-
gional/Bilateral
Instruments
Number Adopted
1948-61 4 (50%) 4 (50%) 6 (75%)
1962-71 2 (20%) 8 (80%) 8 (80%)
1972-81 12 (52%) 11 (48%) 16 (70%)
1982-96 15 (47%) 17 (53%) 29 (91%)
Totals 33 (45%) 40 (55%) 59 (81%)
* “Instruments” include Codes, Conventions, Charters, Agreements, Treaties, Rules,
U.N. Resolutions, Declarations, and Principles.
Source: UNITED NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRADE,
AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 135-39 tbl.v.2 (1996).
The third solution is to move toward unification.  The trend toward codify-
ing international law is now almost one hundred years old.435  The Hague Con-
ference on Private International Law has been meeting since 1893.436  While no
supranational body can draft and enforce such unified laws without co-
operation from sovereign nations, the United Nations has taken significant
steps toward addressing the problem.  The U.N. General Assembly established
the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) in 1966.437
                                                          
435. See Franco Ferrari, Defining the Sphere of Application of the 1994 “UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts,” 69 TUL. L. REV. 1225 (1995).
436. See generally K. Lipstein, One Hundred Years of Hague Conferences on Private International
Law, 42 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 553 (1993); Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Conference Celebrates Its 100th
Anniversary, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 531 (1993).
437. The U.N. General Assembly established UNCITRAL in 1966 by the passage of Resolution
2205 (XXI).  G.A. Res. 2205, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 99, U.N. Doc. A/6394/Add.
1/Add. 2 (1966).  UNCITRAL is a formal committee of the United Nations and is composed of repre-
sentatives from 36 nations.  It is the United Nations’ primary legal committee in the field of interna-
tional trade law.  Among other things, UNCITRAL drafts model laws, holds international conventions
on topics related to international trade law, and publishes legal guidelines.  UNCITRAL has an im-
pressive list of projects that have since been published in brochures or legal guides.  Convention on the
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UNCITRAL was formed to facilitate the “progressive harmonization and uni-
fication of the law of international trade.”438
The key UNCITRAL project in the field of international contracting is the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). 439
CISG presents a comprehensive code governing contracts for the international
sale of goods, analogous to an international version of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.440  Currently, at least fifty-seven countries have ratified the Conven-
tion.441  Other developoments include the Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts
(“CLOUT”), a reporter of UNCITRAL-based cases from around the world.
                                                          
Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, June 14, 1974, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-10 (1980)
1151 U.N.T.S. 99; Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, entered into force Jan.
1, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea,
entered into force  Nov. 1, 1992, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Liability of Operators of Trans-
port Terminals in International Trade, Apr. 19, 1991, 30 ILM 1503 (1991) (not yet in force); Conven-
tion on International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, Dec. 9, 1988, 28 ILM 170
(1989) (not yet in force); Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, Dec.
11, 1995, 35 ILM 735 (1996); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985); UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/384 (1992); UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction, and Serv-
ices, with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser. A (1995); UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442 (1997); UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/XXX IX/CRP. 1/add. B (1996) (1996); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SR.178 (1976); UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules adopted and reprinted by G.A. Res. 35/52,
U.N. GAOR 35th Sess. Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/35/17 (1980); UNCITRAL Notes on Organizing Ar-
bitral Proceedings, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.11 (1996); UNCITRAL Legal Guide on International Coun-
tertrade Transactions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser.B/31 (1993); UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Drawing Up
International Contracts for the Construction of Industrial Works, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser.B/2 (1988);
UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/Ser.B/1 (1987).  See
UNCITRAL (last modified Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.uncitral.org>.  It contains the actual text of
UNCITRAL’s model laws and other projects and is fairly informative about the general scope and
aims of UNCITRAL.  See also John D. Franchini, International Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Ar-
bitration Rules: A Contractual Provision for Improvement, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223, 2224-26 (1994).
438. G.A. Res. 2205, supra note 437, at 42, 43; see also Franchini, supra note 437, at 2224-25.
439. At the Vienna Convention in 1980, UNCITRAL presented CISG which entered into force in
1988 when the United States, China, and Italy ratified the convention.  See Harold S. Burman, Building
on the CISG: International Commercial Law Developments and Trends for the 2000’s, 17 J.L. & COM.
355 (1998).
440. The actual textual provisions of CISG can be accessed at the UNCITRAL website: “This Con-
vention establishes a comprehensive code of legal rules governing the formation of contracts for the
international sale of goods, the obligations of the buyer and seller, remedies for breach of contract, and
other aspects of the contract.”  UNCITRAL (last modified Apr. 20 1999) <http://www.uncitral.org>.
See generally Paul Amato, Recent Development: CISG: U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods—the Open Price Term and Uniform Application: An Early Interpretation by the
Hungarian Courts, 13 J.L. & COM. 1 (1993); V. Susanne Cook, From the Perspective of the Practitioner,
17 J.L. & COM. 343 (1998); Lisa M. Ryan, The Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Divergent Interpretations, 4 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99 (1995); Richard E. Speidel, Sympo-
sium—The Impact of Internationalization of Transnational Commercial Law: The Revision of UCC Ar-
ticle 2, Sales in Light of The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 165 (1995).
441. The UNCITRAL website contains a current list of all countries that have ratified.  See
UNCITRAL, supra note 440.  Some of the nations that are parties to the Convention signed with res-
ervations.  CISG is limited to contracts for the sale of goods, yet it has the force of law in countries
where it has been adopted.  In the United States, CISG is a federal treaty and, as such, preempts state
Uniform Commercial Code laws.  CISG preempts the Uniform Commercial Code whenever foreign
parties whose nations have ratified the convention contract for the sale of goods.  See Speidel, supra
note 440, at 166-67.
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The goal is for CLOUT to serve as suggested interpretations for judges, arbitra-
tors, and attorneys in countries that have ratified the Convention.442
Perhaps the most significant development to date, from a corporate govern-
ance standpoint, has been UNCITRAL’s role in the development of cross-
border insolvency laws.443  The UNCITRAL Model on Cross-Border Insol-
vency (“Model Law”), developed in 1997, attempts to move away from the tra-
ditional notion of territoriality to that of universality in jurisdictions.444  The
Model Law currently is receiving serious consideration in both the legislative
and executive branches of the U.S. government.  There is a bill to reform U.S.
bankruptcy laws pending in the U.S. Congress.  The bill incorporates the provi-
sions of the Model Law, and the U.S. Treasury has endorsed the changes.445
                                                          
442. See UNCITRAL, supra note 440. Some evidence indicates that CLOUT acts primarily as a
source of information but fails to create the necessary legal obligations to fully harmonize decisions
under CISG.  See Hannu Honka, Harmonization of Contract Law Through International Trade: A
Nordic Perspective, 11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 111, 179 (1996).
443. UNCITRAL opted to draft a model law rather than a convention because of concerns that a
convention would not be ratified.  This fear likely is based on the failed efforts of both the Council of
Europe at the Istanbul Convention in 1990 and the European Union Convention of Insolvency Pro-
ceedings.  Neither of these conventions on cross-border insolvency were ratified.  Thus, UNCITRAL
drafted a model law instead, allowing countries to enact the Model Law exactly as drafted or in a
modified form.  See Andre J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A
Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 316-18 (1998).
444. The territoriality view holds that the ramifications of an insolvency proceeding do not extend
beyond the boundaries of the nation wherein the insolvency proceeding was opened.  When the assets
of insolvent debtors are located in a number of different countries, this problem necessitates a separate
insolvency proceeding in each country and the appointment of a number of different liquidators.  It is
also possible that the claim may be recognized in one proceeding but refused in another.  Moreover,
small creditors may find it too costly to file a claim abroad.  On the other hand, the universality view
calls for only one proceeding to administer all assets, wherever they are located.  Under this view, in-
solvency proceedings in one country are fully recognized in other countries.  See Berends, supra note
443, at 313-14; see also Burman, supra note 439, at 357-58.
445. See Burman, supra note 439, at 358.  The Bankruptcy Reform Act before Congress as section
601 incorporates the Model Law as part of the proposed amendment.  The Model Law is to become
Chapter 6 to Title 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998).  Currently, another
bipartisan bill is under consideration as H.R. 833.  This bill is identical to the Conference Report on
H.R. 3150.  See ABI Testifies on Bankruptcy Reform Bill, 1999 AM. BANKR. JNL. LEXIS 32 (1999).
John Barrett, the United States delegate to the UNCITRAL committee that drafted the Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency, believes that the Bankruptcy Reform Act will pass through the Senate.  He
acknowledges that “there is controversy with other aspects of the bill that may require amending.
[However] this is not likely to affect the Model Law provisions.”  John A. Barrett, Various Legislative
Attempts with Respect to Bankruptcies Involving More than One Country, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 557, 557
(1998).  A working group of the U.S. Treasury attributes the following advantages to the Model Law:
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, once enacted, could be useful in
the following ways.  Among other things, it creates a procedural mechanism that would allow
for the imposition of a creditor moratorium protecting the international assets of a firm un-
dergoing insolvency proceedings; provides a foreign representative with access to local insol-
vency proceedings; provides a transparent regime for foreign creditors to commence, or par-
ticipate in, insolvency proceedings in a given state; and permits courts in a given state to
cooperate more effectively with foreign courts.  Rules on cross-border insolvency and recog-
nition of foreign proceedings should enable better coordination in the case of multi-
jurisdictional insolvencies and thus facilitate more orderly workouts as well as allow countries
to be better prepared for the increased incidence of cross-border insolvencies stemming from
the expansion of global trade and investment.
Report of the Working Group on International Financial Crises (last modified Oct. 1998)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/g22-wg3.htm>.  For a background on the problem of cross-
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These developments are quite impressive, given that they have occurred so
soon after the creation of the Model Law.
Such attempts at cross-border integration of laws are not restricted to gov-
ernments and multilateral institutions.  Private organizations also have shown
significant interest in international contracting.  The International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”),446 founded in 1926, created a
set of principles for cross-border commercial contracting in 1994.  The
UNIDROIT principles represent the most recent and ambitious attempt to
provide an example of unified contract terms that can be employed worldwide.
It remains to be seen if UNIDROIT’s ambitions will be fulfilled.
Although developments such as UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT are signifi-
cant steps forward, the problems that remain and the new ones that will arise
cannot be minimized.  Consider, for example, the attempts to harmonize corpo-
rate law in the European Union.  Despite impressive convergence on a host of
economic and political issues, including moving toward the adoption of a com-
mon currency, members of the European Union have been mired in discussions
and disputes for almost a quarter century on the question of adoption of an
E.U.-wide corporate law.  Similarly, scholars have long argued for the creation
of a WTO-type cross-national body for the supervision of multinational corpo-
rations and for the creation of a uniform set of corporate standards worldwide,
but to little avail.447  Nationalism typically stymies such efforts.448
                                                          
border insolvency, see Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (1997).
446. See UNIDROIT, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994).  See also E. Allan Farnsworth,
An International Restatement: The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 26 U.
BALT. L. REV. 1 (1997); Ferrari, supra note 435, at 1228 n.23.  It is interesting to note that E. Allan
Farnsworth, reporter for the Restatement Second of Contracts, was the United States’s delegate to
UNCITRAL and a member of the working group that drafted CISG.  He was also the only American
member of UNIDROIT’s governing council and participated in drafting the UNIDROIT Principles.
Farnsworth comments that the UNIDROIT Principles borrowed very extensively from CISG, much
more than either CISG or the UNIDROIT Principles borrowed from the Uniform Commercial Code.
See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, The American Provenance of the UNIDROIT Principles, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 1985 (1998); Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129 (1998); Michael Joachim Bonell, The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: Why? What? How?, 69 TUL. L. REV.
1121 (1995); Alejandro M. Garro, The Gap-Filling Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International
Sales Law: Some Comments on the Interplay Between the Principles and the CISG, 69 TUL. L. REV.
1149 (1995); Sarah Howard Jenkins, Exemption for Nonperformance: UCC, CISG, UNIDROIT Princi-
ples–A Comparative Assessment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 2015 (1998); Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren, Conflict of
Law Aspects of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 69 TUL. L. REV.
1239 (1995); Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts: Sphere of Application and General Provisions, 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 381 (1996);
Hernany Veytia, The Requirement of Justice and Equity in Contracts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1191 (1995);
Ferrari, supra note 435; Baptista, supra note 427.
447. See generally Paul M. Goldberg & Charles P. Kindleberger, Toward a GATT for Investment: A
Proposal for the Supervision of the International Corporation, 2 LAW & POL’Y  INT’L BUS. 295 (1970);
Peter Hansen & Victoria Aranda, An Emerging International Framework for Transnational Corpora-
tions, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 881 (1990-91).
448. For an impassioned plea for American protectionism in the face of global free trade, see
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE GREAT BETRAYAL 288 (1998).  The essays by Robert Boyer, The Con-
vergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization But Still the Century of Nations?, in NATIONAL DI-
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It also should be pointed out that if international law does not step in to fill
the void, firms must do it themselves, not only through alliances and joint ven-
tures, but also with some sort of bonding mechanism.  In other words, firms
may have to create the enforcement rules, mechanisms, and incentives them-
selves, a prospect that may not be altogether appealing.  Variants of such
mechanisms conceivably could include the more odious forms of enforcement
(for example, Mafia-style control mechanisms) that are currently observed in
settings where the contractarian infrastructure is still evolving or absent.449
VI
CONCLUSION
This article began with the recognition that most research on corporate
governance is of a cross-sectional nature and derives from the rather limited
view that good corporate governance simply requires solving an agency prob-
lem between the firm and its capital providers as mediated by its top manage-
ment.  It discussed the need not only for a time-series approach, but also for an
enlargement of the relevant set of corporate constituencies on which govern-
ance attention must focus if the ability of firms to adjust to the ever-changing
environment in which they operate is to be fully understood.  Evidence was
presented of a host of recent changes in the corporate form and its environment
that have had a significant impact on the conduct of business, and it was con-
cluded that the contemporary challenges facing managers and directors are un-
like any they have faced before.  These changes pose a number of discrete
challenges to corporate governance.  The very nature of the firm, its purposes,
and its accountability to society are all in question.
These challenges have rekindled an age-old debate about the purposes and
accountability of the firm.  Both sides in the contractarian versus communitar-
ian debate believe that a firm can and should be a source of wealth and well-
being for society.  The question is not about the ultimate purpose of the firm
but rather about how the firm should fulfill its purpose or, indeed, repay its
debt to society.  This article concludes that contractarianism provides neces-
sary, but not sufficient, conditions to govern the business enterprise.  It is nec-
essary to impose constraints on the system to control what have been called
third-party effects and to adopt a worldwide contractarian enforcement infra-
structure to overcome the voids at the intersection of sovereign boundaries.
                                                          
VERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 29-59 (Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996), and Robert
Wade, Globalization and Its Limits: Reports on the Death of the National Economy Are Greatly Exag-
gerated, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY, supra, at 60-88, make the case that the nation-state is still a signifi-
cant economic actor in an era of globalization.  Indeed, they argue that the idea of economic and insti-
tutional convergence toward some ideal equilibrium is naive and denies the possibility of local
equilibria born of the interests of the nation-state.
449. This is true in the former Soviet Union.  See Criminals as Insurance Salesmen, ECONOMIST,
July 18, 1995, at 52, 52; see also, Floyd Norris, The Russian Way of Corporate Governance, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1999, at A22.
BRADLEY_ETAL.FMT6 02/28/00  2:41 PM
86 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 3
There are at least three limitations to understanding corporate governance
in this light.  First, there is a glaring lack of evidence on whether and how
communitarian structures of governance affect firm performance or stake-
holder claims.  Perhaps this is not surprising.  Because much of the empirical
research has been conducted in the contractarian context of U.S. corporations,
these research agendas cannot, by design, address the larger questions sur-
rounding the effectiveness and efficiency of contractarianism versus communi-
tarianism.  Second, while the vast majority of research on corporate governance
sits squarely within the contractarian paradigm, it is almost entirely focused on
governance relationships manifest within the firm.  Because this work typically
focuses on U.S. firms or firms in the world’s other leading economies, it ap-
pears to take for granted the contractarian infrastructure that provides con-
tracting information, monitoring, and enforcement capabilities.  This is a mis-
take.  Research on the evolution of these institutional contexts themselves is
needed.  Left unchecked, the community of scholars who study corporate gov-
ernance may miss the essence of many governance problems.  By focusing on
governance challenges as they are revealed within firms, scholars may inadver-
tently investigate only symptoms of a more fundamental problem, a problem
rooted not within the firm but rather in the firm’s institutional environment.
The final limitation of contemporary governance work implicates the limits
of the contractarian paradigm itself.  Even if an efficient and adaptive world-
wide contractarian infrastructure could be established, and even if any atten-
dant agency costs could be ameliorated, stakeholder abuse may be manifest in
some form.  The deepest challenge then is to find a way to enact communitar-
ian sentiments in a contractarian world.
